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2Abstract
This thesis aims to provide an explanation for the causes of existence of many low 
capitalised companies (LCCs) listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The main theoretical 
framework for the thesis is derived from the agency conflicts approach. The agency model 
examines the relationship between managers and owners and determines managerial effort in a 
contractual arrangement under asymmetric information.
Given the developing nature of the financial and industrial structure in India, the 
agency conflicts between the different claimants take a different form as compared to that 
suggested in the traditional agency literature, which is oriented towards developed market 
economies. Accordingly, the inherent governance structures, which are specific to India and 
changes initiated by financial reforms of the early 1990s, make a strong case for agency theory 
to be used as a tool to investigate the peculiarity of Indian stock markets. The dynamics of 
agency conflicts inherent in the firm structure influences all decisions made in the firm, i.e. 
debt-equity ratio, dividend policy. It then becomes important to study the impact of the firm’s 
structure 011 its outstanding equity. This thesis is an attempt at analysing the low average 
market capitalisation of the BSE from the point of view of owner-managerial behaviour 
capacitating financial decision-making i.e. how the decision-making of the owner-managers 
affect the value of the outstanding stock.
The existence of many LCCs on the BSE can be analysed by the simple "entry and 
exit" model of firms into the low capitalised category of the stock market. Among other 
reasons the entry of firms into BSE was facilitated by relaxation of many stringent 
bureaucratic policies towards new firms making their maiden public issues. Survival of a firm 
depends on its performance in the real market and effective monitoring is required to sustain 
both performance in the market and any improvements thereof. An LCC can move to a 
different capitalisation category through internal growth and takeovers or mergers. LCCs on 
the BSE face not only an ineffective outside monitoring (outside shareholders and debt 
holders) but also non-existent market "exit" mechanisms of takeovers or mergers. Most of the 
LCCs have exited from the stock exchange through de-listing (if firms fail to pay the listing 
fees and abide by the rules of the exchange) by SEBI, the regulatory authority. This 
corroborates to the insufficiency of the market mechanisms of "exit" in changing the status 
quo of LCCs. This thesis explores the causes behind the non-existent mechanisms of "exit" for 
LCCs.
This thesis proposes that lack of exit mechanisms stem from a market for lemons 
syndrome. Effective monitoring from outside stakeholders i.e. diffused shareholders is non­
existent because of the free rider problem. Whereas block debt holders base their monitoring 
on the relative position of a particular firm in their portfolio or the importance of a firm to the 
block debt holder determines the extent of monitoring. Lack of an effective outside monitoring 
is manifested in the dividend policy, which reflects accumulation of free cash flow used for 
the personal benefit of owner-managers. Lack of effective monitoring and exit mechanisms 
have led to the existence of many LCCs and them continuing in the similar status for a long 
period of time. These hypotheses were established with the help of an interview-based survey 
of managers working for these firms as well as econometric analysis of their financial data.
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Chapter-1 
The Stock Exchange, Mumbai
1. 1 INTRODUCTION:
The recent east Asian economic crisis has shown that even highly successful 
economies with high economic growth rates can suffer if  there are fundamental flaws in 
corporate, financial and governance systems. For a large majority of developing countries 
including India, the last decade was characterised by considerable deregulation, 
privatisation, internal and external liberalisation of product markets as well as extensive 
financial liberalisation. This has meant that some version of the Anglo saxon model of 
corporate, financial and governance systems has been adopted by many of these 
developing countries. One of the structural characteristics which have been criticised for 
the east Asian crisis is the nature of corporate finance. Although India has been quite 
immune to the fall out in east Asia, there are important lessons that it needs to learn in 
order not to face the same grief.
The interface between capital markets and firms provides avenues of performance 
monitoring by a number of agents under a variety of circumstances, depending on the 
firm’s financial policies. Differences in the financial policies of films (the formulation, 
implementation and adaptation of corporate strategy) lead to differences in financial 
preferences on the part of investors and may result in a variety of systemic outcomes. 
“Insider” systems1 are considered superior at implementing policies that require strong 
relations with a number of different stakeholders. “Outsider” systems2 are better at 
responding to market driven change (Sarkar et al., 1998). But a hybrid o f these two
1 Characterised by greater concentration o f shareholder power with banks, families and the other films.
2 Characterised by diversified equity ownership and less involvement of lending institutions.
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systems in India seem to be dominated by their respective disadvantages rather than their 
advantages, the next chapters provide evidence to this statement.
Performance monitoring by different constituents of the capital market is, in 
principle, a key element in influencing overall “corporate governance”. The interaction 
among competition, governance and performance of firms is strong although the existing 
literature does not provide sufficient evidence to support a conclusive basis for any policy 
decisions (Mayer, 1996). Corporate governance has become a subject of active academic 
and policy debate throughout the world, although in the UK and US, there is much 
discussion of the deficiencies of the market system in delivering effective governance.
This thesis tries to analyse one particular element of apparent market failure in the 
governance o f firms in the developing country context of India. Specifically this thesis 
tries to illuminate why such a large number of veiy low market-capitalised companies 
(LCCs) continue to exist in listings on Indian stock exchanges, i.e. why the entiy of LCCs 
on capital markets is so facile while exit is so rare. The reasons of this phenomenon could 
be due to both a priori structural and incentive deficiencies and/or empirical failures of 
the market in permitting the phenomenon to persist and recur. The presence of such a 
phenomenon indicates structural, policy and regulatory shortcomings in the Indian capital 
market which bear examination and rectification. Using empirical analysis and personal- 
interview-based survey of managers of the LCCs, the thesis points to possible causes of 
market failure in inducing sufficient and effective corporate governance. Persistence of 
ineffective corporate governance leads to too many firms remaining in a low market- 
capitalisation trap over a long period of time. This not only reduces overall market 
capitalisation of Indian stock markets, it also diminishes their quality.
14
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows, Section 1.2 deals with a 
description of the Bombay Stock exchange, the premier stock exchange of India, Section
1.3 outlines the objectives of this study while Sections 1.4 and 1.5 provide an analytical 
and overall structure for the thesis.
1. 2 INDIAN STOCK MARKETS (BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE):3
A discussion of the Indian Stock Markets, requires tobe preceded by an outline of 
some of the key features of the Indian financial system. The Indian financial system is 
characterised by relatively small, highly imperfect stock markets, a very large number of 
medium and small firms, and a banking cum long term “development financing” 
institutional system which lends large amounts to companies but does not have the kind 
of close or inter-corporate ties with firms (Cobham and Subhramanyam, 1998) that bank 
dominated systems in Germany, Japan and Korea for example have had. Between 1950- 
85, the main feature of the industrial funding pattern in India was the significant usage of 
debt4 (owed to banks and other institutions i.e., not “marketable” debt). The major 
Financial Institutions (FIs) in India played a highly significant role in funding corporate 
growth, during a period when equity markets had not evolved to their current dominant 
status. The investment made by the FIs in terms of both debt and equity in public and 
private industrial corporations was veiy high. The eventual transformation towards 
market-based equity financing was consciously brought about by different government
3 Bombay Stock Exchange has been renamed as Stock Exchange, Mumbai, but the old and more widely 
recognised name o f Bombay Stock Exchange is used throughout this thesis.
4 Financial Institutions (FIs) provided credit at relatively stable lending rates during the 1980s. The prime- 
lending rate o f the major FIs duiing the 1980s was 14% whereas the regular short-term lending rates o f  
commercial banks were between 16 and 19.5%. Inflation rates based on the Wholesale Price Index were 
between 4.5% and 8% during the period. Although the GDP deflator was higher, and was between 6.5%- 
9.3%, real interest rates on non-concessional loans were positive. The fiscal system also encouraged debt 
finance over equity; as a result Indian firms have been highly leveraged and dependent on the FIs for their 
investment needs (Srivastava and Schiantarelli, 1997).
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policies5 occurring from the mid 1980s onward and accelerating after the 1991-92 crisis. 
In India as in many other developing economies, the State has been active in promoting 
the growth o f the stock markets (Singh, 1993).
Indian stock markets are many and varied. India currently has 2 national and 23 
regional stock exchanges and an over-the-counter market, which are recognised by the 
Government under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. The two national 
stock exchanges are both located in Mumbai. The regional stock exchanges are located in 
other primary and secondary cities in India, including Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, 
Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Bangalore. All these stock exchanges function under the 
regulation o f the Ministry of Finance and Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). 
By any comparative standard for emerging markets Indian stock markets have a very 
large base of shareholders6 (the retail equity investor population increased from about 2 
million in 1980 to around 25 million in 1996-97, while the number o f retail investor 
accounts that the mutual fund industry manages is estimated at around 50 million). Retail 
investors are currently serviced by about 6500 brokers and 150,000 intermediaries, 
including sub-brokers, and investment advisors (Roy et al., 1997).
The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), which forms the focal point o f this study, is 
the oldest in Asia as well as the largest in hidia (Price, 1994). BSE accounts for nearly 
70% of daily turnover and for 75% of total market capitalisation in India. It was 
established in 1875 as "The Native Share and Stockbrokers Association" and is a 
voluntary non-profit making association. The Exchange has evolved over the years into 
its present status as one of the two premier Stock Exchanges in the country. At present
5 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and other fiscal measures (see Chapter-2 ),
6 India has the third largest investor base in the world after the USA and Japan (Roy et al., 1997).
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there are over 6,000 companies listed on the BSE; a very high number of listed 
companies compared to any other emerging or developed market.7
Yet, although the secondary market in BSE is characterised by voluminous 
trading, that volume is highly concentrated in just a few issues. Trading in the shares of 
50 companies, out of the 6000 listed (with a total market capitalisation o f about Rs. 2.5 
trillion), accounts for over 80% of market turnover. More recently about 65% of trading 
volume has been concentrated in just 10 scrips. The market is afflicted by outdated and 
inefficient floor trading practices, which are opaque. Broker behaviour is severely 
inimical to the market’s integrity and to the interests of all other market participants (CR 
1992, Gupta 1990).
But given the large number of listed companies, the average market capitalisation 
of BSE is inefficiently low (because of a very large proportion o f firms with extremely 
low market capitalisation as shown in table 1.1) compared to other emerging markets; 
which have far fewer number of firms listed on their stock markets. Under a process of 
gradual reform initiated in the early 1980s,8 market capitalisation has been steadily 
increasing9 along with the number of companies listed on the stock market.
7 USA lias the largest number o f companies listed on its stock exchanges followed by India and the BSE.
8 The first step towards decontrol and deregulation was taken in 1982 with the decontrol o f  cement 
companies and prices. Although that decade did not witness major changes in the financial system, it 
started a period o f gradual change towards decontrol and deregulation. But growing public concern about 
the need to reform stock markets led the government to set up a committee in May 1984 under G.S. Patel. 
The Committee submitted its final report to the government in June 1986, suggesting a radical and 
exhaustive set o f recommendations for the primary and secondary markets. Since then the government has 
managed to implement a few not-so-important recommendations like the cost o f raising fresh capital and 
increasing the marketable lot o f shares o f new companies to a uniform number of 100. The other 
suggestions o f this committee were; a uniform structure and organisation for all stock exchanges, closer 
supervision of the day-to-day functioning of the stock market, broad-based membership o f the stock 
exchanges, computerisation o f dealings in securities, strict curbs on insider-trading and simple transfer 
procedures. Very few o f these recommendations were implemented until 1998, when dematerialisation was 
introduced along with changes in settlement systems and periods. The Patel report remains among the more 
exhaustive and visionary documents produced on reforming India’s capital markets.
See T able-1.2.
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Table 1,1; Proportion o f LCCs in BSE:
Year No. o f listed companies No. o f LCCs Proportion o f LCCs
1991 2556 2158 .8442
1992 2781 2383 .8568
1993 3263 2865 .8780
1994 4413 3815 .8644
1995 5389 4791 .8890
1996 5999 5401 .9003
1997 5843 5245 .8976
1998 5860 5262 .8979
Note: Tlie proportion of LCCs was derived by subtracting the number of companies which are part o f stock market 
based indices like BSE Sensex, BSE National Index, BSE-100 Index, BSE-200, BSE-500, S&P Mid Cap. All these 
indices have overlapping listed companies and there is no specific index for the LCCs.
A round o f deeper financial reforms triggered by the severe financial crisis of 
1991-9210 has resulted in a major increase in the market capitalisation o f the BSE (which 
represents about 75% of the total market capitalisation of the country) has quadrupled 
from Rs. 1.1 trillion at the end o f 1990-91 to Rs. 4.64 trillion at the end o f 1996-97. By 
1998, 9,833 companies were listed on all the stock exchanges in India, compared to 
9,89011 companies listed at the end of 1996-97. The total market capitalisation of 
companies listed on the BSE (5,85312 companies listed on BSE in 1998) was Rs. 5.60 
trillion as on March 31, 1998, indicating a rise of 20.78% from its 1996-97 level of Rs.
10 A Committee on (Reforms of the Financial System, 1991) headed by Mr. Narasimham set out the 
rationale of the 1991-92 financial sector reforms. It submitted its report on Dec. 1991 which put forward a 
set o f recommendations dealing with various aspects o f the functioning o f the financial system i.e. 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector conceding operational freedom and flexibility to it 
through regulation and supervision in a free financial environment. Capital market reforms in the period 
1992-93 to 1996-97 include:
• Allowing direct stock investments by institutions,
• Permitting private sector mutual funds to be established,
• Scrapping o f the Office o f Controller o f Capital Issues (CCI) that regulated the issuance o f stocks and
debentures,
• Establishment of SEBI as a regulator o f the capital market,
• Allowing companies to access international capital markets through Euro Issues.
Firm level reforms included;
• Compulsory disclosure o f material facts and specific risk factors associated with their projects while 
making public issues,
• Mandatory filing o f annual statements disclosing end use o f funds by companies raising funds from the 
capital market,
• Underwriting by the issuer has been made optional to reduce costs o f issue.
11 Includes companies listed in the OTC market.
12 Excludes companies listed in the OTC market.
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4.63 trillion. As a percentage of GDP, movement in market capitalisation lias been more 
erratic, but this ratio has also been rising (SEBI Report, 1998).
Table 1.2: Performance o f Indian Stock Markets.
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Trading Val (Rs. bn.) 626.81 572.72 675.15 854.14 724.40 3398.44 5764.83
Mkt. Cap/GDP 19% 27% 38% 42% 39% 34% 33%
Traded Val/GDP 10% 8% 9% 9% 6% 27% 40%
Traded Val/Mkt.Cap 51% 31% 22% 21% 16% 77% 122%
Source: SEBI Annual Report, 1998.
In Tables — 1.3 and 1.4 emerging markets have been listed by the size of their 
market capitalisation. They highlight the very low market capitalisation when expressed 
as an average per company.
Table 1.3: Comparison o f Indian Stock Market Capitalisation and Turnover ratios with other Emerging and 
Developed markets.____________ ______________ ______________________________ ______________ _______
Countries Mkt. Cap. 
($ bn)
Turnover 
ratio13 (%)
Value Traded Mkt. Cap. 
($ bn)
Turnover 
ratio (%)
Value
Traded
1998 1991
Similar Markets
India 105.2(21) 55.2(27) 64498(19) 47.7 50.9 24295
Korea 114.6(20) 28.9(48) 137859(17) 96.4 85464
Mexico 91.8(25) 27.3(46) 33841(28) 98.2 32.3 31723
Malaysia 98.5(23) 9.1(64) 6805 58.7 10657
Singapore 94.5(24) 50.5(33) 50735(23) 47.6 37.9 18074
Larger Markets
US 13451.3(1) 106.2(10) 13148480(1) 4087.6 534.4 2183910
Japan 2495.7(2) 40.3(35) 948522(4) 3130.8 100.7 315279
UK 2374.3(3) 53.4(30) 1167382(3) 987.9 100.8 995939
Taiwan 260.0(14) 323(1) 884698(5) 124.8 292.5 365232
Brazil 160.9(18) 70.4(21) 146594(16) 42.8 31.2 13373
Smaller Markets
Austria 34106(37) 47.4(34) 16566(32) 7689 - 7039
Thailand 34903(36) 71(19) 20734(31) 35815 64.5 23119
Pakistan 5418 111.1(9) 9102(39) 7387 155.3 11476
Sri Lanka 1705 14.8(53) 281 1936 16.0 311
Bangladesh 1034 61.7(25) 793 269 142.7 384
Note: Numbers in the brackets show the world rankings.
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Market Fact book, 1999, P. No. 15-17, 20-23.
13 The ratio o f total value traded for the period to average market capitalisation in local currency. Average 
market capitalisation is the mean o f the end-of-period market capitalisation o f the prior and current periods.
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Table 1.4: Number o f Listed Domestic Companies. (End of period levels)
Countries No. o f Domestic Listed Companies
Similar Markets 1998 1991
India 5860(2) 2556
Korea 748(13) 183
Mexico 194 209
Malaysia 736(15) 321
Singapore 321(25) 166
Larger Markets
US 8450(1) 6742
Japan 2416(4) 2107
UK 2399(5) 1623
Taiwan 437(22) 221
Brazil 527(20) 570
Smaller Markets
Austria 96 105
Thailand 418(24) 276
Pakistan 773(12) 542
Sri Lanka 233(38) 178
Bangladesh 208 138
Source: Emerging Stock Markets Fact book, International Finance Corporation, 1999.
With almost similar levels of market capitalisation, the number of domestic 
companies listed in Korea, Mexico, Singapore, or Malaysia is far fewer than the number 
in India. The tables below also show the world ranking of the BSE in terms of market 
capitalisation (rank 20) and number of domestic companies listed (rank 2) in 1998. The 
comparison between 1991 and 1998 in these tables highlights increases in these two 
measures after the 1991-92 financial reforms that took place in India. So the BSE 
portrays an unusual situation in that with very low market capitalisation, a large number 
of existing as well as new companies have resorted to new market-based equity issues14 
to finance the growth o f their net assets as shown in tables 1.5 and 1.6.
14 Between 1994-1998, capital raised through the primary market declined (due to recessionary conditions 
in the economy) as shown in Table 1.5. But it showed an increase in 1998-99. The total amount of capital 
raised during 1998-99 horn the primary capital market was Rs. 55.8 bn., which is 22.24 % higher than the 
amount o f Rs. 45.7 bn. mobilised in 1997-98. While the amount o f capital mobilised increased during 
1998-99, the number of firms entering the market declined substantially from 111 in 1997-98 to 58 in 
1998-99. This indicates that companies on an average made issues o f a size considerably larger than that in 
the previous year. In 1997-98, the proportion of rights issues in total issues increased by more than three 
times over 1996-97. The over-pricing of issues following the introduction of free pricing and decline in the 
market prices o f those same issues had an adverse impact on the primary market (SEBI Annual Report, 
1998). At the same time, the number o f IPOs has also declined. The proportion o f IPOs in total issues has
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Table 1.5: Capital Raised in the Indian Primary Market.
Year Book value of the Issues (Rs. Bn.) No. of Issues (Public and Rights 
Issues)
1994-95 276.32 1692
1995-96 208.03 1725
1996-97 142.76 882
1997-98 45.70 111
1998-99 55.86 58
Source: SEBI Annual Report, 1999.
Table 1.6: Proportion o f Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Indian Public Issues.
Year No. o f IPOs Book value of the Issues (Rs. Bn.)
1996-97 715 59.50
1997-98 52 10.47
1998-99 18 4.04
Source: SEBI Annual Report, 1999.
On turnover, BSE is ranked 27th of the world markets. This turnover ratio is a 
measure of liquidity. All the markets which are similar to BSE in terms of market 
capitalisation tend to lack liquidity. When ranked by turnover ratios their relative position 
is lower than when compared to their rankings based on market capitalisation (Tables —1.3 
and 1.4). Given the large number o f companies listed on the BSE, a low turnover ratio can 
be obviously attributed to lack of liquidity in the market as a whole and almost complete 
illiquidity for over 85% of listed scrips i.e., despite a large number of stocks listed, there is 
no trading in most of these stocks at all.
Domestic institutional investors hold about one-third of the market’s capital, 
while management insiders and individual investors hold a third each. Effectively the 
bulk of daily trading is restricted to institutional investors both domestic and foreign. In 
the case of smaller companies (which make the bulk of listed companies in BSE), family 
members usually hold over 50% o f the firm's issued shares. With the remainder being 
held by domestic FIs, and insurance companies as well as by banks (mainly as collateral), 
only a small proportion (usually less than 20%) of total shares issued are available for
also declined from 81.07% in 1996-97 to 31.03% in 1998-99. SEBI claims that the strict norms it 
introduced for all public offers since 1995-96 has helped ensure improvement in quality o f firms entering 
the stock market (SEBI Annual Report, 1998).
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public trading. According to Sarkar et al. (1999), in the private stand-alone companies, 
the equity holding by directors and relatives is highest (22% of the total stake). Table 1.7 
shows the market concentration in the BSE. A majority of the smaller companies have 
extremely low turnover ratios, given that they face thin trading.
Table 1.7: Market Concentration in BSE.
Year Share o f Mkt. Cap. Held 
by 10 largest stocks
Share o f value traded 
held by 10 most active 
stocks
1989 20.8% 47.3%
1990 23.5% 30.6%
1991
1992 22.6% 32.2%
1993 19.6% 29.9%
1994 19.4% 6.2%
1995
1996 20.4% 74%
1997 24.8% 81.1%
Source: IFCI Emerging markets Fact book, 1998.
As observed earlier turnover on Indian stock exchanges has been increasing 
significantly since 1994. hi 1994, the government introduced competition by creating a 
new National Stock Exchange (NSE) that offered superior technology for electronic 
trading and computer links to brokers in 40 cities around the country. At present the 
N SE’s average daily trading volume is almost three times higher than that of BSE, which 
introduced electronic technology belatedly in response to competition from NSE, which 
has led to increased liquidity and efficiency nationwide. In 1995 the government also 
created India’s first depository,15 and has moved progressively toward dematerialisation 
and electronic transfer of scrip ownership. Those measures have improved dramatically 
an outmoded share trading system (Barger, 1998) that was subject to considerable abuse 
by the broker community. After 1996-97, increase in turnover has been facilitated and 
supported by the screen based trading systems of NSE and the expansion o f BSE’s On-
15 National Securities Depository Limited.
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Line Trading System (BOLT)16 facility across the country. Table 1.8 looks at the market 
capitalisation and the turnover ratios of the BSE from 1980-98.
Table 1.8: Market Capitalisation, No. o f Domestic Companies listed and Turnover ratio in BSE.
Year No. o f Companies 
listed on the stock 
exchange
Market Capitalisation 
(US $ Millions)
Value Traded 
(US $ Millions)
Turnover Ratio 
(%)
1981 1031 6649 6693 108.3
1982 1106 7058 5030 74
1983 1151 7178 2377 33.5
1984 1295 6370 3916 57.6
1985 1529 14364 4959 48.3
1986 1912 13588 10781 77
1987 2095 17057 6743 43.9
1988 2240 23623 12241 59.2
1989 2407 27316 17362 68.8
1990 2435 38567 21918 65.9
1991 2556 47730 24295 56.8
1992 2781 65119 20597 37
1993 3263 97976 21879 22.4
1994 4413 127571 27290 21.4
1995 5389 122199 13738 11.24
19 96 5999 122605 26599 21.6
1997 5843 128466 53954 42
1998 5860 105188 64498 61.3
Source: IFCI Emerging Markets Fact book, various issues.
No doubt, low turnover partly explains the low average market capitalisation of 
scrips on the BSE. A low proportion of effectively tradable shares contributes to low 
turnover in the stock market. Given the capital gains and transfer, tax structures and other 
transactions costs, the lack of liquidity in BSE can be attributed to both the capital 
structure of firms and their ownership structure. Analysing the debt and equity (holding) 
pattern in Indian corporates and the inherent conflicts of interest that arise is important 
for understanding the fundamental causes of low market capitalised companies listed on 
the BSE.
i6 BOLT was set up to achieve the following goals:
To increase market transparency,
To enhance market quality through improved liquidity, by increasing quote continuity and market depth, 
To reduce settlement risks due to open trades, by elimination of mismatches,
To provide management information systems (MIS),
To introduce flexibility in systems in order to handle growing volumes easily,
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1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS:
This thesis attempts to investigate and explain the causes of low average market 
capitalisation of firms listed on BSE. The main theoretical framework for the thesis is 
derived from the agency costs approach, initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The thesis highlights the contrast between the rhetoric surrounding the supposed 
attributes of market mechanisms17 (disciplinary and efficient allocation o f resources) and 
their apparent inability to induce effective corporate governance and performance 
through market discipline especially in an emerging market like India.
Firms try to maintain a desired capital structure (or debt-equity ratio) according to 
the nature o f their productive activities, although the ratio is maintained more in the 
boolc-value terms than in market value proportions.18 When sales, profits or assets 
increase or taxes change, the impact on the financial structure of a firm emerges through 
changes in the book value of its debt and equity. These changes in turn lead to changes in 
public issues on capital markets by firms by way of equity issues and/or debt from the 
financial intermediaries. Market pricing and valuation of such issues is reflected in the 
premia or discounts obtained over par in the pricing of issues and in the case of debt their 
coupon returns (with the interplay between price and coupon determining yield). Thus 
changes in the above mentioned variables, i.e. sales, profits, assets, costs, taxes, affect the
and to support nation-wide expansion of market activity (SEBI Annual Report, 1997).
17 Capital markets allocate scarce capital among competing users and uses. They provide signals to guide 
investors in making investment decisions and provide a mechanism by which capital markets enforce 
performance and governance disciplines.
18 Financial ratios related to the firm make use o f book values rather than market values. The market value 
of the equity o f a company finally determines whether debt holders get their money back. But analysts do 
not look at the face amount of the debt as a proportion of the total market value o f debt and equity because 
market values are often not readily available and are subject to volatility. The market value includes the 
market’s perceptions (subject to rapid change) o f value o f intangible assets generated by R&D, advertising, 
staff training, and so on. These assets are not readily saleable, and if  the company falls on hard times, the 
value of these assets may disappear altogether (Myers and Brealey, 1997).
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book value proportions of debt and equity. The resulting market value o f equity19 or the 
market traded debt o f a corporation acts as a mediating influence on the cost of effecting 
changes in the book values o f debt and equity. LCCs incur higher costs in bringing about 
changes in the book values of their debt and equity.
Companies in emerging markets with low levels of development and inherent 
market imperfections, depend much more 011 internal, rather than external or market 
finance. As King (1977) observes, firms in countries where stock markets are poorly 
developed are forced to rely more extensively on bank and non-market debt as an 
informal credit, depending on the level of development of the domestic credit market. But 
the number of firms listed on the stock markets in India suggests a seemingly paradoxical 
situation, with large number o f companies financing a significant part of their investment 
through equity markets,20 for whom dependence on debt as a source of finance is not 
preferable compared to equity as shown in the table 1.9.
Table 1.9: Debt-Equity Ratios o f Indian corporate sector.
Year No. o f Companies Debt to Equity ratio in Public 
Limited Companies
1990-91 2131 99
1991-92 1836 98.4
1992-93 1802 90.4
1993-94 1700 73
1994-95 1720 65.5
1995-96 1730 58
1996-97 1930 61.6
1997-98 1948 65
Source: RBI Finance and Currency Bulletin, Various Issues
19 “Financial price data provide a window into the firm through the market's valuation o f the securities 
issued by the firm and the changes in these values over time. Accounting data, 011 the other hand, provide 
information on the resources used by the firms. Thus, comparing accounting data and financial valuation 
data offers the opportunity to examine performance, the difference between inputs on one hand and output 
on the other” (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981).
20 Prior to 1992 Indian firms faced bureaucratic hurdles in respect to raising new equity finance as well like, 
companies making new issues, bonus issues, pricing the issues had to seek the permission o f Controller of  
Capital Issues (CCI), as stock markets in general, were under the direct control o f Ministry o f Finance, 
Government o f India. Many o f the small and medium firms faced problems of inadequate access to the 
capital markets.
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Floating external equity is often regarded by corporate managers especially of
• 91 ■family owned ad new firms as leading to loss of control, which most managers try to 
avoid. Companies with low market capitalisation compared to the book value of their net 
asset become an easy target for acquisitions and hostile takeovers.22 In addition to loss of 
control and vulnerability to takeovers, the tax rate23 in India on widely held domestic 
companies and closely held domestic companies is around 40% and 50% respectively. 
Because of the deductibility of interest payments, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue 
that the net gain from debt financing relative to equity financing increases with the film ’s 
tax rate.
21 This is because public issues increase the number o f outside shareholders who become residual claimants 
on the net assests o f the firm. Outside shareholders could then act as monitors to the managerial activity. 
Private stand-alone companies with higher insider ownership have lower agency costs o f equity and higher 
agency costs o f debt because the incentives of managers are more closely aligned with owners than with 
creditors [Lang-Friend (1988) and Friend-Hasbrouclc (1987)]. Managers are envisaged as pushing 
investment programs to a point where their marginal rate of return is below the level that would maximise 
stockholder welfare, in other words managers indulge in over investment. For these purposes internal 
finance is particularly favoured since they are the most accessible part of the capital market and most 
amenable to managerial desires for growth. In other words, professional managers avoid relying on the 
external finance because it would subject them to the discipline of the external capital market (Cherian,
1996).
22 A low Tobin's Q can be a reliable indicator o f a declining firm as it measures the low valuation o f a film’s 
tangible assets in their current use. It may pay to sell off assets when Q is low because those assets may have a 
higher value in another firm or sector. If a low Q reflects a low valuation o f physical assets relative to their 
potential, then acquiring the firm will be a cost-effective way to buy and redeploy its physical capital. A related 
measure o f profitability relative to the value o f physical assets is the deviation o f a film’s Q from the average Q 
for its industry. A low Tobin's Q can also result from well-managed but invaluable assets. For example, if  the 
targets for hostile takeovers invested a long time ago when their industry was growing, but in the current period 
if  the fortunes of the industry have turned around, they will be stuck with excess capacity. In recent years the 
corporate sector in India has witnessed many mergers and takeovers (though few have been hostile), yet 
LCCs have been immune to this mode o f market correction. Despite the increasing frequency o f highly 
publicised takeover battles in recent times, not many o f the worst managed listed companies in India are 
vulnerable to hostile takeovers. Such companies are restructured by the Board o f Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR) and not through the market for corporate control. This is because the promoters 
have voting control in their hands, facilitated by many regulatory relaxations made in the listing 
requirements for companies (Gupta, 1990). Also their shares are heavily owned by FIs and public insurance 
companies and unit trusts that are disinclined to support hostile takeovers.
23 Corporate taxation for “widely held” domestic companies has been in the range o f 55% in 1975-76 [for 
income of more than Rs. 1 Lakh (Rs. 1,00,000)] to 50% in 1988-89. in the early 1990s it ranged between 
45-40%. Surcharge is levied on tax at 8% for the accounting year ended march 31, 1990 if  taxable income 
exceeded Rs. 50,000. It is levied at 15% for the accounting year ended march 31, 1991 and thereafter if  
taxable income exceeds Rs. 75,000 (Source: Price Waterhouse Information Guide; Doing business in 
India).
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High tax rates, limited access to capital markets due to thin trading, loss of 
control, vulnerability to takeovers and acquisitions should have pushed firms toward debt 
financing. But the number of firms both existing quoted firms and new firms issuing 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), seeking funds from the equity markets has been steadily 
increasing.
Why then do (a) the potential tax savings to be generated by increasing debt 
coupled with (b) the fear of loss of control, not lead firms to borrow as much as possible 
instead of issuing equity on the stock market? The different lines of argument from the 
supply side, suggest the following reasons:
• Imperfect or incomplete capital markets;
• Credit rationing24 by public banks and other lending institutions (e.g. FIs),
• Financing decisions considered as information signals25 about the firm’s credit 
quality and commercial risk rating and its current/future profitability,
24 “Banks making loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive on the loan, and the riskiness o f  
the loan. However, the interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the riskiness o f the pool o f loans by 
either: 1. Sorting potential borrowers (Adverse selection effect) 2. Affecting the actions of borrowers 
(incentive effect). Both effects derive directly from the residual imperfect information, which is present in 
loan markets after banks have evaluated loan applications. When the price (interest rate) affects the nature 
of the transaction, it may not also clear the market. .. .It is difficult to identify “good borrowers,” and to do 
so requires the bank to use a variety of screening devices. The interest rate, which an individual is willing 
to pay, may act as one such screening device: those who are willing to pay high interest rates because they 
perceive their probability o f repaying the loan to be low. As the interest rate rises, the average “riskiness” 
of those who borrow increases, possibly lowering the bank’s profits. Similarly, as the interest rate and other 
terms o f the contract change, the behaviour o f the borrower is likely to change. For instance, raising the 
interest rate decreases the return on projects, which succeed. In a world with perfect and costless 
information, the bank would stipulate precisely all the actions that the borrower could undertake. However, 
the bank is not able to directly control all the actions of the borrowers; therefore it formulates the terms of 
the loan contract in a manner designed to induce the borrower to take actions, which are in the interest o f  
the bank, as well as to attract low-risk borrowers. For both these reasons, the expected return by the bank 
may increase less rapidly than the interest rate and beyond a point may actually decline. The interest rate at 
which the expected return to the bank is maximised is called the bank-optimal rate r*. The bank would not 
lend to an individual who offered to pay more than r*. In the bank’s judgement, such a loan is likely to be a 
worse risk than the average loan at interest rate r*, and the expected return to a loan at an interest rate 
above r* is actually lower than the expected return to the loans the bank is presently making. Hence, there 
are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed” (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1983).
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• Avoiding the hidden costs and implicit taxes (kick-backs) involved in borrowing 
from public financial institutions and banks,
• Avoiding tying up collateral as well as potential bankruptcy26 costs and 
transaction costs involved in reorganisation and, lastly,
• Owner-managers having proclivity to avoid high debt ratios in an attempt to retain 
control and protect personal wealth.
The last o f these reasons forms part of the agency approach.27 Agency theory 
purports to capture the conflict of interests among various groups (“agents”) with claims 
to the firm’s resources, including owner-managers, shareholders, debt holders etc. To 
analyse the interface between a firm and the capital markets, an understanding o f the 
conflicts of interest between these groups was important. This thesis analyses the high 
proportion of LCCs 011 the BSE using agency theory as its analytical proposition.
25 The shareholder and the manager have private information regarding the firm's prospects. The 
asymmetry o f information in capital markets engenders an adverse selection problem. Information 
asymmetry models argue that as managers know more than investors do about the firm's prospects, 
dividends reveal some o f that information to the market. It also helps explain the observed reluctance of 
managers to change dividends. Thus, dividend-signalling models describe how managers can optimally 
convey their private information to lesser-informed outside investors (Bessler and Nohel, 1996). Fama and 
Babiak (1963) find a relation between annual dividends and earnings that is consistent with the view that 
dividend-paying firms increase their dividends only when management is relatively confident that the 
higher payments can be maintained. If managers have information about the future and/or current cash 
flows that investors do not have, investors will interpret a dividend increase as a signal that management 
anticipates permanently higher cash flows, and a dividend decrease as a signal that management expects 
permanently lower cash flows. Unexpected changes in dividends provide the market with clues about 
unexpected changes in earnings, which in turn trigger price movements that look like responses to dividend 
decisions. Miller and Modigliani (1959) suggest that given information asymmetry investors are likely to 
interpret a change in dividend rate, as a change in management view of future profit prospects o f the firm.
26 As debt and firm risk increase, financial distress and bankruptcy become more likely. In a two period 
model in which the firm invests in the first period and gets its return in the second period, bankruptcy can 
be defined as the income o f the firm which is less than the fixed obligations to bondholders in an ongoing 
firm. But a firm can avoid bankruptcy even when its income is less than the obligations o f the firm by 
borrowing more. A firm is also bankrupt if  the value o f its equity is zero or if  the value o f its future income
streams, assuming it does not go bankrupt in the meantime, is less than the value o f its outstanding debt.
27 Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify three potential value-reducing behaviours, which arise out of 
conflicting interests between stockholders and bondholders. Asset substitution occurs when a film invests 
in riskier, lower-valued projects than originally anticipated by bondholders. Claim dilution results when 
new debt of equal or greater priority than original debt is issued. Under investment results when instead of
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Corporate capital structure is determined at least in part by optimisation of 
management interests even when these interests conflict with shareholders’ interests, hr 
their empirical study on bond and equity issues, Jung et al. (1996) conclude that their 
results on corporate security issue choice strongly supports the agency model. Their 
results are consistent with the role of agency costs in the new issue decision. An equity 
issue allows firms with poor investment opportunities to invest in poor projects and/or to 
reduce the disciplinary role of debt. Their study finds that firms which issue equity, are of 
two types:
a. Finns with valuable investment opportunities which seek financing to grow profitably
b. Firms, which do not possess any valuable investment opportunities.
Most of the LCCs would belong to the second category (they also don't have debt 
capacity). Equity in most cases is deemed as a non-obl igatory, unrestricted source of 
finance.28 Hence, there are few incentives for the firm’s management to align their 
interests with those of the outside shareholders (in maximising the market value and 
dividend returns on the company’s shares).
Aspects of corporate monitoring and governance,29 which play a positive role in 
improving the performance of a firm, can also be best understood within a principal-agent 
framework (Sarkar et al., 1999). According to Mayer (1998) there are five channels30
investing in positive net present value projects, a firm pays the debt proceeds to shareholders either as a 
dividend or a share repurchase. All three conflicts impose agency costs on the firm.
28 it increases managerial discretion, which management values. Managerial discretion can take numerous 
forms; managers may run slack operations, pursue sub-goals that are at variance with corporate purposes, 
and can engage in self-dealing.
29 Mechanisms o f corporate governance deals with providing managers with proper incentives in labour 
markets, in order to induce them to work in the interests of the shareholders and to make them accountable 
for company performance.
30 a. Managerial incentives,
b. Disciplining,
c. Financing and investment decisions,
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through which corporate governance affects performance. These channels are established 
by structural and institutional factors related to a firm i.e. ownership structure, financial 
structure, internal control systems, and the legal, political and regulatory environments. 
This thesis deals with only some aspects of corporate governance, i.e. through finance 
and investment (debt and equity), disciplining and restructuring (market for corporate 
control31 and the role o f financial institutions).
Barua et al. (1994) commenting on the state of capital market research in India, 
assert that certain areas such as arbitrage pricing theory, option pricing theory, agency 
theory and signalling theory are virtually unresearched in the Indian context. The Indian 
capital market has been attracting considerable attention in recent years especially after 
the financial liberalisation initiated in 1991-92. Against this background, it becomes 
important to study hitherto unresearched aspects of finance related to India.
There is a strong case for agency theory to be used as a tool to investigate the 
behavioural characteristics o f Indian stock markets. The dynamics o f agency conflicts 
inherent in the firm structure influences all the decisions taken by a firm i.e. debt policy, 
dividend policy etc. Accordingly, it becomes important to study the impact of firm’s 
financial structure on its outstanding equity. This thesis tries to analyse low average 
market capitalisation of the BSE by looking into how owner-manager behaviour
d. Corporate restructuring and
e. Instilling commitment and trust.
31 Prior to the economic reforms, regulatory bodies like the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP) placed several restrictions in the way o f takeovers, mergers, and amalgamations. Banks could not 
finance takeovers under the regulations of the Reserve Bank of India. Currently RBI allows banks to lend 
against shares only to individual borrowers within a ceiling of Rs. 100, 000 and stockbrokers against their 
stock in trade where the ceiling is decided on a case-to-case basis by individual banks. Business houses 
cannot borrow against shares. The cost o f funds is high at around 23%, including service charges. In 1991, 
the Government omitted relevant sections and provisions from the MRTP Act. The need for prior approval 
of the federal government for M&A activities was abolished. Bhagwati Committee Draft on Takeovers
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influences financial decision making i.e. how does decision-making o f owner-managers 
affect the market value o f outstanding equity and the movement of its prices.
1.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
A model of turnover of the population of firms (through the birth of new films 
and death of existing firms) helps to analyse the incidence of LCCs on the BSE. High 
rates of entry typically coincide with high rates of exit; since one effect o f entry is the 
displacement of some o f the older firms by new firms. A common way of modelling is to 
assume that entry responds to deviations in expected profits from the cost of entry,32 
which depends on entry barriers. The determinants of birth, growth and death of firms on 
the BSE can be summed as follows:
El = f (P t -C E 0  
CEt = g (BEt, CO
Where E is entry, P is expected profits, CE is the cost o f entry, BE are entry barriers, C is 
cost of finance.
Xt = f (P t, Gt, BXt, CO
1996 and SEBI Substantial Acquisitions of Shares and Takeovers Regulations 1994 attempted to ensure 
that takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism perform the function of enhancing efficiency o f firms.
32 Firms which want to be listed on BSE have to fulfil the following criteria:
■ Minimum Capital: New companies can be listed on the Exchange, if  their issued & subscribed 
equity capital after the public issue, is Rs.100 mil. and above.
■ Minimum Public Offer: As per Rule 19(2) (b) o f the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules,
1957, securities o f a company can be listed on a Stock Exchange only when at least 25% of each 
class or kind o f securities is offered to the public for subscription.
Whereas companies listed on other Stock Exchanges and seeking listing on these Exchanges are required to 
fulfil the following criteria:
■ Minimum Issued Equity Capital of Rs.30 mn. to Rs.l 00 ran.;
" Profit track record o f at least three years;
■ Minimum Market Capitalisation of Rs.200 mn., based on average price o f last six months;
■ Trading for a minimum 50% of the total trading days during the last six months on any stock
exchange;
" Minimum average volume traded per day during the last three complete months should be 500 shares 
and minimum 5 trades per day;
■ 25% of the issued capital should be with public (including corporate bodies) and minimum 15
shareholders per Rs. 100,000 of capital in the public category (BSE Annual Report, 1999).
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Where X is exit, BX is the exit barrier,33 G includes variables related to the growth34 of
' i  c
the firm and P is profits.
Now assuming that all the new entrants in BSE are LCCs, let Lt be the proportion of 
low capitalised firms in BSE at time t. These new firms generally start on a small scale 
and their access to the capital markets may be limited. Lt can be defined as 
Lt = EE t-j-E X t.j
Where EE t-j is summation of all the factors leading to the entry o f a firm in the low 
capitalised category of BSE. EX t-j is the specific exit factors.
EX t _j = Bankruptcy o f LCCs + Involuntary de-listing36 of LCCs + Voluntary de-listing 
of LCCs + LCCs reaching medium capitalised and large capitalised companies’ category 
through growth + LCCs being taken over or merged.
This thesis concentrates on the last two variables on the RJ-IS of the above 
equation. For considering the causes restricting takeovers and internal growth, this 
chapter looks at the firm level characteristics of financial policy. The firm-specific 
characteristics are analysed from the point of view of agency theory.37 Some of the 
characteristic features of a typical “Iow-cap” film ’s financial policy were in accordance
33 Exit barriers in India were high, i.e. management was constrained by law to retrench either surplus assets 
or labour (Venkiteswaran, 1993).
34 Growth in the market value of a company due to a takeover or a merger.
35 Falling profits over a period o f time would lead to bankruptcy and liquidation.
30 In addition to the market determined routes o f exit, the regulatory body Securities Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) de-lists companies from the stock exchange. Since 1999 BSE has introduced "Z Category” 
stocks instead of delisting for companies which do not comply with the provisions o f the Listing 
Agreement. De-listing was not a very effective disciplinary option because it was realised that companies, 
which defaulted on the listing fees wanted to be de-listed in the first instance. This meant that then they 
would have no obligation towards the Stock exchange or its direct governance and interference. But SEBI 
does not have any rules as yet to deal with such companies. The number o f companies placed under this 
group, by the end o f 1999 was 600 (BSE Annual Report, 1999).
37 “The size and scale o f operations of most listed companies leads to a division between the shareholders, 
the board and the professional management. In addition to the benefits from specialisation of function, 
there are also however, certain costs inherent in the corporate form of firm organisation. The most
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with existing literature. There were some which did not follow the pattern as suggested 
by existing literature. Insights on these deviant characteristics were available from the 
personal interview based survey of the LCCs' managers.
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS:
The broad structure of this thesis is as follows:
The chapter 2 develops the implications of agency theory in the Indian context. By 
using the exit and entry model of firms, this chapter deals with the mechanisms 
(analysing them on the basis o f agency theory) by which the agency costs of LCCs can be 
reduced i.e., agency costs of debt, equity and takeovers.
The chapter 3 outlines the interface between Indian corporations and capital markets. 
It deals with the choice of different sources of finance in India along with the institutional 
environment, which determined the prevailing financial policies of firms. It also provides 
an account o f takeover activity in India and outlines the financial reforms o f 1991-92, 
which brought about changes influencing the choice of finance among other things.
The chapter 4 deals with two models of takeover markets and institutional debt 
holding and monitoring. The takeover model analyses the “market for lemons” or adverse 
selection to understand the lack of effective corporate mergers and acquisitions market 
for firms listed on BSE. Given the highly diffused ownership of outside shareholders and 
high proportion o f family ownership in a typical firm listed on BSE, the second model 
points out that monitoring is possible by financial institutions but only on the basis of a 
firm's relative position in the overall portfolio of the financial institutions. These two 
models help to explain why there are so many LCCs listed on BSE as a permanent
significant o f these are agency costs. Agency costs arise because o f a divergence between the interests of 
shareholders and managers” (Stapledon, 1996).
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feature. Takeovers provide firms with an exit mechanism, which is absent on BSE; as is 
effective performance monitoring, which helps to improve firm performance for many 
LCCs. Together they explain why LCCs have become a permanent feature of Indian 
stock exchanges to the detriment of firms, investors and that of the market itself.
The chapter 5 models dividend behaviour' of LCCs using agency theory and adopting 
a critical approach to existing theories on dividend behaviour. The agency theory 
approach to dividends, subjects films to be monitored by capital markets before they are 
able to raise outside equity. The use of “rights issue” and private placements of shares in 
India reduces the monitoring o f firms by capital markets. This again points to the absence 
of any effective monitoring perpetuating the presence of a large number of LCCs on 
Indian stock markets.
The chapter 6 presents with the results of an interview-based survey conducted 
between December 1997 and May 1998 with the managers o f LCCs. The survey 
questions ranged from those investigating the choice of debt and equity, the fear of 
market driven performance monitoring and decision making in the film to that 
concerning threats of takeovers. The questions in the survey helped to unveil the 
management’s perception about dividend policy, and about monitoring by outside 
stakeholders.
The chapter 7 tests two of the hypotheses empirically, on the basis o f the independent 
variables suggested in other studies, leaving out the model on takeovers and the “market 
for lemons”. A comparative test between LCCs and the top 30 companies of the BSE 
Sensex has been done. Using panel data, a comparative analysis has been undertaken of 
firms in the BSE Sensex and firms in the sample surveyed.
34
The chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It outlines the main conclusions drawn by this 
study. The first section of chapter 8 deals with a summary o f the inferences of all the 
chapters individually. The second section outlines the main contributions that this thesis 
makes in improving understanding of hidian stock market behaviour.
35
Chapter-2
Corporate Governance and the Principal-Agent Conflicts
2.1 INTRODUCTION:
This chapter tries to apply agency theory to India-specific firm characteristics 
learnt from the survey (as mentioned in the previous chapter). In order to address the 
central question o f this thesis (namely analysing why such a high number and proportion 
of LCCs have remained a permanent feature of BSE) it was felt that agency theory 
provided an analytical framework that embraced the various and conflicting interests of 
all the key constituents that determined the financial behaviour o f a firm. Agency 
conflicts are inherent in the formulation of different policies related to the firm. Policies 
related to a firm can be implemented effectively only when the interests of all the 
stakeholders are adequately addressed.
The performance of a firm on the stock market depends on its financial and 
operating policies and its performance in the “real” market. But while a firm’s 
performance in the real market depends upon the policies formulated and implemented by 
it, performance and outcomes are subject to being influenced by random unanticipated 
shocks.
The fundamentals of corporate governance38 can also be best understood within a 
principal-agent framework. The management of a firm has the freedom to choose
38 Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers o f finance to companies assure themselves 
of getting the maximum return on their investment consistent with their contractual position. The 
mechanisms o f governance include providing managers with proper incentives, inducing managers to work 
in the interests o f the shareholders and make them accountable towards firm performance. Corporate 
governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions. They deal with constraints that managers put 
on themselves, or that investors put on managers, to reduce ex p o s t misallocation and thus to induce 
investors to provide more funds ex ante (Stapledon, 1996).
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financial policies (debt-equity ratio and dividend payout policy) that aim to maximise the 
market value of the company. Therefore it is important to know about the kind of 
institutional monitoring mechanisms that influence the choice of financial policies i.e. 
financial institutions and banks (via debt) and market forces (via equity). The adequacy 
and effectiveness o f such “internal” monitoring determines the performance o f films.
This chapter reviews the existing literature on the agency theory approach. 
Although that approach is powerful, a simple version framed only in terms of principals 
with direct claims on the firm is inadequate, even in the presence of well-defined property 
rights within a firm, hi addition to the groups with direct claims 011 the firm, it shows that 
interaction between other outside claimants and the firm also forms an essential part of 
the principal-agent conflict. Given the developing nature of the industrial and corporate 
structure in India, agency conflicts between different claimants take a different form to 
that suggested in traditional agency literature, which is oriented mainly towards 
developed market economies.
This literature review identifies specific features of the principal-agent 
relationship and shows how financial policies of the firms are affected by the conflicts 
between different stakeholders. The identification of gaps in prevailing literature about 
the structure o f a firm in a developing economy (especially in India) is a necessary step 
towards a better understanding of the functioning of the firm. Knowledge of these gaps 
aided in constructing models for dealing with prevailing conditions in Indian stock 
markets as a consequence o f the existing structure of the firm. This chapter deals with 
“agency costs” related to debt and equity and with “agency motives” behind takeovers.
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The agency costs related to dividends are dealt with in Chapter 5, together with a model 
on the dividend payout policies of family-owned businesses.
In the rest o f this chapter; Section 2.2 provides a historical perspective of the 
principal-agent conflict and an overview of conclusions drawn from the literature survey. 
Section 2.3 and its sub-sections (A and B) analyse the agency costs of debt in general and 
the agency costs of debt provided by State-owned financial institutions respectively. 
Section 2.4 analyses the different aspects of agency costs related to equity and includes an 
analysis of the conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders as well as 
an exposition on ownership patterns and monitoring. Section 2.5 deals with the agency 
motive of takeovers and reputation building by managers. Section 2.6 deals with 
equilibrium at the industry level, given the presence of agency costs in the individual 
firms. The last section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 THE AGENCY PROBLEM:
Separation of ownership and management control is a quintessential and endemic 
feature of the modem limited liability corporation. In a firm owned entirely by an 
individual, all the net benefits and costs accrue to him or her. Conversely, in a diffusely 
owned firm, the divergence between the accrual of benefit and costs39 is much larger for 
the typical fractional owner; he or she usually responds by neglecting some tasks of 
ownership.
From assumptions of the unrestricted nature40 of residual claims and/or highly 
diffused ownership, a complete separation and specialisation o f decision making
39 Divergence between benefits and costs equals net profit.
40 The common stock residual claims o f organisation are unrestricted in the sense that
1. Stockholders are not required to have any other role in the organisation.
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functions and residual risk bearing can be posited. The separation o f ownership and 
management control o f company stakes leads to managerial control over all aspects of 
corporate decision-making. The shareholders, or the owners of residual claims are 
assumed to perceive a conflict of interest when independent managers are assigned the 
task of decision-making. Dispersed individual or institutional shareholders usually hold 
diversified portfolios. They have little incentive to monitor on a day-to-day basis the 
activities of managers, leading to a free rider41 problem. Portfolio stockholders are eager 
to diversify firm specific risk, while the managers of a firm pursue their own interests. 
These may not necessarily be in the best interests of stockholders. The manager’s 
preference is assumed, typically, to conflict with that of the owner, since maximising his 
or her compensation may not be equivalent to maximising the firm’s profit.
The inefficiency implied by such externalities represents the cost of diffused 
ownership structure. Yet diffuse ownership structures exist precisely because there are 
other counterbalancing advantages in terms of value maximisation and portfolio risk 
reduction. According to Demsetz (1985), a decision by shareholders to alter the 
ownership structure of their firm from concentrated to diffuse is made keeping in view 
the consequences of losing control over professional management. Higher costs and 
reduced profits, which are associated with the decrease in owner-control, are offset by 
other profit enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership.
2. Residual claims are freely alienable.
3. Residual claims are rights in net cash flows for the life o f the organisation.
41 Shareholders who are the owners of a firm may have a little incentive to devote much attention to the 
monitoring and control o f a company if  each holds a minute fraction of the total shares. Even if they are 
willing to do this, the dispersed nature o f shareholding prevents them from undertaking effective collective 
action.
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Many authors have highlighted the advantages of this separation o f ownership and 
control. The determinants of diffused ownership according to Demsetz (1985) are; value 
maximising size, profit potential, systematic regulation. According to Berle and Means 
(1933), diffused ownership makes the owners of shares powerless to constrain 
professional management. The interests of management do not converge with those of 
owners, implying that corporate resources are not used solely to maximise shareholder 
profit. Veblen (1924) believed that a transfer of control from capitalistic owners to 
engineer-managers would become more pronounced as diffusely owned corporations 
grew in economic importance. As a result of this transfer o f power, profit maximisation 
would end, as capitalists would try to seek monopolistic restrictions to raise prices rather 
than seek efficiency or increased output. But, trained engineers seeking technological 
efficiency would ensure that production in firms they controlled would rise to higher and 
socially more desirable levels. The profits o f monopoly would be sacrificed for efficiency 
goals. Galbraith (1967) also argued that technocrats who gained control of diffusely 
owned corporations would be inclined to sacrifice owner profit for increased output, 
which would serve the interests of consumers, and firm enlargement which would serve 
the interests of managers.
The separation o f decision making and risk bearing functions observed in large 
corporations is common to other organisations such as large professional partnerships, 
mutual funds, and non-profit organisations. The complications arising from such 
separation are handled by an effective common approach, i.e. through a “contract 
structure”. The contract structure in most organisations tries to limit the risks undertaken 
by managerial agents by specifying either fixed promised payoffs or incentive payoffs tied
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to specific measures of performance. The residual risk42 is borne by those who have the 
rights to net cash flows. Contracts that direct decisions toward meeting the interests of 
residual claimants are claimed to enhance ability of the organisations to survive.43
But agency problems arise because contracts cannot be costlessly written and 
enforced. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests and asymmetric information.44 Agency 
costs also include the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of 
contracts exceed the benefits. Agency problems in organisations take the following forms:
1. The possibility that individuals will sometimes say what they do not mean 01* what 
they know not to be true (Hidden action or moral hazard)
2. Individuals sometimes do things they said they will not do or do not do things they 
said they would (Adverse or self-selection).
3. Member’s willingness and ability to engage in actions that enhance their claims on the 
organisation’s payoff (Strategic behaviour).
42 The risk associated with stochastic flows o f returns given promised payments to agents.
43 "The enforceability o f contracts is generally recognised as central for the development o f market 
economies. Without binding commitments (contracts), all transactions would have to be “spot,” that is, only 
contemporaneous exchanges would be viable. Owners of a firm can, and do, making binding commitments, 
commitments which are binding not only upon them, but also upon their successors; when they sell the firm, 
the sale entails a transfer not only of the assets, but also o f the liabilities, and included in the transfer are all 
the binding commitments. If current owners make commitments that a later owner may not like, it will be 
reflected in the price that the later owner will be willing to pay. Since the transaction is voluntary, when 
someone buys a firm, he willingly undertakes all the outstanding commitments o f the concern" (Stiglitz, 
1989).
44 The principal determines a rule that specifies a pay-off for the agent, as a function o f the latter’s action. 
The problem acquires interest when there is uncertainty about the outcome o f the agent’s action and when 
the information available to the two participants is costly and unequal. Information asymmetries play a 
pervasive role in the principal-agent relationship and have implications for economic efficiency. Agents 
typically know more about their tasks than their principals. Therefore, they may have an incentive to hide or 
distort information so as to serve their interests best. “Managers can always claim that the reason they are 
losing money is not that they are inefficient or incompetent, but that they have been pursuing other goals. It 
is virtually impossible for an outsider to judge the validity o f those claims. The difficulties ascertaining 
whether a manager is a good manager make it difficult to judge the magnitude o f the market’s
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These problems arise because of asymmetric information between principals and agents 
in an organisation (Ben-Ner et al, 1993).
Control of agency problems is important because the managers who initiate and 
implement important decisions are not the major shareholders o f the wealth effects of 
their decisions. Without effective control mechanisms, managers are more likely to take 
actions that diverge from the interests of residual claimants. If the decision management 
and control are combined in a few agents i.e. in an owner-managed firm, residual claims 
will also be restricted to these agents. Restricting residual claims to decision-makers will, 
no doubt, control agency problems between residual claimants and decision agents, but at 
the expense o f the benefits o f unrestricted common stock. The decision process would 
suffer efficiency losses, as decision agents must be chosen on the basis of both wealth and 
willingness to bear risk as well as for their decision skills. Residual claimants will have to 
forgo optimal diversification so that residual claims and decision-making can be 
combined in a small number of agents. Forgone diversification and limited ownership 
lowers the value of the residual claims and raises the cost of risk bearing services and 
lead to lower investment in projects with uncertain payoffs (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Whereas decision-making agents have limited wealth, restricting residual claims 
to them also limits resources available for bonding contractual payoffs and for acquiring 
risky organisation-specific assets. It limits the scope of the firm in acquiring any assets 
even the less specific ones.
Thus restricted residual claims of proprietorship can dominate only when 
technology does not involve important economies of scale and when specialised decision
incompetence” (Stiglitz, 1989). Asymmetric information may be simple incomplete information caused by
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skills, specialised risk bearing, and wealth are not needed from residual claimants. 
Conversely, unrestricted common stock residual claims involving a full separation of 
ownership from management, are more likely to dominate when there are important 
economies to scale in production that;
1. Can be realised only with a complex decision hierarchy that makes use o f specialised 
decision skills throughout the organisation.
2. Generate large aggregate risks to be bome by residual claimants
3. Demand large amounts of wealth from residual claimants to purchase risky assets and 
to bond the payoffs promised to a wide range of agents in the organisation (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).
2.2. A. IMPLICATIONS DRAWN FROM THE CURRENT LITERATURE SURVEY: 
This section outlines the main conclusions drawn from the literature survey of agency 
conflicts. It deals with only those aspects of traditional literature, which were modified to 
suit the Indian firm given its financial system. A detailed explanation o f the agency costs 
of debt, equity and takeovers along with their respective limitations follows this section.
The agency problem is an essential element of the so-called contractual view of the 
firm, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen
(1983). The essence o f the agency problem is the separation of ownership and control. 
When an entrepreneur or a manager raises funds from investors i.e. in the form of debt or 
equity, the lenders and shareholders have to make sure that their investment is not 
expropriated and at the same time generates returns. Given the managerial control rights 
(discretion), free riding problem faced by individual investors, inability of legal
bounded rationality, or when self-interested individuals intentionally hide or misrepresent information.
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institutions to enforce contracts,45 the costs incurred by both managers and the investors 
are called agency costs.46
The agency costs of debt can be defined as a measure of the difference in the firm’s 
market value when, to meet bondholders' desire for protection, the shareholders are 
compelled to opt for the second best operating policy rather than the first best. Debt 
holders realise that the incentive o f shareholders to undertake greater risk in a situation of 
high debt is higher. Accordingly block debt holders, who possess large enough bargaining 
power, pressurise the incumbent management to change the policies of the firm, if  they 
are risky.
Monitoring by the block debt holders or the financial institutions or banks may not 
depend on the high debt-equity ratios of the firm in all circumstances, hi some situations 
lenders will become more like shareholders and greater consultation between the 
management and its principal creditors takes place (Williamson, 1986). Intensity of 
monitoring may not depend on the proportion of debt that a firm has borrowed. Instead it 
will be based 011 the relative position of a firm in the overall portfolio o f the financial 
institution. Accordingly, the agency costs of debt may or may not increase monotonically 
with the debt ratio, given the firm’s position in the total debt portfolio o f the bank or the 
financial institution and its market value.
On the other hand, agency costs of equity stem from effort-incentive and perk 
consumption problem. Traditionally it has been considered that agency costs of equity
45 Assuming that it is too costly to write contracts, which have enforceable terms that cover all foreseeable 
circumstances, which makes courts weak in enforcing enforceable terms o f contracts.
46 These comprise costs incurred to monitor managers in order to minimise the divergence between their 
interests; costs incurred by the managers, and the residual loss resulting horn the remaining divergence in 
shareholders' and managers' interests (Stapledon, 1996).
44
decline with decrease in debt-equity ratio, hi principle agency costs o f equity are absent in 
case of firms that have high insider ownership (see Chapter-3, most of the LCCs in India 
have large insider shareholding). In the absence of any protection for minority 
shareholders, the owner-managers can divert resources from the firms for their own 
personal benefit despite their large stake in the firm. Payment (non-payment) behaviour of 
dividends is a manifestation of this attitude of the owner-managers.
Takeovers,47 mergers48 and acquisitions49 are mechanisms that can correct 
management inefficiency and increase the value of the target firm. There are some doubts 
regarding the effectiveness of takeovers as a mechanism for effective corporate 
governance. A takeover market could be completely absent where it is needed the most, 
as in the case of stock markets with a large number of LCCs (potential takeover targets).50 
Takeovers and their absence are relevant to the persistence of large numbers of LCCs in 
emerging stock markets.
47 Achieved by buying shares o f the target company (Sen et al., 1997).
48 The transferor company is dissolved and its assets and liabilities vested in the acquiring company (Sen et 
al., 1997).
49 Outright purchase o f a business undertaking (Sen et al., 1997).
50 Some firms find it worthwhile to acquire loss-making companies for the following reasons, instead of 
letting them go into liquidation:
1. For tax purposes.
2. The less profitable firm will be relatively cheaper to acquire in relation to its assets.
3. There will be more opportunity and greater certainty o f increasing the profits o f firms with lower 
profitability relative to their respective industries (Singh, 1971).
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2.3 AGENCY COSTS OF DEBT:
Williamson (1986) regards debt and equity as different governance structures 
rather than as financial instruments. Providers of both these sources of funding 
necessitate some monitoring of firm performance and management. There are significant 
differences in the ways in which companies in different countries finance themselves and 
also in the costs o f capital across countries, but the implications of these differences are 
still very unclear (Mayer, 1996). Debt financing requires that the debtor meets stipulated 
interest payments regularly, that business should continuously meet liquidity tests, that 
sinking funds51 are set up, and finally the principal amount is repaid on the loan- 
expiration date. If the firm performs well the debtor can pay interest and principal on 
schedule, but when the firm produces poor results debt is unforgiving. Failure to make 
scheduled payments promptly results in reorganisation or liquidation. Various debt­
holders will then attempt differential recovery in the degree to which the assets in 
question are redeployable (Williamson, 1986).
The agency costs of debt take several forms, in the Jensen-Meckling (JM) (1976) 
framework it is associated with managerial risk incentive and bankruptcy. It also occurs 
when the exact nature o f firms issuing bonds cannot be revealed costlessly. According to 
Myers (1977), when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near future, equity holders may 
not have any incentive to invest. The reason is that equity holders bear the costs o f further 
investment while the returns accrue to debt holders. This concept is similar to Jensen- 
Meckling’s asset substitution effect, but clearly the beneficiaries are not the same.
51 “Long term loans are commonly repaid in a steady, regular way, perhaps after an initial grace period. For 
publicly traded bonds this is done by means o f a sinking fund -  every year the firm pays a sum of cash into 
a sinking fund which is then used to repurchase and retire the bonds” (Brealey and Myers, 1997).
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The asset substitution problem52 as identified by JM (1976) forms a major 
component of the agency costs of debt. JM believe that the agency costs o f debt increase 
with the amount of debt the firm employs or it monotonically increases in debt-equity 
ratio. The whole of JM ’s analysis on the agency costs of debt (asset substitution) is based 
on the phenomenon of the managers taking up risky projects at the expense of the 
bondholders. Usually, the shareholder’s value maximising investment policy responds to 
changes in the level of debt53 by increasing monotonically the risk o f the firm as the 
promised debt payment increases. Even when the debt is increasing to levels at which 
debt holders acquire an almost complete claim on the cash flow54 of the firm, managers in 
the initial period would still have a strong incentive to alter the choice of projects toward 
risky ones (Green and Talmor, 1986). Thus, the greater the quantity of debt in the capital 
structure, the greater is the lack of effort on the part of managers and corporate 
performance is negatively affected.
The existence of the agency costs of debt may provide an explanation for the lack 
of increase in debt ratios for firms in general, even though corporate tax rates have risen 
steadily. Over the past 50 years in the industrial countries, corporate ownership has 
become much more dispersed. The percent of ownership by corporate insiders has 
declined dramatically with the growth in corporate assets. Thus, the incentive for higher 
debt ratios due to tax increases may have been offset by the increased agency cost o f debt
52 “The agency costs associated with the existence of d eb t... are composed mainly o f value reductions in the 
firm and monitoring costs caused by the manager’s incentive to reallocate wealth from the bondholders to 
himself by increasing the value of his equity claim”(Jensen and Meclding, 1976).
53 The managers increase the riskiness o f the firm by carrying out physical investment in riskier projects; as 
a result, the risk o f equity holders lises as debt rises.
54 Present value o f expected future cash flow.
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(Kim and Sorensen, 1986). The same argument is true for the Indian corporate sector,55 
(See Chapter -3 for more details) which relies more on outside equity56 although the tax 
rates57 have not been reduced considerably after the financial reforms. But debt 
financing58 is still prevalent because the owners of these firms want to retain control 
(Stulz, 1990) by acquiring more debt and at the same time they want to avoid the costs of 
external equity.59 Large films in developing stock markets, as Demirguc-Kunt (1992) 
points out, take advantage of further stock market development to increase their 
borrowings, whereas in the developed stock markets, firms would substitute equity for 
debt. The benefit of a debt contract is in preventing the manager from investing in 
negative net present value projects.
If there are two projects 1 and 2 and its investment outlay is assumed equal and 
that the value of the stock rises with an increase in the variance of the outcome 
distribution. Assuming then that two distributions vary in their variances, ct22<ct2], if the 
equity value of S j is lower than S2 i.e. S 1 < S2 then the bond value o f Bi is greater than B2 
i.e. Bi > B2, since Bi = V - Sj and B2 = V - S2. V is the value of the firm. The manager
55 The survey that I conducted in 1997-98 suggested that for many managers o f LCCs in India, the time gap 
between applying for a loan and sanction o f the loan acted as a deterrent for acquiring debt capital. As many 
regulations related to stock markets, capital structure etc, have been considerably reduced, Family Owned 
Businesses (FOBs) can now easily become public limited companies and can be listed on the stock markets. 
Due to reasons o f lack o f access to bank loans and for funding risky projects most o f the FOBs depend on 
the external equity sources.
56 The growing reliance on equity can be seen in Chapter 3, Table 3.9 on the debt -equity ratios in India.
57 Corporate taxation for “widely held” domestic companies has been in the range o f 55% in 1975-76 [for 
income o f more than Rs. 1,00,000] to 50% in 1988-89 and it decreased to 45% in 1993. Surcharge is levied 
on tax at 8% for the accounting year ended march 31, 1990 if  taxable income exceeded Rs. 50,000. It is 
levied at 15% for the accounting year ended march 31, 1991 and thereafter if  taxable income exceeds Rs. 
75,000 (Source: Price Waterhouse Information Guide; Doing business in India).
58 See Table 3.4 in Chapter 3.
59 Associated with flotation costs, monitoring by outside shareholders and the regulatory authorities, 
disclosure norms and also agency costs o f equity.
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will invariably choose the investment with the higher variance distribution 2. If the cash 
flow distribution 2 is lower than that of distribution 1, i.e. V] > V2 and then AV, which is, 
AV = Vj - V2 = (Si + B , ) - ( S 2 + B2)
= (S i - S2) + (B] - B2) is small relative to the reduction in the value of the 
bonds the value of the stocks will rise. Rearranging the above equation,
S , - S 2 = (B1-B2) - (V i - V2)
Bj - B2 is the amount of the wealth transferred from the bondholders and Vi - V2 is the 
reduction in the overall value of the firm. As Bi > B2, S2 - Si can be positive even when 
the reduction in the firm value VJ - V2 is positive. The wealth loss Vj - V2 in addition to 
monitoring and bonding costs, according to JM, are the agency costs associated with debt. 
And they increase with the increase in the debt-equity ratio as shown in the figure 2.1.
AC Agency costs
AC
v Debt-Equity Ratio
Figure 2.1: Traditional agency costs of debt.
Without agency costs of debt, the value of the levered firm is the first best value 
of the firm plus the interest tax shield of debt. Each added unit of debt increases the value 
of the firm by the value of its associated interest tax shields. With agency costs, as the 
size of debt increases, the total agency costs more than offset the total tax shields, making 
the value less than the first best. With increase in debt obligations, managers are more
likely to indulge in risky activities because their loyalties lie with their shareholders and 
not with the debt holders. Thus the agency costs borne by the firm’s equity holders 
increase monotonically with the obligatory payment on the debt. And as debt is never 
issued beyond debt capacity,60 agency costs also increase monotonically with the market 
value of debt (Green and Talmor, 1986). In the absence of agency costs, corporations are 
indifferent between equity and debt financing as long as the corporate debt yields the 
certainty-equivalent of interest. An individual firm issues debt until the differential 
agency costs o f debt financing are equal to the marginal unit of debt.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency costs o f debt increase 
monotonically in the debt-equity ratio. But firms with large amounts of debt cannot afford 
to take high risks because of the fear of bankruptcy. So it can be implied that the agency 
costs of debt in that case cannot increase with leverage, as firms usually set a target debt 
level, beyond which any increase in the leverage can lead to bankruptcy. Gavish and 
Kalay (1983) also maintain that stockholders who control firms with a high leverage ratio 
are less likely to choose high-risk projects with negative net present value. Bradley et al
(1984) also imply that the debt ratio is inversely related to the costs of financial distress, 
which includes bankruptcy costs and the agency costs of debt, level of non-debt tax 
shields and the variability o f firm value.
Adequate safeguards are difficult to provide for risky projects. As the exposure to 
risk increases, debt holders become more concerned with the details o f the firm's 
operating decisions and strategic plans. With high debt-equity ratios, the creditors become 
more like shareholders, and greater consultation between the management and its
60 Rational shareholders will never issue debt where the market value o f the debt is a decreasing function o f
50
principal creditors results. A banking presence on the board of directors61 may be 
reasonable in those circumstances (King, 1977). Bondholders realising the incentive of 
shareholders to undertake greater risk in a situation of high debt will require a higher 
payment as compensation. The tough negotiating stance of debt holders after default 
deters managerial shirking ex ante (Tirole and Dewatripont, 1994). These are some of the 
ways through which bondholders can effectively discourage managers from following 
risky policies. Managers are forced to change their policies because of a continuous need 
for finance from banks and financial institutions. Moreover, firms usually obtain debt 
only after the firm has laid out its project plan and a stringent project appraisal from the 
financial institution has been done.
On the other hand, privately owned debt suppliers can exercise a check on 
discretionary managerial behaviour (Jensen, 1986). Likewise block debt holders have 
large enough bargaining power62 to pressurise the incumbent management to change the 
policies o f the firm, if  they are risky. This bargaining power results when stock markets 
are not well developed and firms have to depend on debt. As mentioned earlier, large
its face value (Green and Talmor, 1986).
61 "Unlike stockholders, for short-term lenders who make loans for general business purposes, evidence that 
the firm is currently financially sound, coupled with short maturity, provides protection for short-term 
lenders. Such lenders do not need additional representation. But long-term lenders, who make loans against 
earmarked assets, place pre-emptive claims against durable assets. Long-term lenders usually align 
incentives and protect themselves with safeguards, and a place in the board is justifiable" (King, 1977).
62 Debt may be tougher than equity when it is not concentrated. If a borrower defaults on debt held by a 
large number o f creditors, renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult and the borrower 
might be forced into bankruptcy (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). But public 
debt is an extremely uncommon financing instrument used only in few developed countries, and even there 
much less than bank debt (Mayer, 1990). There are other studies, which point out the failure o f banks as 
tools of corporate governance: Harris and Raviv (1990) suggest banks have no incentive to discipline 
managers and some incentive to cater to them to get more business as long as the firm is away from a 
default. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) suggest that banks fail to terminate unprofitable projects they have 
invested in when continuation is preferred to liquidation. Banks as block debt holders usually try to force 
the managers to change to alternative policies if  their interests are in danger, and would avoid a direct 
disciplining of managers.
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firms in developing stock markets take advantage of further stock market development to 
increase their borrowings. With stock market development, the borrowing capacity of the 
firms increases as the stock markets provide improved quality of information and banks 
are in a better position to assess the credit worthiness of their clients more accurately and 
can increase lending. But the coefficients of the same stock market indicator for small 
firms63 in the developing stock markets are negative but not statistically significant 
(Demirguc-Kunt, 1992).
But exercise o f bargaining power by the block debt holders may not depend on the 
high debt-equity ratios64 o f the individual firm. Intensity of the monitoring would be 
based on the relative position of a firm in the overall portfolio of the financial 
institution.65 Monitoring each small firm increases the costs of the financial institution. 
Accordingly it monitors those firms where the marginal benefit o f monitoring equals 
marginal cost of monitoring. Increase in the costs of monitoring a firm’s activities should 
either decrease the supply of debt to the firm or increase the level o f collateral.66
63 Banks may view requests for loans from small businesses less favourably than those from larger firms 
because o f informational problems, because smaller films are less likely to be professionally audited, and 
are both difficult and costly for a bank to monitor. But in her empirical work, Bopaiah (1998) finds that 
FOBs are associated with an easier availability o f credit than non-FOBs. This suggests that lenders see 
family ownership as providing incentives for a behaviour, which reduces the moral hazard problems faced 
by lenders.
64 An additional finding of Bopaiah's (1998) study was that family ownership o f a business is not 
significantly related to a reduction in the premiums on loans. So the individual film's debt-equity ratio does 
not affect the monitoring o f it by a financial institution.
65 See Chapter-4 (Section -2 )  for a more detailed theoretical analysis. And Chapter - 6 section - 6.5.B for 
empirical evidence on the FI's monitoring.
66 Usually collateral affects a film’s access to credit, it acts as a signal from the borrowers concerning the 
safety o f the lender's investments (Besanko and Thakor, 1983) and it also acts as an insurance which the 
banks require from riskier borrowers to hedge their position in the case of default (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1983). But not all firms that seek a loan have enough business assets to pledge as collateral. Moreover, 
banks may not wish to accept accounts receivable and inventory as collateral because o f the higher 
monitoring costs required (Berger and Udell, 1995). FOBs are assumed to have more control over their 
firms, it is possible that owners and managers of FOBs may be more willing, if  able, to offer personal 
collateral to ensure approval o f a loan request. In the case of expansion plans, which are considered to be 
risky by the owner-managers, they would not pledge their personal assets.
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According to the costs and benefits of monitoring, a financial institution prioritises firms 
in its portfolio and a film's position on this portfolio determines monitoring by the 
financial institution. In the case o f smaller firms, debt holders will concern themselves 
with the value of the collateral and not with the valuation of the entire firm (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1996). Firms whose relative position in the FI's or bank's portfolio is higher, 
attract more monitoring. As a result their agency costs of debt increase with an increase in 
the debt. Agency costs o f debt as a result may increase monotonically not with the debt -  
equity ratio but with the market value of the firm. This is because financial institutions, 
which provide debt to several firms, would initially monitor those firms whose relative 
position in their overall portfolio is higher. Change in the market value o f a firm changes 
its position in the portfolio o f the financial institution and will accordingly lead to closer 
or looser monitoring of the firm.
Following the exposition of JM, it was assumed that bondholders could not 
prevent managers from changing the investment program. Relaxing this assumption, 
managers are now forced to choose investment project 1 because project 2 has a higher 
variance distribution. In this case, managers have to maximise Vi instead o f V2: 
V ^ C B . + S O
v 2 = (S2).
AY = V2 - V] the loss o f value is the agency cost. But the block debt holders will exercise 
their bargaining power only when the position of an individual firm in their overall 
portfolio is high. And a firm's position in the portfolio of the debt holders will rise 
according to its market performance. Thus agency costs of debt will increase not with an 
increase in the debt equity ratio, but with the market value of a firm as shown in figure
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2.2. The volume o f debt is irrelevant. Thus, the negative consequences of debt-induced 
moral hazard cannot be ameliorated simply by reducing the amount of debt.
▲ AC Agency
ACd Agency costs of debt
0 Market Value
Figure 2.2: Agency costs of debt in relation to market value of the firm.
By using a state contingent claims model,67 Mello and Parsons (1992) define the 
agency costs of the debt as a measure of the value lost when the equity owners, because 
of the outstanding debt, change the operating policy from the first best. As the operating 
policy chosen (second best operating policy)68 to maximise the value o f the equity is not 
the first best operating policy,69 the value of the levered firm is less than the first best 
value of the firm plus the interest tax shields. They claim that by using the contingent 
claims technique, a measure of agency costs can be yielded which is robust i.e., it is not 
vulnerable to variations in parameters determining a firm’s market value. This can be 
further used to compare different capital structures and to analyse the agency effects 
under different circumstances facing the firm. Although it is difficult to identify 
beforehand different states likely to arise in the future, a firm’s present and future
67 State contingent claims are those which specify payoffs for each possible future state o f the world. Such 
state contingent claims help avoiding and allocating risk. But in order to specify the total payoffs to be paid 
in all future states, identification o f  all current and future states and all current and future decisions o f an 
organisation through state contingent claim contracts is needed. Given the costs and information 
requirements, the state-contingent claims are not the dominant system for allocating risk. (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).
68 Maximising the value o f levered equity.
54
decisions still need to be carefully analysed, which involves heavy information and cost 
requirements as Fama and Jensen (1983) also indicate. However, a company’s past capital 
structure can provide sufficient insights into the pattern of decision making under 
different circumstances. Agency scholars assume stable and consistent risk preferences on 
the part of both the principals and agents. A contingency-based view on risk-taking to 
allow for the possibility of varied risk preferences by the agent is important, because the 
context the agent faces every time he/she makes a decision on behalf o f the shareholders 
does not remain constant. Hence, a comprehensive view of managerial risk choices 
should integrate risk, performance attributes of the choice situation, and internal 
governance structure (Wiseman and Mejia, 1998).
Thus, agency costs of debt can be measured as a difference in the film ’s value 
when the shareholders are compelled to opt for the second best operating policy to meet 
debt holders' desire for protection, rather than the first best. In order to evaluate the effect 
of the level of debt on a shareholder’s choice of projects, what should be examined is 
whether a higher promised debt payment leads shareholders to choose an alternative 
operating policy rather than the one that would have been chosen in the absence of debt. 
Given the book value o f debt, shareholders will usually choose an investment policy that 
maximises the present value of the residual equity claim.70
Kim and Sorensen (1986) empirically test whether cross-sectional variations of 
corporate leverage ratios can be related to agency costs. Their study classifies firms into
09 Maximising the value of equity.
70 Residual equity claim is the difference between a firm’s end of period cash flow and the level o f debt.
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two groups, one with relatively high insider ownership71 and the other with relatively low 
insider ownership. They test whether firms with concentrated equity ownership among 
insiders make use of long-term debt in the capital structure differently from diffused 
ownership firms. The determinants of long term borrowing in their study included annual 
growth rate in earnings, variation in earnings, average level of total assets of the firm, 
average tax rate, average rate of depreciation and a dummy variable for firms heavily 
owned by insiders. They conclude that although several of the variables determine the 
debt decision, the debt decision is determined non-systematically by managers across 
firms. Their findings indicate that insider owned firms tend to use long-term debt to 
finance projects. They also maintain that high inside ownership have lower agency costs 
of debt.72
Leland and Pyle (1977) also find that the level of debt in a firm is directly related 
to the entrepreneur’s equity position73 or his stake. Myers and M ajluf (1984) suggest that
71 An insider ownership firm is one in which insiders own more than 25 percent o f the equity. They can be 
also referred to as FOBs, which are characterised by owner-management, high levels o f  insider ownership 
o f equity, and the use o f personal collateral to secure loans. Other less observable characteristics may be 
different managerial skills and styles i.e. they have more cohesive managerial structures retained by family 
members, with leadership positions carrying more authority. The widely held corporation is more common 
in countries with good shareholders protection. Family control is more common in countries with poor 
shareholder protection (La Porta et al, 1998).
72 The reasons for this are;
1. Debt provisions and covenants designed to counter balance shareholders’ incentives to exploit 
bondholders is considered more effective if  there is close control o f equity ownership.
2. For these kinds o f firms, the lenders have a clearer view o f risk involved with corporate investment 
decisions.
73 Given that the entrepreneur owns higher levels o f equity in his firm, conservative investment strategies 
are adopted because he/she is the residual claimant and bears the greatest risk (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Owner-managed family-owned businesses (FOBs) may have an additional advantage in monitoring decision 
agents because family members have many levels o f interaction amongst themselves (Fama and Jensen,
1983). Because o f their greater stake in the survival o f the firm, owner-managers o f FOBs may want to be 
more certain to meet their fixed obligations and avoid bankruptcy (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990), thus reducing 
the lenders risk. All these features count towards incentives to banks to lend more to FOBs. But banks use 
non-price terms o f the loan contract such as size o f the loan, collateral, commitment status, demand status, 
maturity premiums and other restrictive covenants, to provide for insurance against default or to avoid 
adverse incentives for borrowers. Banks use other proxies as well i.e. ownership and organisational features,
56
more profitable firms will decrease their demand for debt, as more internal funds will be 
available to finance investment. Friend and Lang (1988) test whether capital structure 
decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self-interest. To analyse the effect 
o f differences in management’s ability and desire to reduce the level o f debt, they classify 
firms into two groups depending upon the stock owned by management i.e. closely held 
(CHC) and publicly held (PHC). They further group CHC and PHC into CHC1 and 
CHCO, PHC1 and PHCO i.e. CHC and PHC with and without non-managerial principal 
stockholders respectively. They find that corporations in CHC1 and PHC1 have higher 
average debt ratio than CHCO and PHCO. The level of debt decreases as the level of 
management investment in the firm increases in CHC1, CHCO and PHC1, but debt is 
positively related to management investment for PHCO.
Table 2.1: Closely held and privately held companies.
CHC1 CHCO PHC1 PHCO
LMV74 negatively
significant
Negatively
significant
Less negatively 
significant
Insignificant
FR75 negatively
significant
Negatively
significant
Insignificant negatively significant
Source: Friend and Lang (1988).
balance sheet and financial information, characteristics of the industry and trends in the economy to 
estimate risks involved in lending (Bopaiah, 1998). An additional finding of her study was that family 
ownership o f a business is not significantly related to a reduction in the premiums on loans. When the size 
of a firm increases it improves its access to the capital markets as the average fixed costs o f going public 
decrease. However, since owner-managers of incorporated firms are not (totally) personally liable for the 
losses o f the firm, it is possible that they would make riskier investment choices and banks would require 
some protection against loan losses.
74 The value of the stock held by corporate insiders.
75 The ratio o f  managerial holdings to the total value o f their outstanding stock.
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2.3. A. AGENCY COSTS OF DEBT AND STATE-OWNED FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS:
Given that the block debt holders who possess enough bargaining power to alter 
the risky policies o f a firm in India are State-owned Financial Institutions, it was 
important to consider the nature of agency costs when the debt is provided by public 
financial institutions.
The firm and the state are both “non-market” institutions. The co-ordination of 
decisions taken by different individuals on the basis of asymmetric information and 
different competencies takes place directly through the issue of orders and control over 
their execution. There is a division o f labour and a hierarchical structure within the two 
institutions, and so internal co-operation and authority relationships influence the 
behaviour of the agents belonging to them. The problem faced by economic agents is to 
close the gap between the exogenous complexity of their various choice problems 
dictated by the environment and their decision-making capacity (Dallago, 1994). As a 
response all economic agents make plans, but the relevant question is who has the 
effective control of the process of making and carrying out plans (Bimer, 1994)?
In any economic organisation be it public firm or private firm, interchange 
between three main actors i.e. workers, managers and owners can be characterised as a 
series of contracts where one party, the agent agrees to perform tasks on behalf of the 
principal in return for compensation. Public firms76 then can be specifically perceived
76 A pertinent question, when initiating a discussion on public sector, is, what is the most appropriate 
response in cases where the profit-making form enterprise is not readily available and where redistribution 
through cash is not an option? The state then is compelled to intervene due to gaps created by the market in 
the economic sphere. To attain allocation of resources which are Pareto efficient, the private sector requires 
markets to be perfectly competitive and welfare effects to be traded in the market. The universally accepted
58
from the point of view o f principal-agent relationships of citizen, politician, senior 
bureaucrat, subordinate bureaucrats and managers of State-owned-enterprises (SOEs). If 
the principal, i.e. government, possessed full information about market and technological 
conditions, it could instruct the agent to set first-best levels of prices, output, capital, 
labour and wage rates. If allocative efficiency were the concern then this would imply 
marginal cost pricing, labour receiving its opportunity cost wage, and inputs chosen to 
minimise costs. Government or for that matter any other principal does not effectively 
possess all the relevant information.
In market economies, most state institutions are formed to provide public goods, 
or goods and services that have strong externalities. Their principal goal may not be 
maximisation of profits or net worth, but some complex set of objectives, which cannot 
be readily measured in financial terms. Given the political compulsions and other 
economic considerations, agency costs are a manifestation of the difference in the film ’s 
value when the firm is compelled to opt for the second best operating policy rather than 
the first best.
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) differ in the extent of autonomy they enjoy. In 
some countries such institutions have managements that make decisions without any
notion of higher productive efficiency in the private sector hence may not always lead to allocative 
efficiency. The state intervenes in the cases of Public goods, natural monopolies and goods, which produce 
externalities. The state can also involve itself in the area o f economic activity in three ways: provision, 
subsidy or regulation. It can provide a particular commodity itself through owning and operating the 
relevant institutions and employing the relevant personnel. It can subsidise the commodity by using public 
funds to lower the commodity’s price below the one that it would otherwise obtain. Or the state can regulate 
the provision o f the commodity, regulating its quality and its quantity or its price (Le Grand and Robinson, 
1992). Thus in the presence of imperfect information or incomplete markets the economy will not be Pareto 
efficient and there will always be some intervention by which the government can make everyone better o ff 
(Stiglitz, 1994). In a developing country context this intervention commands greater importance in order to 
build the much-needed basic infrastructure on which subsequent economic activities can take place. As a 
result the scope o f state activities increased through time in most developing countries as in India.
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government intervention. In others, managers have to operate within relatively narrow 
constraints.
The identity o f owners77 in SOEs is fuzzy. While in theory these films are 
controlled by the public at large, the de facto control rights belong to bureaucrats. These 
bureaucrats have concentrated control rights, but no significant cash flow rights because 
cash flow ownership of the state firms is in theory effectively dispersed amongst the 
taxpayers of the country. Bureaucrats have goals that are dictated by political and 
personal career interests. Particularly in democratic countries these executives operate 
under many constraints, of running SOEs in ways that will be acceptable to the relevant 
population or their representatives (Ben-Ner et al, 1993). Hence state firms are termed to 
be commercially inefficient enterprises.
The other specific characteristics of public firms, given the lack o f effective 
monitoring to control agency costs and lack of competition is that the planner-manager 
relation has developed in an idiosyncratic and inefficient way. hi addition, there is no 
automatic and constantly operating economic feedback mechanism, which controls the 
performance o f managers and planners (Wagener, 1994). Accordingly, as Stiglitz (1989) 
suggests, managers of government departments may engage in practices that are difficult 
to verify: such as over manning, simply because they make a manager’s task politically 
easier. The penalties that can be imposed on public officials when failure occurs are also 
limited (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). The severity of the agency problems encountered 
by the government may be compounded by the government’s relative imperviousness to
77 Ownership refers to a bundle o f rights that an economic agent is entitled to exercise over an asset. Its 
main component are the right o f utilisation, the right to the products of the asset, and the right to alienate or 
dispose of the asset and o f these rights o f utilisation and return (Putterman, 1993).
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financial distress (Brealey et al., 1997). The lack of avenues for comparisons of efficiency 
makes it is difficult to ascertain whether production in SOEs is efficient or not.
Majumdar and Chibber (1999) suggest that when debt is supplied primarily by 
State-Owned Financial Institutions a negative relationship appears between the level of 
debt and performance. For debtor firms’ managers, debt is owed to the public at large78 
who effectively can do nothing. In a system characterised by a hierarchy of FIs, the 
burden of bad debts is invariably (inevitably) passed on to the superior organisation. 
Ultimately it is the State that has to write it off. Lewis and Sappington (1995) model the 
capital structure of a regulated firm (agent) controlled by a regulator (risk-averse 
principal) and capital secured from a risk neutral financier (credit market). They suggest 
that the financier can play a dual role o f limiting the agent’s information rents and at the 
same time reducing the risk the principal must bear. Lewis and Sappington (1995) analyse 
an exceptional case to the conventional thinking of the sources of funding, but this is 
possible only, in government owned films when the credit institutions are also guaranteed 
by the state itself. Now due to mounting pressure on public funds in India, the state has 
been unable to finance the expanding portfolios of its own financial institutions.
78 The following exposition relates to lack of property rights in the State-owned enterprises:
"Financial institution’s ownership is normally vested in one government department which holds all the 
shares on behalf o f the government. Thus, ownership is not diffused but vested in one owner who can 
exercise control. From the debtor film ’s perspective, this fact ought to encourage bonding because their 
debt suppliers are likely to face strong monitoring pressures themselves. This, however, is not the case since 
the fuzziness o f owners’ identity crops up. The government department, which owns shares in the financial 
institutions, is itself an agency o f the citizens who are de ju re  owners of the financial institutions. This 
implies that the control o f the state-owned financial institutions being undertaken by civil servants o f the 
concerned government department, is vested in persons who are themselves agents o f the citizens o f the 
state, monitoring other agents, the financial institutions’ managers. As collection o f many principals, 
citizens o f a state face several agency problems. Citizens in a democracy neither have incentives, because of 
free riding problems (Olson, 1965), nor do they find it easy to control managers in state-owned enterprises 
such as financial institutions. The very diffuseness of public ownership implies that citizens acting 
individually have small probabilities in influencing outcomes, or in expressing their voice. As a result,
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Consequently they have been attracting an increasing proportion o f their funds from 
capital markets for debt and equity. The partial discipline emanating from the stock 
markets has induced state financial institutions to increase their efficiency, as in the case 
of India.
The argument of monitoring based on the relative position o f a firm in the 
portfolio of the FI is also valid in the case of state-owned FIs. So the argument that debt 
from a state-owned FI will lead to a negative impact on performance of the firm, may be a 
biased conclusion.
The theorists of transition agree that once freed from the government (through 
privatisation) firm managers will automatically be motivated to maximise profits, and 
markets will spontaneously arise to co-ordinate production.79 Although this proposition is 
theoretically sound, given the agency arguments it still remains more or less an empirical 
issue. Moreover, for privatisation to be successful in the short-run, important post­
financial enterprises become proprietary organisations owned de fac to  by civil servants or politicians"
(Majumdar and Chibber, 1999).
79 The benefits o f privatisation, which are often cited in the literature, are that privatisation permits the 
replacement of soft budget constraints and it permits more flexible executive compensation than is possible 
under civil service rules (Stiglitz, 1994). Executive compensation alone cannot align manager’s pursuit o f  
self-interest with that o f the principal. James et al. (1979) consider the problem of the design o f incentive 
schemes that will induce managers of state firms to pursue risk-neutral strategies on behalf o f the 
organisation. It turns out, however, that such incentive schemes are likely to result in the self-selection o f  
risk-averse managerial candidates. Thus a correct static policy prescription has negative dynamic 
consequences due to adverse managerial self-selection. Along with this, most SOEs often have non- 
financial goals. Because other owners cannot acquire their ownership, their top management cannot be 
motivated through incentive schemes such as share in the organisation’s payoff or the discipline imposed by 
an external market for control. Moreover, public opinion often opposes high pay or financial incentives to 
SOE management. Instead o f financial incentives, top management’s behaviour is controlled through 
selection methods, which place considerable weight on their support for the organisation’s mission. In 
addition, it is regulated through rules, which determine acceptable and unacceptable behaviours, and also 
monitoring. Executive compensation in public enterprise management thus provides limited incentive to 
improve performance. SOEs have provided a measure o f job security for its employees, which its private 
sector counterparts may not possess. Uncertainties attached to market mechanisms can mean shorter job 
spans even when the managerial performance cannot be completely blamed for poor results. Performance is 
thus strongly affected by lack o f job security in the private sector.
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privatisation conditions such as protection of minority shareholders, creation o f large 
outside investors, need to be fulfilled.
2.4 AGENCY COSTS OF EQUITY:
Equity is the most suitable financing tool when debt contracts are difficult to 
enforce or when collateral value is insufficient to back credit and short term cash flows 
are not sufficient to service debt payments. Newly established firms, and firms with 
intangible assets may need to be financed by equity because their assets have little value. 
As a result in most o f the growing economies like India (See Chapter-3 for more details), 
such firms are characterised by highly concentrated equity ownership by the 
entrepreneurs, and dispersed outside equity ownership (Mayer 1990, Singh 1994). Equity 
does not promise any payments in return for the investment to its holders; they receive 
dividends but at the discretion of the board of directors. Equity holders have no claim on 
specific assets o f the firm and have no right to call on collateral. And they do not even 
have a final date on which their investment matures: i.e. when the firm is liquidated and 
the proceeds are distributed. In most cases, equity holders may never get anything in 
return for their investment. But equity holders have voting power.
As noted earlier, the separation o f ownership and control in firms usually means 
managerial control over decision-making resulting in conflicts of interest and free rider 
problems that result in agency costs related to equity as well.
In more technical terms, the agency costs of equity can be understood by the 
following exposition:
. .when an owner-manager sells equity claims on the firm which are identical to 
his, agency costs are generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the
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outside shareholders, since he will then bear only a fraction of the costs o f any non- 
pecuniary benefits he takes out in maximising his own utility." (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976: p. 320).
The agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders is 
derived from the manager’s propensity to appropriate perquisites at the firm’s expense for 
his/her own consumption. As the manager’s ownership claim falls, his/her incentive to 
devote effort to creative activities falls. He/she provides less effort in managing the firm 
since he/she bears the disutility of work, but receives only part o f the firm’s value 
enhancement (effort incentive problem). In other words, the owner-manager consumes 
more perquisites since he/she himself benefits from the consumption and bears only part 
of the consequent value reduction of the film (perk consumption problem). This requires 
minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his/her behaviour, while 
the owner-manager faces more wealth costs in obtaining additional cash from the equity 
markets. Thus, the agency costs of equity are in effect caused by the conflict of interest 
between inside shareholders (owner-managers) and outside shareholders. The agency 
costs of equity decrease monotonically in the debt-equity ratio (Jensen-Meclding, 1976) 
as shown in the figure 2.3.
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AC Agency costs
0 1 v Debt-Equity ratio
Figure 2.3: Traditional Agency costs o f equity
As long as managers are not the sole beneficiaries of enhanced value, they will not 
exert greater effort to derive more value. So, increasing the equity level does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in the agency costs associated with equity. Usually, 
managers would try to avoid ventures that demanded more effort on their part. In the case 
o f firms with high insider shareholding, owner-managers are the majority residual 
claimants. There is, therefore, no conflict of interest in effort exertion. As a result the 
agency costs o f equity cannot decline monotonically in the debt-equity ratio. Kursten 
(1995) also suggests that the agency costs of equity can increase or decrease 
monotonically, or be non-monotonic, as long as risky debt is involved. Only when debt is 
risk-free, do the agency costs of equity decline monotonically.
Reducing the amount of external equity does not reduce the agency costs of 
equity. Given risky debt, the agency costs of equity can be defined as the loss o f value to 
shareholders caused by sub-optimal investment by managers who choose to do so in order 
to avoid investing a lot of his personal strain. Whereas agency costs of debt are incurred 
by a firm when managers are forced to choose the second best operating policy.
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Firms with high insider shareholding for e.g. LCCs, tend to vest most of the 
decision-making positions to family members80 who may not indulge in shirking their 
responsibilities. Then the conflict between inside shareholders and diffused outside 
shareholders does not include overseeing the behaviour o f the managers. The 
manifestation of the conflict of interest takes the form of accretion and diversion of the 
firm's returns towards insider shareholders81 for their personal benefit. But diversion of 
the firm’s returns towards family shareholders will depend 011 a firm's performance in the 
market. If the firm does not create enough returns for its future operations, the insiders 
cannot accumulate net earnings for themselves. As the market value of a firm’s shares 
increases there is a higher tendency for the accumulation of firm's returns. But at higher 
levels of market value, accumulation by insiders is invariably reduced in order to create 
credibility82 with outside shareholders. The agency costs of equity can be defined as a loss 
of value to outside shareholders due to adoption of certain payout policies by owner- 
managers who choose them in order not to divert the returns from the firm to outside 
shareholders. Thus agency costs increase with increases in the market value of the firm 
and decline at further higher levels of market value as shown in figure 2.4.
80 All-equity firms exhibit greater equity ownership by top managers and there is more extensive family 
involvement in corporate operations than levered films: Managerial ownership in all-equity firms is 
positively related to the extent o f family involvement. Therefore, the loss to managers from bankruptcy is 
potentially greater when members o f the manager’s family are also employed in the film. Managers face the 
risk of displacement by dissident shareholders or through hostile takeovers. There is greater managerial 
control o f voting rights in all equity firms with greater family involvement. Thus, managers avoid leverage 
to reduce the risk to their personal and family human capital. But if  the decision management and contr ol 
are combined in a few agents, residual claims will also be restricted to these agents. Although it will control 
agency problems between residual claimants and decision agents, the benefits o f unrestricted common stock 
cannot be reaped. Limited ownership lowers the value o f the residual claims and raises the cost o f risk 
bearing seivices and leads to less investment in projects with uncertain payoffs.
81 This is evident in their dividend policies.
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AC Agency costs
ACe Agency Costs of Equity
0 Market value0
Figure 2.4: Agency costs of equity in relation to market value of the firm.
2.4.A. CONFLICT BETWEEN LARGE AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS:
An entrepreneur always tries to choose his/her own stake in the firm and a 
monitor’s stake so as to maximise the total surplus arising in a firm i.e. the market value 
of the whole firm minus the cost of the investment plus his private benefits minus 
monitoring costs (Pagano and Roell, 1996). In this situation when share ownership is 
more concentrated, a single large shareholder or a tightly knit group o f shareholders 
retains a controlling stake in the company. The main conflict o f interest is then between 
the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders. This conflict is generated by 
the diversion of corporate earnings to the advantage of the controlling shareholder. 
Although it has been accepted that large investors are necessary to force managers to 
distribute profits, in the case of firms with high insider ownership, large investors 
themselves accumulate profits without distributing them in equal proportion to smaller 
outside shareholders. But at the same time they bear excessive risk. Expropriation by 
large investors can be detrimental to efficiency through adverse effects on the incentives 
of managers and employees, who might reduce firm-specific human capital investments.
82 At higher levels o f market value, the firm is in need o f additional funds for its investment projects. For
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If the initial owner of the firm wants to sell out to many small shareholders, he/she 
has to go public. If he wants to keep the company private, then he cannot sell minority 
stakes to more than a few large shareholders. In the bargain, he saves the cost of listing 
the company on the exchange but will have to accept a far greater degree o f monitoring. 
The danger o f over monitoring increases with the amount of the outside finance to be 
raised. So companies go public if they need a large amount o f new funding relative to 
their value. A single large external shareholder generally has an incentive to over-monitor 
which an entrepreneur tries to avoid. Increasing the number of shareholders beyond one 
alleviates the over-monitoring problem but it also carries costs (i.e. transaction costs, 
monitoring costs, and cost of investment).
The costs of insider ownership are borne by insiders who must allocate a large 
portion of their wealth to the firm and hold a concentrated portfolio with high covariant 
risk. Control of a firm provides the greatest incremental value when informational 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is greatest. The controlling shareholder tries to 
limit the transferability o f shares in order to maintain his position. Several restrictions are 
used to ensure that the controlling shareholder captures a bigger share of any rents that 
may result from future changes in shareholders’ stakes. Large non-controlling 
shareholders are often bought off by the company’s managing shareholder via disguised 
side payments, in the form of favourable supply contracts, reciprocal share deals etc. 
(Pagano and Roell, 1996). In order to prevent outside shareholders from interfering in the
83management o f the company, outside stakes are usually sufficiently dispersed. Thus an
this it will depend on outside shareholders.
83 Minority shareholders can verify the actions of controlling shareholder in a public company, i f  companies 
are subject to stricter disclosure requirements and transparent accounting standards.
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ownership structure emerges when there is one large shareholder who monitors, while all 
other shareholders are atomistic and therefore too small to enter into a co-operative 
agreement to monitor. Then the presence of a large outside shareholder may harm the 
interests of minority shareholders. In the absence of minority investor rights, public 
equity markets do not develop (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). But the large equity market of 
BSE despite lack of concrete protection of minority investors is indeed a puzzle. This can 
be explained by lack of corporate governance mechanisms.
2. 4. B OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MONITORING:
Different types of ownership structure (e.g. concentrated and diffused) which 
result in monitoring firm activities, and liquidity in the secondary market respectively, 
have generated extensive debates in the academic world. Liquidity in capital markets is 
often associated with the lack of effective corporate governance. As Bhide (1993) argues, 
in the US stock market, regulators have created market liquidity at the expense of the 
efficient governance o f firms. The liquidity promoted by US policies has obvious 
benefits; investors can encash their assets quickly and diversify cheaply. The same 
policies, however, impair governance by encouraging diffuse stockholding and 
discouraging active monitoring. Diffuse stockholders face more serious collective action 
problems. They cannot be provided with confidential information, be included on boards, 
or be given any other active role in the governance of firms.
Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that market liquidity can undermine effective 
control by a large shareholder by giving him excessive incentives to speculate rather than 
monitor. These investors may lack access to proprietary firm specific information, and 
therefore find it difficult to evaluate the long-term value of a firm (Porter, 1992). Instead
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they may focus on performance measures like current earnings that are easily quantifiable. 
Their behaviour is like that of arbitrageurs who frequently turn over their portfolio of 
stocks in order to capitalise on all possible short-term gains (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).
On the other hand it is also true that, while monitoring managerial activities, a 
large shareholder may receive information about the value of the firm before other market 
participants (Huddart, 1993). Together the managers and the large shareholder might 
obstruct any information production in the stock market. Due to this informational 
monopoly, a film ’s exclusive lender can dictate the terms of continuation o f finance, thus 
distorting the film ’s investment choice (Burkart et al., 1997). All these characteristics are 
true of a shareholder that can sell his/her claims as soon as he or she perceives a bad 
return state and, in other states, can speculate on the basis of his or her exclusive access to 
private information about the firm. While Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) argue that insider 
trading by a large shareholder could provide incentives to monitor incumbent 
management, it inevitably results in a higher cost of capital for the firm.
If a large shareholder decides to disperse his/her block of shares to several buyers, 
no large owner will emerge ex post in usual circumstances. Although according to Bolton 
et al. (1998), as long as hading remains non-anonymous, an attempt by the large owner to 
unload his/her block of shares with several buyers would immediately be reflected in the 
price,84 which in turn would remove the incentive to disperse his/her block.
Outside shareholders will only buy shares at a discount in the bad state, which in 
turn, reduces the number of trading partners in the secondary market who are ready to 
provide liquidity in all states. Although concentration of ownership improves the
84 If in a bad state the large block is sold, it trades at the same price as the single shares.
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incentives for the control of management, it reduces valuable trading possibilities for all 
shareholders. On the other hand, maximum dispersion of shares among initial owners 
increases trading opportunities among those who potentially will pay the full price for 
shares even in a bad state, but it leads to value-reducing lack of control. A shareholder 
monitors the manager only when the benefit exceeds the cost o f monitoring. The benefit 
increases with the fraction o f the firm he owns. A  shareholder will not monitor when he 
owns a tiny fraction o f the firm or when monitoring is expensive. A minority portfolio 
shareholder will have a short-term sense of association with a firm, so he/she cannot be 
expected to play an important role in monitoring the activities of either the large 
shareholder or of the firm’s managers.
Most o f the work related to monitoring a film ’s activities assumes that the 
relevant ownership structure is the initial one determined in the IPO.85 Maug (1998) and 
Bolton et al. (1998) emphasise an ownership structure that is robust i.e. resistant to 
retrading in secondary markets. A dispersion in time t=0 does not necessarily imply that 
there is dispersion in time t—1, after liquidity trading. One of the more patient owners may 
buy enough shares in the bad state to assemble a stake that makes it profitable for her or 
him to intervene. According to Maug (1998), the capital gain on her/his initial stake does 
not cover the costs of monitoring. Part o f the incentive to monitor, therefore comes from 
the ability to purchase additional shares in the stock market at a price that does not reflect 
the large shareholder’s improvements. As a result, the large shareholder’s engagement in 
shareholder activism increases with the liquidity of the market. This result runs counter to 
the conventional wisdom that liquid markets discourage large activist shareholders. When
85 Initial Public O ffering.
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there is no concentration at date t = 0, the main question is whether an owner who is large 
enough to control management emerges after trading in the secondary market in the bad 
return state. The main factor which prevents the emergence of a controlling block at date t 
= 1 is due to free riding by small patient owners. So, free riding makes the concentration 
of shares in the bad return state impossible. According to Vishny and Shleifer (1986), if 
the ownership structure o f the firm is initially very diffuse and trading is public, it is not 
profitable to assemble a large block of shares. Premonitoring purchase o f shares by the 
large shareholder raises the firm’s expected profits. If the major shareholder changes 
his/her holdings through trade, then the price at which trade takes place will reflect the 
new resultant monitoring level. He/she can capture the gains of monitoring only on the 
shares he owns initially, but not on any newly acquired shares, for which he/she must pay 
a price, which reflects the eventual monitoring. When he/she buys shares, he/she 
increases his/her monitoring but does not receive the benefits of this higher level of 
monitoring on the newly acquired shares. The reason is that the price he/she pays for the 
shares already reflects increase in the expected payoffs brought about by the higher 
monitoring level. Conversely, when he/she sells shares, he/she reduces his/her monitoring 
costs. But these cost savings are partially eroded by the loss realised on the shares sold 
since the price at which they are sold reflects the lower expected payoffs with a reduced 
level/cost of monitoring. Therefore, he/she captures the benefits of monitoring only on 
his/her initial endowment (Admati et al, 1994).
Usually in most films large shareholders co-operate in order to influence 
positively the management of a company. But this arrangement, according to Bolton and 
Thadden (1998), reduces liquidity and does not provide any improvement in the ex post
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reorganisation/continuation decision. A single large owner with a stake strictly greater 
than 10-20%86 reduces liquidity but does not improve ex post efficiency. This establishes 
that firm value is maximised by having exactly one large owner with a stake o f between 
10-20%. It is usually difficult for single large outside shareholder with a stake of 10-20% 
to emerge in the case of small sized firm where a controlling family will resist any such 
attempt at entry. The existing large inside shareholder (the owner-family) fears an outside 
large shareholder as the latter can pressurise management in ways that affect adversely 
the total surplus they can expropriate.
The above exposition points out that: (a) the presence of a large shareholder does 
not always guarantee monitoring, and (b) liquidity, or the lack of it in the market, does 
not change the monitoring behaviour of the large shareholder. Hence, both types of 
ownership structure concentrated or dispersed can be optimal, depending on the 
characteristics of the firm87 and the environment in which it operates (Bolton and 
Thadden, 1998).
86 In the US a block o f 10-20% if  established can be associated with significant share price rises due to 
improved corporate control.
S7 Mikkelson and Partch (1989) find that the level o f inside ownership has a negative relation to the 
probability of being targeted but a positive relation to the probability o f successfiil targeting if activism 
serves as a substitute for takeovers. The presence of a large outside block holder can increase the likelihood 
that a firm is targeted (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Shivdasani (1993) finds a positive relation between 
ownership by block holders unaffiliated with management and the likelihood o f a hostile takeover attempt. 
Hence firm size and likelihood o f targeting should be positively related. If larger firms comprise a larger 
percentage of an institution’s investment portfolio, the expected benefits may be larger from targeting these 
firms, since the private gains to the activist are higher. If stock price performance reflects managerial 
performance and firms with poor stock price performance are more likely to be disciplined, then there 
should be a negative relation between stock price performance and probability o f being targeted through 
activism. Firms with lower Tobin’s Q or market-to-book ratio of firm value should have a higher probability 
of targeting. If activism, like bonding, aligns incentives, which results in improvements in operating 
performance, then the market value of the firm is expected to increase with unanticipated activism. The 
market value of the firm could also increase if  activism targeting is associated with an increase in the 
probability that the firm will be subject to a takeover attempt. Both the levels o f insider and institutional 
ownership measure ownership structure. Larger the firm and higher the level o f institutional ownership, the 
greater the probability o f being targeted.
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Only a diffused ownership structure can arise in a competitive equilibrium when 
all investors are price takers. In a diffused ownership structure, risk sharing is efficient 
but no one monitors. To sustain a welfare maximising ownership structure the major 
shareholder must be discouraged from liquidating his holdings piecemeal. If a shareholder 
divests his stake holding piecemeal, then the firm has always to ensure that paper wealth88 
stays high. Imposing restrictions on the sale of shares by certain large shareholders 
facilitate such a commitment. The major shareholder could receive a payment from the 
firm, conditional on retaining a specific stake of the firm (Huddart, 1993).
Huddart (1993) considers that monitoring is valuable only when coupled with an 
incentive scheme responsive to the signals generated. Monitoring is necessary to induce 
managers to work hard; only concentrated share ownership induces shareholders to 
monitor. A manager’s incentive to signal his/her qualities by producing high short-term 
profits depends on how that particular performance affects his/her prospects of retaining 
the job. But managers in family owned companies do not face employment risks such that 
incentive schemes may not make any significant contribution to their efficiency. At the 
same time it is observed that although managerial discretion is ex post detrimental to 
shareholders, it can be beneficial ex ante as it favours firm-specific investment. The 
manager is less inclined to show such initiative when shareholders are likely to interfere. 
Hence, to the extent that managerial initiatives contribute to the value of a firm, there is a
88 The difference between paper and real wealth is the following:
Paper wealth of a shareholder’s holdings refers to their value at the prevailing market price. This is common 
practice in financial risk management and is also referred to as “marking-to-market”. Accountants use this 
procedure in market value accounting. Whereas Real wealth refers to the value o f the shareholder’s 
holdings after he liquidates his position. If the shares of the corporation are widely distributed among 
numerous small shareholders that trade for liquidity purposes, it is optimal for the corporation to ensure that 
the paper wealth of the corporation stays high. In this case, small shareholders stay satisfied as they can sell 
their shares at high prices (Chatterjea et al, 1994).
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trade-off between the gains from monitoring and those from exercising managerial 
initiative. Under these conditions the owner-entrepreneur may be willing to bear a lower 
share price, because a more dispersed outside ownership grants him more effective 
control and higher private gains (Burkart et al, 1997).
This could partly explain the trend for most of the small owner-managed 
companies listed on BSE. Given the prevailing situation in BSE, in the absence of any 
effective monitoring by the outside shareholders, block debt holders89 (financial 
institutions) are the only institutional holders who can potentially monitor the activities of 
a firm, albeit only partially.90 It becomes important that a block debt holder monitors the 
firm, as there is no scope for an outside large shareholder to emerge. Moreover, as the 
debt holder has limited claim on the returns of the firm, its intervention cannot constrain 
managerial initiative. A block debt holder with a sufficiently large stake may be willing to 
monitor the firm and guide managerial decisions. But again the block debt holder 
considers only certain conditions in which it is worthwhile to monitor, or in some cases is 
forced91 to monitor.
89 But there is also a possibility o f collusion between banks and insiders concerning preferences for profit 
retention over distribution o f dividends. Corporate growth and product diversification based on high 
retentions allows managers and employees to secure their jobs. Creditor banks have a similar strategy as 
high retentions reduce the risk that the company will default on its outstanding debt. Banks as shareholders 
may have a strong incentive to behave opportunistically, since they have privileged access to company 
information (Filatotchev, 1997). Simultaneous existence o f low dividends and FI’s presence can still 
provide some credibility in the minds o f the investors, which may be completely absent if  there were no 
block debt holders.
90 A large shareholder is only concerned about selling his shares at the highest price whereas institutional 
investors normally have a fiduciary duty to try to achieve their client’s objectives. Given their responsibility 
towards the clients, institutional investors must justify their activism in terms o f achieving these objectives. 
Consequently, for an institution, activism during the bad return state will depend upon the pressure of its 
own clients.
91 Continuous losses for a long period o f time in a firm drives it towards being declared as bankrupt. A 
financial institution in that case has to decide between two options i.e. going through costly bankruptcy 
procedures or playing a part in the decision making process o f the firm and give the firm another 
opportunity to reorganise and restructure.
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2.5 AGENCY MOTIVES OF TAKEOVERS:
Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions provide ways through which fmns can exit 
from the LCC category. The emphasis of the analysis is from the point of view of the 
target Finn. Given the documented large gains in shareholder wealth after a takeover, 
under what conditions might there be a lack of initiative to divest, or a lack of interest in 
taking over a target firm? hi attempting to answer that question, this section explains the 
effectiveness o f one of the areas of corporate governance i.e. disciplining managers 
through takeovers92 and mergers.
92 Economic analysis has identified two broad classes of takeovers. They can be divided on the basis o f the 
purpose: motives, which stem from industry-specific factors (including synergistic effects and the impact o f  
restructuring); and corporate control and agency cost motivations. Early theories o f takeover emphasised 
industry-specific factors as important motives for takeover (Gort, 1969) or called synergistic takeovers, since 
the motivating force behind them is the possibility o f benefits from combining the businesses o f two firms. 
These include the realisation o f economies o f scale and the desire to reduce competition and benefit from 
monopoly power. Both provide motives for takeovers, which are either horizontal or vertical. An extension 
of this theory is provided by Mueller (1969), who argues that conglomerate acquisitions can be explained 
by the existence o f management synergies and by the fact that large diversified firms might have easier 
access to finance. And also due to a desire on the part of management to reduce risk through a pooling of 
activities (Amihud and Lev, 1981). A second industry-specific motive is that mergers and acquisitions can 
often be a convenient means through which industries are restructured following some economic 
disturbance, which requires a reduction in the optimal size of that Industry (Gort, 1969). The acquiring films 
determine their takeover targets by using the following measures:
1. Tobin's Q: The ratio o f the market value o f the firm to the replacement cost o f its tangible assets. Tobin's Q 
can be viewed also as measuring the ratio of intangible to tangible assets o f the firm. The former may include 
future growth opportunities, monopoly power, and quality o f management, good will, and so on. A low Q can 
be a reliable indicator o f a declining firm as it genuinely measures the low valuation o f the film’s tangible 
assets in their current use. It may pay to sell off assets when Q is low because those assets have a higher value 
in another firm or sector. If a low Q reflects a low valuation of physical assets relative to their potential, then 
acquiring the firm will be a cost-effective way to buy and redeploy its physical capital. A related measure o f  
profitability relative to the value o f physical assets is the deviation of a firm’s Q from the average Q o f its 
industry. A low Tobin's Q can also result from well-managed but invaluable assets. For example if  the hostile 
targets invested a long time ago when their industry was growing, but in the current period if  the fortunes o f the 
industry have turned around, they will be stuck with lots o f capital. This is also possible when foreign 
competition and technological progress have ruined the hostile targets. But the view that firms with a great deal 
of old fixed capital have a low Tobin's Q doesn't explain why these films are potential targets for mergers and 
acquisitions. The free cash flow theory explains this situation as follows; if  low Q industries are in decline, 
managers may be too slow to close down or sell off plants, curtail investment, and firm down operations in 
order to retain their positions. If manager’s dedication to the survival o f organisations, as suggested by 
Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), keeps them from shrinking their operations sufficiently fast, then acquirers can 
increase value by accelerating the decline o f the target firm.
2. Stock market valuation: Manne (1965) argues that the stock market provides the only objective evaluation of  
management performance through the price it places on a film’s equity. If the management o f a public
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Disciplinary takeovers try to correct the non-value-maximising practices of the 
managers of target firms. These practices might include excessive growth and 
diversification, lavish consumption of perquisites, over payment to employees and suppliers 
or debt avoidance to secure a quiet life. Disciplinary takeovers thus address the problem of 
discretionary managerial behaviour (Williamson 1964) or the agency cost of free cash
corporation performs inefficiently, then the firm’s share price will fall to create an incentive for more 
competent managers to take control o f the firm and try to increase the value o f the firm. Thus, the worse a firm 
is managed, the lower its share price and therefore higher potential capital gains to outsiders who buy the firm’s 
stock and run the firm more efficiently. Although the process o f the takeovers can be expensive as long as the 
cost o f the takeover is outweighed by the gains to be made by ousting inefficient managers, they will be 
attractive to potential acquirers. This is what is called the Inefficient Management Hypothesis. So acquisitions 
become a mechanism through which managers o f a firm who are unable to maximise its market value are 
replaced. The excess return on a firm’s stock, averaged over an extended period o f time is used as a proxy for 
management efficiency. As an alternative to the excess return measure, accounting profitability is also used as a 
proxy for management performance. If the stock market does not value some firms properly, an acquirer who 
understands their intrinsic value may be able to buy their assets more cheaply on the stock market than on the 
new or used capital goods market.
3. Industry related reasons: According to the Growth resource mismatch hypothesis, two types o f firms are 
likely to be takeover targets i.e. low-growth, resource rich films and high growth, resource-poor firms. This 
hypothesis indicates that both growth and resource availability are important variables in determining a film’s 
acquisition likelihood. The Industry Disturbance Hypothesis explains an observed variation in merger rates 
both across industries and over time. Goit argues that mergers are caused by valuation differentials among 
market participants resulting from economic shocks like changes in technology, industry structure, and 
regulatory environment. A factor that signals the acquisition likelihood of a film is, therefore, the recent history 
of acquisitions in its industry (Palepu, 1986).
4. Other accounting measures: The Size hypothesis relates to the transaction costs associated with acquiring 
a firm. These include the cost associated with the absorption o f the target into the acquirer’s organisational 
framework as well as the costs associated with fighting a prolonged battle that a target may wage to defend 
itself. These costs are likely to increase with the target size and hence the number o f potential bidders for a 
firm to decrease with size. The Market to book hypothesis suggests that the firms with low market-to-book 
value ratios are cheap buys. But as the book value of a firm need not reflect the replacement value o f its 
assets, the validity o f this assumption is dubious. And also bidders with high P/E ratios seek to acquire low 
P/E firms to realise an instantaneous capital gain because of the belief that the stock market values the 
earnings of the combined entity as a higher P/E ratio o f the acquirer (Palepu, 1986).
In summary, hostile targets appear to have sharply distinguishable asset characteristics. Relative to the 
market value o f the firm, they appear to have a considerable amount o f old tangible capital. They are glowing 
slowly and have heavy debts. Although these characteristics suggest that hostile acquisitions might be related to 
the desire to purchase these fixed assets, other explanations as mentioned above also form part o f this general 
story. In particular incompetent management, asset redeployment, free cash flow, taxes, and under pricing o f  
the film’s assets by the market could all invite takeover bids. But empirical studies on these hypotheses prove 
that just like the stock markets, they fail to predict targets with a high degree o f accuracy long before the 
takeover announcements (Palepu, 1986). Due to asymmetric infoimation problems governing the takeover 
markets it is difficult to predict that a film with all the above-mentioned features would become a target for a 
takeover or a merger.
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flow93 (Jensen 1986). In the absence of any internal method of control, or where such 
methods are not successfully implemented, the market for coiporate control facilitates the 
dismissal of managers who are not acting in shareholders' best interests (Vishny and 
Shleifer, 1988). The agency motive suggests that takeovers occur because they enhance 
the acquiring management’s welfare at the expense of the acquiring shareholders. A 
takeover is therefore motivated by an acquiring management’s self-interest, enabling 
management to extract wealth from shareholders.
When exogenous increases in earnings decrease managerial effort below efficient 
levels, firms financially recapitalise themselves by increasing the debt/equity ratio, in order 
to restore the effort of existing managers to ex ante efficient levels. When the target firms 
are under performing compared to other firms in the industry, a takeover leads to 
replacement of incompetent management94 rather than recapitalisation of the corporation to 
raise managerial effort.
93 The free cash flow theory o f takeover suggests two additional channels through which the market for 
corporate control exerts its influence. In firms with a lack o f positive NPV investment opportunities, the 
payment o f higher dividends will signal that managers are not dissipating shareholders' assets. Thus, higher 
dividends are related to a lower probability of takeover. At the same time, any increase in investment by 
such firms will necessarily be value reducing since they have no profitable investment opportunities, and the 
market should discipline such over-investment behaviour by takeover. Jensen's extension o f the agency 
theory indicates a role for both investment and dividend policy in influencing the probability o f a takeover, 
among companies, which have no positive NPV investment opportunities. Free cash flow is the main factor 
emphasised in Jensen’s (1986) agency model ofM &A.
94 From a sample o f contested and friendly bids in the UK in 1985-86, Franks and Mayer (1996) found no 
statistical difference in either the share price performance of targets o f hostile bids compared to targets o f  
friendly bids over the 2 years prior to the bid. In addition it was found that only 12% targets o f successful 
hostile bids had reduced or omitted their dividends in the 2 years prior to the bid, compared to a figure o f  
41 % for a random sample o f poorly performing firms (companies from the bottom 20% o f  the market 
measured by share price performance). But they found that there was a significantly higher level o f 
corporate restructuring - asset disposals and executive dismissals associated with successliil hostile bids 
compared to friendly bids. An interpretation o f these results is that the market for corporate control is a 
market in contending prospective strategies for firms rather than a mechanism for correcting past poor 
performance o f firms. That is hostile bids occur where there is ex-ante managerial failure (i.e. the prospect 
of improved performance in the future by an alternative management, even without poor performance by the 
incumbent management) rather than ex-post managerial failure (i.e. poor past performance by the incumbent 
management) (Stapledon, 1996).
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Takeovers solve the problem of free cash flow as they lead to distribution of the 
firm’s profits to investors over time (Jensen, 1986). Conflicts o f interest arise between 
shareholders and managers when the organisation generates substantial free cash flow 
because of its payout policies. Managers have the tendency to use this free cash flow to 
increase the size of the firm even though it does not increase the value of stocks held by 
shareholders. Acquisitions are one of the ways by which managers spend the cash instead 
of paying it out shareholders. They do not pay this excess cash flow to the shareholders as 
such payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ control. In small firms 
with high insider shareholding free cash flow may not be always used for increasing the 
size of the firm, histead there is a tendency to accumulate free cash flow to increase the 
personal wealth o f inside owners as in the case of films listed on BSE.
If a project chosen by the management fails, most managers would be reluctant to 
divest because a divestiture would mean admitting that an inappropriate project was 
chosen, and it would adversely effect perceptions of his/her ability. In this situation, 
skilled managers with high reputation manage to generally make divestiture decisions 
(value maximising), whereas unskilled managers delay divestitures. Thus a takeover 
threat may deter a manager from adopting a sub-optimal project, hi the same manner, 
when low Q industries are in decline, managers may be too slow to close down or sell off 
plants, curtail investment, and trim down operations in order to retain their positions. If 
managers’ dedication to the survival of organisations, as suggested by Donaldson and 
Lorsch (1983), keeps them from shrinking their operations sufficiently fast, then acquirers 
can increase value by accelerating the decline of the target firm.
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When a takeover is motivated by agency reasons, firms’ profits should be higher 
than previously anticipated. The threat of takeovers should result in financial 
restructuring, which could take the form o f increased debt, a spin-off o f the source of the 
free cash flows, or increased regular dividends. Replacement of top management is 
unimportant in this case (Griffin & Wiggins, 1992).
The exact functional relationship between the firm characteristics and its acquisition 
likelihood in a given period, is given by Palepu (1986);
"Let p (a, t) be the probability that the firm a will be acquired in period t, x (a, t) a 
vector of measured attributes of the firm, and s a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated. Then, 
p (a ,t)  =  l / [ l + e - “ <u >]
p (a, t) is the logit probability function of the measured attributes o f the firm.
Whether or not a film is acquired in a particular time period depends on the number 
and type of acquisition bids it receives in that period. This in turn depends on the 
firm’s own characteristics, agency factors as well as the motives and attributes of the 
bidders. The relevant characteristics of the target, which influence its attractiveness, 
and the characteristics of the target-bidder combination are modelled as stochastic 
random variables. It is the probability distributions of these random variables which 
are endogenous to the acquisition process, that determine the specific functional form 
o fp  (b, t)."
In takeovers initiated by agency factors, there are negative total gains and negative 
gains to acquiring shareholders. But, according to Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), if  
target shareholders realise the management’s motives, they can attempt to appropriate
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some o f the management’s rent and will succeed in doing so if they have some bargaining 
power. Since the management’s rent reduces total value to shareholders, total gain to 
shareholders is inversely related to rent. This implies that the correlation between target 
and total gains is negative. Their empirical study found that on average, takeovers yield 
positive total gains, which occurred in about 75% of the takeovers in the sample. So, the 
synergy motive95 for takeovers appears to dominate. Palepu (1986) also finds that friendly 
strategic takeovers96 which combine firms in related businesses are likely to offer greater 
business synergies and higher profitability than hostile transactions.97
A great deal of theory supports the idea that takeovers automatically address 
governance problems. That, however, is not the case. Takeovers increase the combined 
value98 o f the target and acquiring firm. Profits are expected to rise thereafter, through the 
gains involved in selling off parts of the company, laying off workers, and availing o f tax 
advantages. Most of the takeover targets are often ill-performing firms with incompetent 
managers who are removed once the takeover succeeds (Palepu, 1986). But according to
95 Takeovers occur because of economic gains that result by merging the resources o f  the two firms.
96 Friendly transactions, typically involve stock payment for firms in overlapping businesses.
97 Hostile transactions, generally involve cash payments for firms in unrelated businesses.
98 Bhagat et al (1990) also confirm that although it is clear that the hostile takeovers largely allocate 
businesses to firms owning other related businesses, the source o f gains in related acquisitions come from 
improvements in operating efficiency, increases in market power, or other sources. But there is uncertainty 
regarding the sources o f gains from takeovers, it is highly likely that a firm which bases its decision of  
takeover on the above mentioned measures (i.e. Tobin's Q, stock market valuation etc.) is not sufficient to 
carry out the takeover. The asymmetric information leads to extracting of gains through laying off workers, 
selling off parts o f the acquired firm etc., if  the acquiring firms realise that the target films cannot be 
restructured to suit to its strategic policies. Thus, raiders and Management Buy Out (MBO) teams appear 
largely to serve the temporary function of brokering the transfer of assets toward related acquirers. High 
debt levels and concentrated ownership give these organisations a strong incentive to implement a takeover, 
but the task o f subsequent management is left to others.
Even if this was true, many o f the LCCs on the BSE would have been taken over and subsequently 
the management would have changed hands, but this has failed to occur. After a takeover, if  the target firm 
does not seem to be valuable to the acquirer strategically, the acquirer may liquidate the acquired firm. As a 
result the acquiring companies may either face tough resistance to their takeover proposal from the target 
management or the raiders may not indulge in a takeover of an LCC.
81
Cosh et al. (1989), the effect o f a merger on company performance is unimpressive. 
Although growth rates are maintained or improved, profit performance worsens more 
often than it improves. Their study o f the evidence of UK takeovers suggests that 
takeovers or the threat of them has been an imperfect device for ensuring efficient 
resource allocation and improved company performance.
Takeovers can actually increase agency costs when bidding managements overpay 
for takeovers, which bring private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
Takeovers also require a liquid capital market, which can provide bidders with a large 
amount of capital on short notice (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Participation in the market 
for corporate control is costly; a raider faces positive investigation costs prior to detecting 
a takeover target. A takeover threat is only credible if  a raider can expect to obtain part of 
the wealth gains. According to Boot (1992), lack of incentives for the raider to investigate 
potential takeover targets are that the threat of a takeover, which has a disciplinary effect 
on management, reduces the wealth gains which arise from the actual takeover, and the 
raider may not be able to capitalise on private information about the inefficiency of the 
target. Moreover his/her bid would reveal the information to the market and invite 
competitive bids. If his/her bid does not invite competitive bids from other films, it would 
mean that he/she is planning a takeover that the market is not enthusiastic about. When 
his/her bid invites competitive bids and he/she values the target firm higher than any of 
his/her competitors due to hubris, he/she faces what is known as the “W inner’s curse”.99
99 When bidding takes place for a valuable object with an uncertain value, the winning bid is likely to 
represent valuation error. The positive valuation error represents the winner's curse. Given strong-market 
efficiency in all markets, the prevailing market price of the target already reflects the full value o f the firm. 
The higher valuation of the bidder (over the target's true economic value) results from hubris- the bidder’s
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These factors reduce the raider’s potential to obtain rents and discourage participation in 
the market for corporate control. In an environment where there are hidden and 
asymmetric information problems, takeover market100 may fail to occur due to adverse 
selection.
2.5. A. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN TAICOVERS:
Given the agency reasons for takeovers, it is highly probable that top executives 
would engage in acquisitions, initially, at least in areas related to their core business. Any 
non-bonded cash requests by management are likely to be perceived negatively by 
shareholders. Thus, shareholders will perceive requests for unbonded funds as the 
acquisition of free cash flow unless they are provided with contrary evidence. Hence, the 
share price will decline to reflect the residual loss due to the expected misuse of free cash 
flow by managers. But if  cash is obtained through the sale of debt, firms are contractually 
committed to pay out these cash flows to the debt holders. If the bonding o f cash flow 
mitigates shareholder concerns about the misuse of funds, shareholders will respond more 
favourably to debt issue announcements if  management has a favourable acquisition track 
record.
excessive self-confidence (pride, arrogance). Hubris is one of the factors, which causes the winner's curse 
phenomenon to occur (Brealey and Myers, 1997).
100 After having evaluated the possible takeover targets, it is highly unlikely that the acquiring firm is fully 
aware o f the intrinsic value o f the target firm. This is clear from the premium that is paid by the acquirer 
when a hostile takeover is accomplished, in addition to the market value of the company before the takeover 
bid. Payment o f premiums stem from differences in valuations by different parties i.e. the market could be 
undervaluing the companies, so that takeovers occur to correct an under valuation, not to make any changes 
in operations. Acquiring companies can make incorrect valuations and the pay higher takeover premiums. 
Outside shareholders do not have access to all the information regarding the investment operations open to 
firms. Therefore it is difficult to decide whether changes in the profitability o f films are the result o f good or 
bad management, or of the inevitable uncertainty associated with any investment program (Hall, 1988). If the 
market decides that the managers’ decisions are incorrect the value o f the company’s shares in the market will 
fall. As a result firm will become vulnerable to a takeover by a raider who can correct the managers’ decisions. 
But Palepu (1986) finds that in most cases the new value created for the stockholders o f the target company
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Significant creditors like banks or financial institutions can also be potential 
active participants in the market for corporate control. Banks and financial institutions 
hold both equity and debt in the firms and vote on the equity of other investors (OECD, 
1995). They possess a whole range of controls, and use their cash flow rights to interfere 
in the major decisions of the firm. And hence they may be similar to large shareholders, 
in playing an active role in Merger and Acquisition (M&A) transactions. Banks and 
financial institutions themselves may be listed on stock markets and hence are 
responsible towards their own outside shareholders for better returns. In such a situation 
FIs would try to downsize their portfolio in order to concentrate on effective control and 
monitoring over a limited number of companies in which they have a substantial holding. 
A debt holding in many small firms thus means lack of effective control and monitoring 
of all individual firms.101 This is perhaps one of the reasons why Cosh et al. (1989) find 
that the presence of institutional investors has not altered the basic underlying 
characteristics of the takeover selection process in UK.
Many studies argue that Financial Institutions and large block holders have 
economic incentives and as a result make the voting process efficient in a proxy process. 
Outside shareholders hold a very small portion of all the outstanding corporate votes and 
residual claims. Thus their voting pattern is unlikely to affect the outcome of the voting 
process significantly. So there is no incentive for them to become informed and vote so as 
to maximise share value. Given this problem, Pound (1988) suggests that the most
and the acquiring company combined, does not include any additional cash flows beyond those required to 
recover the premium paid.
10lThis runs contrary to the hypothesis o f Cosh et al. (1989), which suggests that behaviour o f all the 
companies in the market will change, given the presence of institutional investors irrespective o f the relative 
size o f their holding.
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important determinant o f efficiency in the proxy process is the informed shareholders 
with large holdings who have economic incentives to make the voting process efficient at 
the margin, even in the presence of some uninformed shareholders.
There are alternative hypotheses about the effects of both groups as suggested by 
Pound(1988):
"Large investors may simply vote ‘street rules’, meaning that they abstain from voting 
and sell their holdings rather than vote actively against management.
Large block holders may maintain strategic alliances with incumbent management.
Institutional investors may vote with management because of conflict-of-interest 
problems. Existing business relationships with incumbent management influences their 
voting behaviour. Voting against management may significantly affect the FI's business 
relationship with the incumbent management, whereas voting with management results in 
no penalties."
In addition to the above hypotheses, Brickley et al (1988) suggest that inside 
block holders vote more actively than non-block holders, and that they vote for 
management initiated proposals more frequently than non-block holders, independent of 
the proposal’s effect on the firm value. Institutions that derive benefits under the 
management control are less likely to oppose management proposals. They classify FIs 
under 3 mutually exclusive categories based upon their susceptibility to management 
influence:
"Pressure sensitive institutions- insurance companies, banks, and non-bank trusts 
owning at least 1% of the firm’s stock;
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Pressure resistant institutions - public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, and 
foundations owning at least 1% of the firm’s stock;
Pressure indeterminate institutions - corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, 
investment counsel firms, miscellaneous and unidentified institutions plus institutions 
owning less than 1% of the firm’s stock." (Brickley et al., 1988)
It is quite possible that FIs can find themselves in situations where they own 
significant stockholding in both films that are engaged in a takeover battle. Institutions 
then find themselves on both sides of the conflict. During these situations their potential 
business with incumbent managements is at stake on both sides. The occurrence of 
takeover or not will then depend on the FI's higher interests in one o f the two firms. Debt 
holding in many firms leads to financial institutions finding themselves in situations like 
these. Takeovers in such cases may not really fulfil the objectives o f corporate 
governance.
2.5.B. REPUTATION BUILDING:
In firms that do not have high insider ownership top executives generate rents 
from superior management skills. The managerial competence of the top team is crucial 
to the film ’s success. This team organises the firm and makes decisions for it. By using 
superior skills to make and implement strategic and operational decisions,102 the top 
management of a firm creates rents. Castanias and Helfat (1992) claim that rent- 
generating top managers have incentives to act efficiently and the potential goal conflict
102 By this managers improve security o f their positions by diversifying the firm’s real asset portfolio. They 
reduce employment risk by increasing the size of the firm and by purchasing assets that are unrelated to the 
firm’s primary line o f business. Managers have incentives to expand firm size since executive compensation 
and promotions are positively related to firm size. But entry into lines of business that are unrelated to the 
firm’s primary focus could yield sub-optimal performance.
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between top management and diffused shareholders is not a source o f concern. The top 
management o f a firm maximises its utility subject to a constraint, which is enforced by 
the market for corporate control. This does not suggest that takeover attempts correct for 
inefficient management. Instead, such attempts may involve rent-seeking behaviour by 
outsiders and result in rent distribution. Rent distribution need not necessarily have a 
value increasing effect. By using their reputation for superior management, the top 
executives of a firm can indulge in acquisitions that bring more assets under their control.
Reputation building is a very common explanation for why people deliver on their 
agreements even if they cannot be forced to. Managers repay investors because they want 
to keep coming to the capital market to raise funds in the future. Hence they need to 
establish a reputation as good risks in order to convince future investors to provide funds 
(Vishny and Shleifer, 1996).
Jensen argues that self-interested managers have incentives to hoard and misuse 
free cash flow. Agency costs can be mitigated through reputation building, particularly, 
management’s reputation regarding its misuse of free cash flow. Investor perceptions 
about management may be more favourable if the firm develops a track record of 
expanding only into related areas of business103. Expansion in related lines of business 
provides information to the shareholder that the firm’s managers are acquiring assets that 
fit them strategically and that they are investing in their areas of expertise. Mann and 
Sicherman (1991) find evidence that if  managers exhibit a propensity to invest and 
expand only in assets related to their core business, investors respond more favourably to 
equity announcements. Thus, managerial reputation for not abusing free cash flow may
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reduce agency costs. Otherwise, given managerial incentives to hoard and misuse free 
cash flow, shareholders will respond negatively to equity issue announcements because 
they expect, on average, management misuse of any non-bonded funds. Investors also 
expect that firms with no track record are likely to pursue unrelated acquisitions. A 
favourable acquisition track record is defined as only acquisitions o f assets that are 
related to the firm’s core line of business. Creating reputation in the minds o f investors is 
very difficult, although coverage of a company in the financial press helps achieve this 
objective. It may happen however that entry of a firm into related activities through 
takeovers could result in negative returns due to unforeseen circumstances. In effect it is 
the improved performance of the acquired firm under the new management which helps 
investors to respond favourably to an equity issue.
103 Rumelt (1974) provides evidence that conglomerates under perform than other firms.
2.6 AGENCY COSTS AND INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM:
Most o f the existing models of financial structures and investment decisions are 
single-firm based. As such they do not take into account the relationship between cash 
flows and the investment decisions of all firms in the industry. The standard results of 
agency theory have been derived for a single firm in isolation than for the whole industry 
taken together. Industry equilibrium may have very different properties if  firms within an 
industry compete in the product market. Then, the standard predictions o f agency theory 
may have limited validity. Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) show that the effect of 
financial structure on investment and production decisions is irrelevant in a competitive 
equilibrium. In a single film case, a film ’s financial structure affects equity holders’ 
incentive to substitute assets. But when the decisions of other firms are taken into 
account, the effect of asset substitution on film value differs from that o f single firm.
If there are two alternative production technologies with the same expected costs 
but imperfectly correlated cost shocks, the price of the output is correlated to the 
technology’s cost shocks in a competitive market. If one firm adopts alternative 
technology, the price o f the good sold will not be highly correlated to the deviating film ’s 
cost shocks. The difference between prices and costs is more volatile for a deviating firm. 
Its expected profit will be higher but riskier. In equilibrium the number o f firms choosing 
each technology adjusts until their expected values are equated. At that point an 
individual firm becomes indifferent to the choice between alternative technologies.
A film ’s choice is also affected by its financial structure in the following manner: 
equity holders o f firms with risky debt have an incentive to choose the riskier but higher- 
yield investment. If there are too many firms with risky debt, the value of the riskier
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investment will fall below that of the less risky project. This creates incentives for some 
firms to reduce their debt levels and invest in the less risky project. In equilibrium, the 
distribution of capital structures must adjust until no firm can increase its value by 
altering its equity holders’ incentives to invest so that each individual firm is indifferent 
between alternative financial structures (Maksimovic and Zechner, 1991). But if the 
effects of the agency costs o f debt (Section 2.2) are taken into consideration where a 
single firm is forced to adopt the second best operating policy, then too many firms adopt 
the less risky project; the value of it would be less than that o f a riskier project. If, in a 
competitive equilibrium, financial structures do not matter then at the firm level there is 
no difference between optimal and sub-optimal decisions. This may indicate inefficiency 
at the firm level leading to efficiency at the aggregate industry level.
They also suggest a link between technology choice and financial structure. 
Within an industry, firms that adopt technology chosen by the majority of firms generate 
higher expected earnings before interest and taxes, and are less levered than firms that 
deviate and adopt a technology which is only chosen by few firms.
According to W illiams104 (1995), managers of most firms like to invest in capital- 
intensive production but fail to commit to avoid the wastage of perks. As a result firms 
cannot sell to outside investors sufficient securities so that they can finance their capital- 
intensive project. Some firms are forced, in the resulting equilibrium, to miss investment 
with positive Net Present Value (NPV). The foregone investment is a result of 
competition within an industry. In equilibrium, capital-intensive firms are profitable and
104 Williams (1995) assumes that each firm in an industry produces a homogeneous good by adopting either 
a labour or capital-intensive technology. The labour intensive technology has no initial cost but has high 
variable costs.
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less risky compared to labour intensive firms. Thus they are hence able to finance their 
investments with some outside debt. Even if  entry costs approach zero, capital-intensive 
firms can earn extraordinary profits, while labour intensive films can fail.
With their findings taken together, the above authors show that the standard 
agency results for an isolated firm change when the same firm is interacting with other 
firms in an industry.
2.7 CONCLUSION:
Any modern economic production system can be described at the level o f the 
individual firm as consisting of three main actors: workers, managers and owners. The 
three possible principal-agent relations between them define the functioning of the firm. 
Agency models essentially: (a) examine the relation between managers and owners, (b) 
develop a model of managerial effort; and (c) determine levels of effort in a contractual 
arrangement under asymmetric infoimation (Haskel and Sanchis, 1995).
Agency theory therefore focuses on a study of the differential risk preferences of 
agents and principals. Principals are considered “risk neutral” in their preferences for 
individual firm actions, since they can diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms. 
Agents are considered risk averse in their decisions regarding the firm in order to lower 
risk to their income as their income is tied to one firm. Agent risk aversion creates 
opportunity costs for risk neutral principals who prefer that agents maximise shareholder 
value returns. Given this relationship, the mechanisms of executive compensation, and 
the threat of hostile takeover, disciplines managers to act in the interests of the 
shareholders.
91
The agency problems take three forms, i.e. moral hazard or hidden action (when 
individuals say what they do not mean), adverse or self-selection (individuals indulge in 
activities which they said they will not do or do things which they said they would) and, 
strategic behaviour (individual’s willingness and ability to engage in actions which 
enhance their claims on the firm’s payoffs) (Ben-ner et al, 1993).
Corporate governance deals with the agency problem. The challenge of corporate 
governance is to set up monitoring, supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms, that 
alter the risk orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. 
Discussion of several aspects o f agency conflicts within the firm concludes that, given the 
self-interest seeking behaviour of the different constituents o f the firm, a firm never 
reaches its optimum level of production and output. Different monitoring mechanisms 
that align managerial decisions with the interests of shareholders have also not resulted in 
controlling managerial opportunism. Certain agency conflicts related to convertible debt 
and callable securities have not been dealt with in this chapter.
Agency conflicts related to debt decrease with the market value o f the firm. They 
do not decrease with an increase in the as against debt-equity ratio as suggested in the 
traditional literature. The agency cost of equity suggests that it can increase or decrease 
with the market value of the firm instead of simply being increasing with the debt-equity 
ratio. Agency theory explains takeovers from the point of view of free cash flow, which is 
used for mergers in order to expand manager's sphere of influence. Free cash flow may 
not always be used by the high insider shareholding companies for takeovers but for 
increasing the personal wealth of owner-managers. These conclusions have been drawn 
by integrating insights gathered from the personal-interview-based survey of the
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managers with agency theory. These findings have been corroborated by the econometric 
results.
Accordingly the high entry and low exit of LCCs in the BSE can be explained as 
follows: high entry can be explained by lax legal requirements, low entry barriers and 
perverse incentives for brokers (See Chapter-3, Appendix-3.1 for further details) whereas 
low exit is due to the absence of an active takeover market, and ineffective monitoring of 
LCCs by FIs and outside shareholders.
Apparent market failure in emerging economies is manifest by the market not 
functioning to achieve optimality (i.e. the “market for lemons”). Decline o f the market 
and its disappearance does not always lead to an automatic rise of an alternative 
institution, which enables the system to achieve equilibrium. The mechanism of 
competition, which supposedly selects competent behaviour virtuously, is superceded by 
a vicious mechanism of adverse selection, which discourages the emergence of efficient 
and competent behaviours. In the same way, if  a contractual system does not allocate 
optimally, this does not result in an alternative contractual system emerging. As a result, 
the economy may remain trapped in a sub-optimal condition (Egidi, 1994).
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Chapter-3
Capital Structure and Governance Structures in Indian Companies
3.1 INTRODUCTION:
This chapter outlines the characteristic features of the Indian financial system especially 
its inherent governance structures,105 together with the changes that have taken place after the 
initiation of financial reforms (1991-92), which has affected the nature o f the capital structure of 
the firms, hi other words, given the high entry and exit barriers, which existed before the 1990- 
91 the nature of the financial policies was very different from what is now emerging when both 
barriers have been considerable reduced. Industrial structure was determined more by the rules 
and regulations o f the state than the market mechanisms. Regulations notwithstanding, between 
1950-90 there has been considerable widening and deepening of the Indian financial system as 
can be seen from the Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Financial Ratios
Ratio 1951-52 to 1955-56 1966-67 to 1968-69 1980-81 1989-90
Finance ratio106 % 4.9 13.8 32.7 43.9
Financial
Interrelation ratio107
0.63 0.93 1.93 2.50
Intermediation
ratio108
0.27 0.33 0.41 0.45
Source: Rangarajan and Jadhav (1992)
This chapter helps understand the peculiarities of the Indian financial system, which were 
incorporated in the traditional theory of agency in the previous chapter to derive an India-specific 
form of agency conflicts. These features of Indian financial system and its effect on the corporate
105 See Appendix -1 for the legal stipulations related to the governance structures.
106 Finance ratio -  total financial claims/national income.
107 Financial Interrelation ratio = increase in stock o f financial claims/net capital formation.
108 Intermedi ation ratio = claims issued by FIs/issues of non-financial sectors.
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sector were substantiated by the results109 derived from the sample survey o f 34 LCCs listed in 
BSE.
The financial system in India has over the years evolved into five broad segments: 
banking, specialised lending institutions, capital markets, money markets and 
insurance/investment institutions. All segments compete intensively, though not through the 
price mechanism (i.e. interest rates) in mobilising household savings. The financial system has 
been oriented towards meeting social/developmental objectives without sufficient regard for 
credit risk, financial soundness and prudential controls (Mistry, 1995). The system also 
characterises o f directed credit to state owned enterprises and priority sectors and 
controlled/prescribed interest rates for lending and deposits. In addition, the system is distinct 
with its relatively small stock markets, large number of medium and small sized firms, and the 
banking system which lends large amounts to companies but does not have really close ties with 
the firms (Cobham and Subhramaniam, 1998).
Indian corporate sector is characterised by a coexistence o f public, private domestic and 
multinational enterprises. Among domestic private enterprises are the large business houses and 
stand-alone companies (Sarkar et al, 1998). Sarkar et al (1998) study 1613 listed manufacturing 
companies on the BSE and their equity holding pattern. Table-3.2 below shows the results of 
their study (1995-96), which reveals that the nature of equity holding as well as identity o f the 
largest equity holder varies significantly across different groups. For domestic group companies, 
corporate bodies are the single most dominant group followed by institutional investors’ 
holdings, for domestic stand alone companies, directors and relatives hold the maximum stake,
109 Detailed results are in Chapter-6.
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followed by corporate bodies.110 For foreign companies, foreign bodies clearly are the single 
largest equity holders followed by holdings by corporate bodies.
Table 3.2: Pattern of equity ownership in different types o f companies.
Type of Company Mean equity holding by %
Directors
and
relatives
Corporate
bodies
Foreign Financial
Institutions
Institutional
investors
Public
Private companies 
belonging to business 
houses
8.1 33.8 9.2 4.2 10.2 34.5
Private stand-alone 
companies
21.6 18.5 7.2 3.1 3.1 46.5
Foreign companies 
belonging to business 
houses
0.8 18.3 42.0 4.3 12.2 22.4
Foreign stand-alone 
companies
2.8 13.8 43.3 1.7 8.4 30.0
All 15.7 23.8 9.9 3.5 6.1 41.0
Source: Sarkar, S. and S. Sarkar, “The governance of Indian Corporates”, India Development Report, 1998.
Table-3.3 shows that equity holding by institutions and non-institutions in the corporate 
sector in India. The participation of institutional investors is significant and comparable to the 
extent o f their participation in Japan and Germany (Sarkar et al, 1998), The equity held by 
individuals is comparable to Anglo-Saxon countries. As a result the Indian corporate governance 
system is a hybrid of the “outsider” systems of the US and UK characterised by diversified 
equity ownership and less involvement of lending institutions, and the “insider” systems of 
continental Europe and Japan characterised by greater concentration of shareholder power 
residing with banks, families and the other corporates.
110 Holdings by other group companies.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of outstanding corporate equity for select countries.
Percentage of equity held by India (1996) US (1993) UK (1993) Germany
(1993)
Japan
(1993)
All corporations 36.3 46.0 64.0 68.0 69.0
Financial Institutions 12.7 46.0 62.0 29.0 45.0
a. Banks/lending institutions 6.6 - 1.0 14.0 22.0
b. Insurance companies 4.0 5.0 17.0 7.0 17.0
c. Pension/investment funds - 26.0 34.0 - 1.0
d. Mutual funds 2.1 11.0 7.0 8.0 3.0
e. Others - 4.0 3.0 - 1.0
Non-financial Corporations 23.6 - 2.0 39.0 24.0
Individuals 40.8 49.0 18.0 17.0 24.0
Foreign 9.8 5.0 16.0 12.0 7.0
Government - - 1.0 4.0 1.0
Others 15.3 - 2.0 - _
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Sarkar et al (1998). “Governance of Indian Corporates” India Development Report 1998, IGIDR, Mumbai.
The financial system affects the capital structure of firms, because they derive funds from 
the different components of the system for their short and long-term capital needs. The existing 
financial system and the legal framework have in effect created a corporate sector with two 
characteristics, (1). The Indian corporate sector was significantly over-levered, compared to 
other developing markets as shown in the tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.5. (2). It is characterised by a 
large number o f small-capitalised111 firms quoted on its stock markets.
Table 3.4: Top listed companies in manufacturing, mean proportion of internal and external finance of corporate
growth (%), Singh (1995) results.
Country Internal Finance Equity Long-term debt
Korea 19.5 49.6 30.9
Pakistan 74.0 1.7 24.3
Jordan 66.3 22.1 11.6
Thailand 27.7 N/A. N/A.
Mexico 24.4 66.6 9.0
India 40.5 19.6 39.9
Turkey 15.3 65.1 19.6
Malaysia 35.6 46.6 17.8
Zimbabwe 58.0 38.8 3.2
Brazil 56.4 36.0 7.7
ALL 38.8 39.3 20.8
Source: Cobham, D. and R. Subramaniam (1998), “Corporate Finance in Developing 
Countries: New Evidence for India”, World Development, Vol. 26, No. 6, p. 1037. Extracted from 
Singh (1995).
111 Refer to Chapter-1, Table —1.1.
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Table 3.5: Gross and net sources o f finance for the Indian corporate sector.
Type/Source 1980-81 to 1992-93 1980-81 to 1986-87 1987-88 to 1992-93
(a) Gross sources of 
finance as % o f total 
identified sources
Internal 37.8 38.5 37.4
Market finance (equity 
issues + bonds)
18.4 15.3 20.2
Bank lending 31.2 29.3 32.3
Other 12.6 16.9 10.1
(b) Net sources of finances 
as % of physical 
investment
Internal 42.0 33.1 49.7
Market finance (equity 
issues + bonds)
16.9 10.4 22.5
Bank lending 28.8 22.6 34.0
Other 12.3 33.9 -6.2
Source: Ibid.
Table 3.6: International Comparisons.
Source Group A Group B Group C India
Gross Sources o f  
finance
Internal 60.4 - 62.7 38.5 - 54.2 38.5 -44.1 37.4 - 38.5
Equity -4.9 - 7.0 3 .9 -1 1 .9 5 .6 -1 0 .8 N/A.
Market finance 3.1 -9 .3 7 .4 -1 8 .0 7 .4 -1 3 .2 15 .3 -20 .2
Bank loans 14 .7 -23 .3 12 .8 -41 .5 27 .2 -41 .5 29.3 - 32.3
Net sources o f  
finance
Internal 80 .6 -97 .3 51 .9 -7 6 .4 51 .9 -6 4 .4 33.1 -49 .7
Equity -1 0 .4 -0 .9 -0.1 - 8.2 -0.1 -8 .2 N/A.
Market finance -6.9 - 8.3 2 .7 -1 1 .0 2 .7 -9 .8 10 .4 -22 .5
Bank loans 11.0- 19.5 15 .2-37 .3 27.7 - 37.3 22.6 - 34.0
Note: Group A: high internal finance countries (US, UK and Germany), Group B: low internal finance 
countries (Canada, Finland, Italy and Japan), Group C: Finland, France and Italy 
Source: Ibid.
According to CMIE,112 the average debt-equity ratio of private sector manufacturing 
companies in India was 1.72 in 1990-91, which fell to 1.05 in 1996-97. More than half o f this 
reduction took place in one single year. The reasons for high leverage were; financial 
institutions113 provided finance at subsidised interest rates114 compared to the required return on
112 Center for Monitoring Indian Economy.
113IDBI (Industrial Development bank of India), IFCI (Industrial Finance Corporation of India), ICICI (Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation o f India), SFC (State Finance Corporations) and other Unit Trusts and Insurance 
Companies etc.
114 Most FIs in India granted loans to the extent of twice the level of equity capital and often much more than that 
(Majumdar & Chibber, 1996).
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equity. This attracted companies towards debt finance. This usually meant the maximum debt- 
equity ratios115 laid down by the government for various industries. In a protected economy prior 
to the financial liberalisation, operating (business risks) were lower and therefore companies 
could afford to depend on a high level o f debt and take more risks on the financing side. A high 
proportion of the debt was acquired from the financial institutions; it was easier for companies to 
reschedule116 the loans at little cost. In addition to these reasons there were some other factors, 
which led to higher debt ratios; given the high corporate tax rate117 structure, it helped the 
companies to take advantage o f the debt tax shields. With underdeveloped organised stock 
markets and many other bureaucratic hurdles, the role o f new equity issues in corporate 
financing was very limited (Varma, 1998), as shown in the Table 3.7. hi 1996, more than three- 
quarters of total funds raised by Indian corporates were from external sources via the capital 
market and through bank borrowings. Funds raised from the capital market constituted 17.4 % of 
the total finance and bank borrowings constituted 33.1% of total funds.
115 See the section Appendix -3.1 on government guidelines on issuing equity.
However, the fact that FIs are largely publicly owned and guided by so called "public interest consideration" is 
likely to have led to serious incentive problems and to misallocation o f resources. These institutions are not under 
pressure to foreclose a mortgage wlien a borrower defaults. Thus loans are likely to rescheduled more often than if  
the FIs were guided purely by commercial motives (Srivastava and Schiantarelli, 1997).
117 Corporate taxation for “widely held” domestic companies has been in the range of 55% in 1975-76(for income o f  
more than Rs. 1 Lakh {Rs. 1,00,000}) to 50% in 1988-89.
1990 1991 1992 1993
Widely held 50% 40% 45% 45%
company
Surcharge is levied on tax at 8% for the accounting year ended march 31, 1990 if  taxable income exceeded Rs. 
50,000. It is levied at 15% for the accounting year ended march 31,1991 and thereafter i f  taxable income exceeds 
Rs. 75,000 (Source: Price Waterhouse Information Guide; Doing business in India).
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Table 3.7 Share Capital raised during 1957-90. (Rs. bn.)
Year Share Capital Shares as % o f Total Capital Raised
1957 .582 53.7
1958 .430 46.5
1959 .635 68.4
1960 .804 72.1
1961 .886 75.9
1962 .784 59.3
1963 .712 64.4
1964 .837 80.0
1965 .810 67.8
1966 .633 64.3
1967 .647 72.1
1968 .684 66.6
1969 .630 59.4
1970 .767 79.7
1971 .787 86.1
1972 .977 62.8
1973 .986 83.5
1974 1.072 75.7
1975 .683 63.8
1976 .658 38.1
1977 .820 66.0
1978 .926 57.0
1979 1.085 74.6
1980 .929 42.5
1981 1.703 54.9
1982 1.249 29.3
1983 1.555 21.6
1984 2.447 26.9
1985 2.447 28.5
1986 8.992 51.5
1987 10.082 39.3
1988 11.109 62.5
1989 10.355 32.6
1990 12.267 18.9
Source: Balasubramanian, N. (1993) Corporate Financial Policies and Shareholder returns
Demirguc-Kunt (1992) finds a positive and significant correlation between firm leverage 
and the extent o f stock market development. Although the decade o f eighties saw some gradual 
reforms in the financial sector, the debt-equity ratio of Indian companies still remained high. Her 
study points out that large firms in developing stock markets take advantage o f further stock 
market development to increase their borrowings, whereas in developed stock markets, firms 
substitute equity for debt. With stock market development the borrowing capacity of the firms 
increases as the stock markets provide improved quality of information and banks are in a better
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position to assess the credit worthiness of their clients more accurately and can increase lending. 
The coefficients o f the stock market indicator for small firms in the developed markets are 
negative and also that of the developing stock markets are negative but not statistically 
significant. Table 3.8 shows the D-E ratios of some of the developing as well as the developed 
stock markets.
Table 3.8: Firm characteristics o f some developing and developed economies.
Economy Long-term Debt 
to Total Equity
Short-term Debt to 
Total Equity
Total Debt to Total 
Equity
Non-Debt Tax 
Shield
Germany 1.479 1.188 2.732 -0.007
Japan 0.938 2.726 3.688 -0.016
US 1.054 0.679 1.791 -0.015
UIC 0.387 1065 1.480 0.009
Hongkong 0.309 0.967 1.322 0.020
Brazil 0.139 0.421 0.560 0.017
Malaysia 0.284 0.639 0.935 0.010
South Africa 0.597 0.518 1.115 0.066
Thailand 0.518 1.769 2.215 0.007
Singapore 0.491 0.718 1.232 -0.004
India 0.763 1.937 2.700 0.027
Source: Demirguc-Kunt (1992).
After an overhaul of the restrictive financial policies in 1991-92, more and more smaller 
companies, which depended on traditional sources of finance, i.e. family and friends, local 
creditors etc. have been able to access stock markets for additional finance. Finance from other 
outside formal sources was restricted, as these firms were not considered creditworthy by FIs or 
the banks, at the same time there were restrictions on the amount of capital that could be raised 
from the primary stock markets. As a result the Indian corporate structure is not as highly 
leveraged as it was prior to 1991-92 as shown in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9: Debt-Equity ratios.
Year No. o f Companies Debt to Equity ratio in Public 
Limited Companies
1990-91 2131 99
1991-92 1836 98.4
1992-93 1802 90.4
1993-94 1700 73
1994-95 1720 65.5
1995-96 1730 58
1996-97 1930 61.6
1997-98 1948 65
Source: RBI Bulletin, Various Issues
This chapter has been structured as follows:
Section 3.2 provides a description of the sources of finance for Indian Companies since 
the first five-year plan, and the governance structures associated with each of these sources. 
Section 3.3 presents a critical summary of the studies dealing with the determinants of the D-E 
ratios in India along with the managerial attitudes towards capital structure. Section 3.4 deals 
with recent reforms in the financial sector, which have had a bearing on the capital structure of 
firms during the eighties and in the early nineties in particular, those following the 
recommendations o f the Narasimham Committee report. Section 3.5 deals with the market for 
takeovers in India. Section 3.6 makes some concluding observations regarding the financial 
structure of the Indian firms.
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3. 2 SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR INDIAN COMPANIES:
3.2.  A. DEBT:
Finance theory suggests that firms with unstable profitability i.e. which are prone to 
cyclical swings in output, prices and sales avoid issue of debt, since servicing of debt is a 
contractual obligation. A  high debt service burden reduces the ability o f corporate units to absorb 
unforeseen business shocks and hence firms usually try to keep the burden o f fixed charges to a 
minimum. On the other hand, industries with assured cash flow prospects, valuable and durable 
assets, which are subject to mortgage, can depend on the capital market for debt instruments. 
Irrespective of these constraints, firms in general have been highly leveraged in India because of 
the above-mentioned reasons in Section 3.1.
Debt can be regarded both as a governance structure and a financial instrument 
(Williamson, 1986).
Intermediaries like commercial banks and financial institutions, which are predominantly 
owned or controlled by the government, have traditionally, met most o f the debt requirements of 
the private corporate sector in India. The principal sources of debt finance are shown below: -
Table 3.10: Sources o f debt.
Long and Medium Term Debt Short Term Debt
Term loans from financial and investment institutions Working capital financing from banks
Term loans from commercial banks Short-term deposits from institutions
Debentures and bonds Inter-corporate deposits and loans
Deposits from public Deposits from public
Commercial Paper
Source: Barua et al. (1994)
1. Debentures and other Corporate Debt Instruments:
Borrowings through the issue of transferable debt securities like bonds and debentures 
were negligible until the 1980s. But, in the recent times, issuance o f debentures by the corporate 
sector has been increasing sharply reversing earlier pattern, as is evident from the Tables - 3.11 
and 3.12 below. Total debentures and loans outstanding rose from Rs. 300 cr. in 1982 to Rs.
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5246 cr. in 1990. Table 3.12 also shows almost an unchanging importance of debentures and 
loans in total borrowings.
Table 3.11: Debentures and loans as a source o f finance (Rs. mn.) between 1957-90
Year Debentures and 
Loans
Debentures as % of 
Total Capital 
Raised
1957 501 46.24
1958 493 53.41
1959 293 31.57
1960 31 27.83
1961 28 24.01
1962 537 40.65
1963 392 35.51
1964 208 19.90
1965 383 32.10
1966 35 35.60
1967 25 27.87
1968 343 33.40
1969 43 40.57
1970 19 20.27
1971 127 13.90
1972 578 37.17
1973 194 16.44
1974 344 24.29
1975 386 36.11
1976 1066 61.83
1977 421 33.92
1978 696 42.91
1979 368 25.33
1980 1252 57.40
1981 1394 45.01
1982 3003 70.63
1983 6162 79.85
1984 6649 73.10
1985 6136 71.49
1986 8457 48.46
1987 15557 60.68
1988 6672 37.54
1989 21369 67.36
1990 52464 81.05
Source: Balasubramanian, N. (1993), Corporate Financial Policies and Shareholder Returns
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Table 3.12: Debentures and loans as a source of finance (Rs, bn.) between 1991-98
Year No. o f Companies Debentures and loans Debentures and loans as 
%age of total borrowings
1991-92 1802 474.29 91%
1992-93 1802 577.39 93
1993-94 1720 584.63 91
1994-95 1720 719.39 93
1995-96 1730 842.61 94
1996-97 1930 1163.91 94
1997-98 1948 1379.36 94
Source: RBI Finance and Currency Bulletin, Various Issues
Table 3.13: Borrowings by the IDBI sample o f 401 companies as on 31 March. (Rs. bn.)
Year Amount o f Long 
Term Debenture 
Issues (1)
Total Long Term
Bono wings
(2)
Total Borrowings 
(3)
(1) as %age of
(2)
(1) as %age 
of (3)
1982 2.92 27.26 43.61 10.7 6.7
1983 4.33 35.30 52.32 12.3 8.3
1984 6.57 42.39 60.24 15.5 10.9
1985 11.79 57.37 79.70 20.5 14.8
1986 17.81 67.48 96.82 26.4 18.4
1987 24.16 77.99 110.97 31.0 21.8
1988 31.63 96.77 130.69 32.7 24.2
1989 36.89 114.03 157.10 32.4 23.5
1990 56.34 139.25 191.91 40.5 29.4
1991 63.35 160.92 224.92 39.4 28.2
Source: Barua et al (1994), Analysis of the Indian Securities Industry: Market for Debt
As the Table 3.13 shows, debentures constituted 6.7% of total borrowings at the end o f 
1981-82. By the end o f 1990-91, the share of debentures had increased to 28.2%. hi the 1980s 
the Convertible Debentures (CDs) dominated the debt market in hidia as the interest rates were 
fixed by the CCI118 for debt instruments. Firms by issuing CDs managed to give their investors 
advantage over straight debt instruments. In many issues, the investor acquired the major 
proportion of his/her return on conversion. Partially convertible debentures were designed to 
minimise the transfer losses through capital gains. A debenture would be issued; part of that was 
to be compulsorily convertible into shares at a predetermined CCI price. The other part carried a 
coupon rate significantly below market rates. Investors commonly kept the portion convertible 
into equity and sold the non-convertible part to an investment institution at a discount in order to
118 Controller o f Capital Issues.
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give the instrument a market rate o f interest. By permitting films to issue bonds at below market 
rates, firms could recoup part o f the loss on selling shares at a discount (Barua et al, 1994).
The market for corporate debt remained underdeveloped because o f the following 
reasons: (a) FIs met most of the long-term debt requirements of corporates by providing loans at 
low interest rates with long repayment periods of 5-7 years in addition to some other 
concessions;119 (b) commercial banks also provided loans to companies at much lower interest 
rate than their short term working capital lending; (c) in addition these companies had to incur 
issuing and servicing costs for debentures while institutional debt saved them these costs; (d) 
tight government regulations meant that companies did not have the freedom to fix the prices of 
the issues and in the case o f the convertible debentures, the mandatory conversion of the 
debentures into equity at a rate and time was determined by the CCI; (e) while interest rate 
incomes on bank deposits and public sector bonds and dividend income from shares were all 
exempted from tax, debenture interest was fully taxable; and (f) the institutional interest in fixed 
income corporate securities was crowded out by various government regulations, which required 
them to invest in government securities and SLR (Statutory Liquidity Ratio) and CRR (Cash 
Reserve Ratio) investments.
The development o f fixed income instruments hading segment o f the capital market has 
also been restricted due to government holding of a large share of banking liabilities at below 
market rates. Though equity markets in India have been operating for over a century (predating 
several markets in sophisticated developed markets) a genuine bond market in trading 
government and corporate issues similar to such markets in the developed world has remained 
underdeveloped. Other characteristics like controlled interest rates and the absence o f credit risk 
differentiation have further contributed to its underdevelopment (Mistry, 1995). The recent
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institutional development and other reforms leading to interest rate deregulation,120 abolition of 
CCI, establishment of the Over the Counter Exchange of India (OTCEI)121 and Stock Holding 
Corporation of India Ltd. (SHCIL)122 will have major implications for the corporate debt 
securities market (Barua et al, 1994).
2. Bank Borrowings:
hi terms o f institutional structure and complexity, India has a total o f 300 banks with over 
60,000 branches accounting for about 70% of the entire financial system’s assets (over Rs. 5 
trillion in 1994). These comprise: 28 nationalised banks with over 40,000 branches, nearly 200 
regional rural banks with about 15,000 branches; 55 private banks with 4,400 branches o f which 
24 are foreign and a small number of cooperative and non-scheduled banks which are o f little 
significance (Mistry, 1995). Before the nationalisation of banks in 1969, bank borrowings 
formed a major source o f corporate debt, as shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14: Bank borrowings as a source o f finance during 1951-52 and 1973-74. 
Annual average amounts (Rs. mn.)__________________ _______________________
Period Bank
Borrowings (1)
Total External 
(2)
Total Sources
(3)
(1) as %age of
(2)
(1) as a %age o f
(3)
I Plan 53 285 725 18.6 7.3
II Plan 362 1011 1836 35.8 19.7
III Plan 713 1899 3603 37.5 19.8
Annual Plan 1024 3095 5321 33.1 19.2
IV Plan 734 3861 8111 19.0 9.0
Source: Kishor, B. (1981) Corporate Capitalisation in India
After 1969, bank business was substituted by specialised financial institutions and banks 
were compelled to shift their main focus towards priority sectors i.e. agriculture and rural area
119 Investments in backward area projects, export oriented projects etc.
m  Company managements, based on the market’s risk-retum expectations can fix the interest on corporate 
debentures and are free to fix coupons to meet the market’s yield requirements.
121 This was started mainly for trading in shares of smaller companies, but from 1993 onwards trading in corporate 
debentures has also begun.
122 It is promoted by some FIs, its functions include depository and custodial services i.e. share transfer and 
registration through book entries, safe custody o f securities, collection of dividend and interest etc.
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related investments, and as a result their importance to the corporate sector declined. Table 3.15 
shows the changes in bank lending after nationalisation of banks.
Table 3.15: Structural changes in the pattern o f lending between 1969 and 1996. (As %  o f gross bank credit)
Sector 1969 1976 1982 1988 1992 1996
Food procurement 6.5 18.8 7.3 3.1 4.3 4.2
Industry (Large) 78.2 43.4 38.3 36.3 38.4 40.1
Wholesale trade - 7.0 7.6 4.9 4.9 5.1
Others 1 6.6 10.2 14.2 17.7 18.7
Priority Sectors 14 24.2 36.6 41.5 34.7 31.6
1. Agriculture 5.2 9.4 15.8 17.1 14 11.6
2. Small-Scale 
Industry
7.9 10.5 13.4 15.5 13.8 13.7
3. Others 0.9 4.3 7.4 8.9 6.9 6.2
Gross Bank Credit 100 100 100 100 100 100
Of which: Exports 7.2 8.4 6.2 5.4 8.5 12.8
Source: Kohli, R. (1997), Directed credit and financial reform, Economic and Political Weekly.
But banks still form a major source of finance for fulfilling the working capital needs of 
the corporate sector. As the Table - 3.16 points out, total bank credit as a share of GNP rose from 
7.3% in 1979 to 10.5% in 1988, reaching 11.11% in 1992.
Table 3.16: Bank credit to small and large industry-
1979 1982 1988 1992 1996
Percentage to Total Bank Credit
Large Industry 43.4 38.3 36.3 38.4 40.1
Small Industry 10.5 13.4 15.5 13.8 13.7
Percentage to GNP
Large Industry 5.7 7.0 7.4 8.2 NA
Small Industry 1.8 2.4 3.1 2.9 NA
Percentage to Sectoral (manufacturing) Value Added
Large Industry 31.7 55.5 41.4 46.0 NA
Small Industry 8.6 16.2 17.7 16.6 NA
Source: Ibid.
The decline in the bank credit was compensated by the industrial credit extended by the 
specialised financial institutions. Bank credit is now restricted to working capital needs of the 
industry, but this segregation of functions between the financial institutions and the banks could 
well be removed, following recommendations of the Narasimham Committee Report (Bhole, 
1992).
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Bank credit was specifically obtained to finance inventory build up or for the operating 
cycle o f which inventoiy accumulation is a very important factor. A high correlation exists 
between bank finance and inventory levels. But the coefficient o f correlation is less than the one 
for the inventory-trade credit variables. So, the two components of short-term funds influence the 
level of inventory activity. The two sources were used simultaneously to sustain high levels of 
inventory needs (Kishor, 1981).
India’s commercial banking system suffers from a large and inefficient institutional 
structure with too many public banks and rural branches, a large impaired portfolio in sick 
industrial units and rural loans, inadequate capital strength, extreme technological backwardness; 
poor management and inadequate internal controls, overmanning and work practices which result 
in excessively high administrative costs, political interference in the credit allocation and 
cost/risk decisions of public banks which have severely impaired their institutional ability to 
make independent credit judgements or to manage their portfolio risks (Mistry, 1995). But now 
the role of banks has increasingly come under scrutiny in view of their reportedly passive role in 
the corporate governance of companies (Sarkar et al, 1998).
3. Financial Institutions:
There are two types of financial institutions in the Indian capital market, namely, 
developmental institutions and investment institutions. In the former category, there are 
institutions of all-India stature, namely, IDBI (Industrial Development Bank of India), IFCI 
(Industrial Finance Corporation o f India), ICICI (Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India) and IRBI (Industrial Reconstruction Bank o f India) and also state level institutions like, 
State Finance and Development Corporations, hi addition to these there are also a number of 
specialised long-term lenders, Small Industries Development Bank o f India (SEDBI), Shipping
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Credit and Investment Corporation of India (SCICI). In the latter category of investment 
institutions, there are Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), Unit Trust o f India (UTI) and 
General Insurance Corporation o f India (GIC) with its four subsidiaries, National, New India, 
Oriental and United hidia form the mutual funds industry. A number of quasi-banking and quasi­
capital market functions are performed by a complex network of many specialised financial 
intermediaries owned by Reserve Bank of India (RBI), central and state governments and 
operating across key economic sectors, i.e.industry and commerce, agriculture and rural 
development and housing (Mistry, 1995).
The supply of debt capital in India is almost fully in the hands o f the public sector, but 
private individuals supply equity capital. Financial institutions making long-term loans were all 
established by the State. The only major private sector financial institution is ICICI, but the 
government has a strong presence on its board. These institutions are the main players in the 
market, both in the primary market and in the secondary market. Besides providing loans and 
venture capital to the industry, they invest in their debentures and shares, underwrite 
subscriptions and actively trade in the shares in the secondary market. The professionalism and 
capabilities of the industrial SFCs are higher than most Indian banks, although their portfolios 
are characterised by the same non-performing asset problems suffered by other Indian banks 
(Mistry, 1995).
Given the lack o f avenues of risk-bearing equity investment, high corporate taxes and 
relatively low cost long tenn finance, lack of flexibility available to financial institutions to 
negotiate interest rates consistent with risk perceptions and other such commercial criteria etc. 
debt was a preferred source o f corporate finance. The role of the FIs became important given the
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characteristics o f a financial system in a developing economy. The following tables 3.17 and
3.18 show the importance of the institutional finance for the corporate sector.
Table 3.17: Cumulative equity and preference capital support by all FIs till 1989. (Rs. bn.)
Institutions Sanctions
(S)/Disbursements (D)
Total (1) Equity & 
Preference Capital 
(2)
(2) as a %age
of(l)
IDBI S 245.924 8.756 3.56
D 183.929 2.248 1.22
IFCI S 65.697 3.840 5.85
D 42.952 .976 2.27
ICICI S 93.132 4.343 4.66
D 64.450 1.477 2.29
LIC S 30.677 2.496 8.14
D 24.136 1.955 8.10
UTI S 52.028 3.165 6.08
D 35.346 2.173 6.15
GIC S 10.976 7.040 64.16
D 8.578 5.742 66.94
Source: Balnsubramanian, N. (1993) Corporate Financial Policies and Shareholder Returns
Table 3.18: FIs as a source o f finance (Rs. bn.)
Year No. o f Companies Borrowings from FIs As %age o f total 
bono wings
1991-92 1802 146.79 28%
1992-93 1802 185.76 30
1993-94 1720 188.59 29
1994-95 1720 205.25 26
1995-96 1730 241.70 27
1996-97 1930 324.01 26
1997-98 1948 363.59 24
Source: RBI Finance and Currency Bulletin, Various Issues
FIs have been a significant influence on the extent and composition o f the private 
corporate finance particularly from the mid-seventies through the eighties. By 1989, the FIs had 
disbursed assistance of Rs. 359.39 bn. since their respective inception. O f this aggregate 
disbursement, only Rs. 14.57 bn. (4.06%) was disbursed in the form of equity and preference 
capital. So, in the process they contributed to the growing debt base o f the assisted firms. 
According to Kishor (1980), most o f the new companies have a smaller reliance on institutional 
sources and a relatively higher dependence on equity sources. But existing companies still prefer 
to remain inclined to institutional sources of finance compared to new stock issues. That is 
because firms with little or no history of production and profits failed to get debt finance from
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these institutions, due to adverse selection problems. As a result they relied upon stock markets 
and/or other traditional sources o f finance. Venture capital institutions were non-existent in India 
till the beginning of the 1980s (Barua et al, 1994).
Inspite o f the FIs’ dominant position as providers of long-term capital, corporate sector 
had its apprehensions to deal with them because of two reasons:
• Firstly, the convertible debt gave the institutions an option to convert upto 20% of the loans 
into equity at a predetermined price, usually at par, after a period of time and generally 
coinciding with the commencement of commercial operations. Due to this, institutions not 
only received capital gains on conversion but also gained considerable amount o f control in 
the company affairs.
• secondly, fear o f the pressures that might be imposed on the companies and their 
managements, as a result o f government control over and ownership of the financial 
institutions. This concern was related to the FIs acting under the government direction to the 
disadvantage of the existing managements, particularly during hostile takeover bids or family 
disputes. Financial institutions appoint a nominee director on the board o f every company 
they deal with.
But the fears of the convertibility clause have largely remained misplaced. The case of 
IDBI points out that till 1987 it had requisitioned the option in 1064 instances with a 
loan/debenture assistance of Rs. 3.42 bn. and it acquired only Rs. 0.236 bn. as converted equity 
in about hundred cases. And from Aug. 1991, the convertibility option is not stipulated in respect 
of new and expansion projects (Balasubramanian, 1993).
Financial institutions managed to acquire a dominant position in terms o f their resource 
base that they had all these years because of the following two reasons: (a) bonds of term lending
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institutions qualified for SLR123 investments o f commercial banks, (b) the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) made its Long-Term Operations Fund available to these institutions at a concessional rate 
of 8%.
Many studies124 point out that because of public ownership o f these institutions in which 
a distinction between ownership rights and control rights is impossible to make, governance 
structures will not be effective enough to monitor activities of a firm. According to Majumdar 
and Chibber (1999) the entry of private foreign and domestic financial institutions in the Indian 
capital market (they initially entered as portfolio investors in equity and have only lately been 
allowed to become suppliers of debt), will pave the way for a disciplining impact125 on Indian 
managers. FIs were both equity and debt holders in the companies, and their nominees are 
represented on corporate boards. Almost all FI debt contracts until recently earned a covenant 
that it will be represented on the board of the debtor company via a nominee director. Majumdar 
and Glibber (1999) find that it is the highly leveraged firms, which are unsatisfactory 
performers. But high leverage in a firm does not always result in higher monitoring o f that firm, 
rather it depends on the relative position126 of the individual firm in the overall portfolio of the 
financial institution. Almost all of these studies suggest privatisation o f these institutions as the 
solution for their inherent problems. On the basis of recommendations o f the Basudeb Sen
123 Statutory Liquidity Ratio, an obligatory investment requirement in government bonds, which usually fetched 
yields below market rates.
124 Patel (1997), Mistry (1995) etc
125 "These foreign FIs are well capitalised and can draw on the deep pockets o f their parent companies for resources. 
As foreign FIs exercise their financial muscle in forcing firms in India, which use the capital market as a source o f  
funds to meet the standard norms o f behaviour that are commonly accepted in the West, then firms’ performance is 
also likely to improve. The entry o f foreign institutional investors (FIIs) into the Indian capital market has 
considerable implications, and overtime it is expected that these institutions will develop into major suppliers o f  
capital" (Majumdar and Chibber, 1999).
126 See Chapter -  4 for a detailed theoretical analysis.
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Committee (1997), FIs have decided to put nominee directors127 only on boards of companies
where their stakes are higher. This suggests that FIs want to monitor only those companies
whose relative position in terms o f equity is higher in their overall portfolio.
FIs in India have been perceived to be very passive128 in corporate governance. But this
FI passivity with respect to corporate governance is based on anecdotal evidence (Sarkar et al,
1999). There has been a major transformation in the position of FIs after the initiation of
financial reforms beginning 1991-92. hi 1991, when interest rates were partially freed, FIs were
forced to borrow at higher rates o f interest in the market and hence are forced to pay the price of
1 ”20their own borrowings and investment choices. As a result, FIs are undergoing a restructuring 
phase by redefining130 their portfolios. In many of the takeover contests and M&A activity in the 
Indian economy, financial institutions have become deciding factors, suggesting redefinition of 
their portfolio. Thus when creditors were made to bear the risk of their investment, they began to 
monitor corporate performance more effectively (Business India, 1998). Signs are emerging in 
recent times of a more proactive131 role in corporate governance by FIs. So the importance of FIs
127 FIs have implemented new norms for appointment o f nominee directors, which have drastically cut down the 
total number of such directors on company boards. According to the new criteria for nomination, FIs are required to 
place their nominees only in companies where their combined exposure is above Rs. 50 cr. or their shareholding is 
above 26% or in the event of the company showing signs of problems such as defaults on loans (Sarkar et al., 1999).
128 The nature o f ineffective monitoring was evident in the project appraisal and evaluation, supervision o f projects 
and mechanisms to anticipate problems and take a proactive role in tackling them through managerial, technical 
and/or financial assistance in time, to projects/enterprises which did not perform as well as anticipated at the time o f  
project appraisal. The primary reason for the lack o f adequate monitoring o f enterprises has been the failure o f the 
lead development bank to evolve mechanisms o f co-ordination with commercial banks, which provided working 
capital finance (Cherian, 1996).
129 The government also reduced the SLR levels steadily in line with the Narasimham Committee report and by 1992 
it withdrew the income tax benefits given to IDBI capital bonds. As a result borrowings from institutions like LIC, 
GIC and UTI declined, partly because these investment institutions began demanding rates o f return around 18%.
130 In order to weed out loss making companies from their portfolio, FIs are being forced to commit a person on the 
board of the companies who can effectively monitor activities o f the company, following the Basudeb Sen 
Committee (1997) report on the nomination of directors on company boards. Under new directives to the nominee 
directors, FIs are considering to make it mandatory for FI nominee directors to attend specific board meetings, 
especially those related to finalisation of accounts (Sarkar et al., 1999).
131 FIs have been asked by the Finance Ministry to take full responsibility for corporate governance in companies 
where they have substantial stake. The objective is to improve investor confidence in the capital markets. The 
government has directed the FIs to insist the companies to make adequate disclosures, move towards internationally
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in the economy has not decreased as a result o f the financial liberalisation, they have been forced 
to determine their operations in order to maximise their shareholders’ returns.
During the regulated regime, the ultimate risk bearer when a firm became sick was the 
federal government, actually a SFC132 as the direct creditor would be the immediate risk bearer, 
which passed on its burden to the IDBI, which in turn could shift to the federal government. The 
system where the burden of risk could be shifted weakened the creditor's incentive to monitor or 
control corporate activities. Presence of many debtholders and their lack of co-ordination led to 
presence of the classic free rider problem with regard to monitoring o f borrower activities 
(Cherian, 1996).133
Until recently, financial institutions rarely suffered from making bad loan-decisions by 
their own principals, because the government, in theory, has deep pockets. The encouragement 
of industrial development in economic environments where capital markets are thin is often one 
of the goals o f the government when setting up financial enterprises (Jalan, 1991). So the basic 
issue is in determining how effectively creditors can be made to bear the risk o f their investment 
before they begin to monitor corporate performance.
Because these financial enterprises were not subject to any discipline by their owner- 
principal, firms that took loans from these financial institutions did not feel the need to change 
their own incentive structures by the bonding behaviour. From the debtor firm ’s point of view, 
the perception that debt holders’ presence is irrelevant or inconsequential can then encourage
accepted accounting standards, maintain distance between the CEO and Chairman where applicable and hold regular 
board meetings with proper dissemination o f proceedings. FIs have been active in pushing for change in 
man agement o f under performing and defaulting companies, in protecting the interests o f minority shareholders. FIs 
are setting up audit subcommittees comprising of non-executive independent directors o f the company board to 
strengthen internal control structures. Mutual funds are asking leading companies to make presentations outlining 
their plans and expected performance after the declaration of half-yearly results (Sarkar et al., 1999).
132 State Financial Corporation.
133 In contrast, IDBI has devised an informal institution called Inter-institutional meeting to co-ordinate the functions 
of all the Indian development banks.
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managers towards undertaking discretionary behaviour, with negative performance 
consequences.
3. 2. B. EQUITY:
Equity as a governance structure has the following properties, i.e.
"it bears a residual-claimant status to the firm in both earnings and asset-liquidation respects, it 
contracts for the duration of the life of the firm and a board of directors is created and awarded 
equity, which is elected by the pro-rata votes of those who hold tradable shares, has the power to 
replace the management, decides on the management remuneration, can authorise audits in depth 
for special follow-up purposes, is consulted of all important investment and operational 
proposals before implementation, has access to internal performance measures on a timely basis, 
in other respects has a decision-review and monitoring rights of the film ’s management." 
(Williamson, 1993).
1. Shares:
The equity raised in India through the primary market grew ten fold between 1981-1991; 
the amount raised increased from Rs. 5.6 bn. in 1981 to Rs. 57 bn. in 1991. These large amounts, 
however, have been raised by a diminishing number of established companies, following a series 
of failures of newly floated companies in the early 1980s. An increasing number of these issues 
are rights issues limited for purchase by existing shareholders. Prospectus issues, available to any 
investor, have been limited because of former State control over their timing and pricing 
enforced by CCI. These controls resulted in considerable underpricing (and over subscription), 
thus compromising the interests o f existing shareholders in favour of new buyers.
Equity markets were assigned a marginal role in intermediation until the early 1980s. 
Equity markets were characterised by distortions with a few large public institutional investors
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dominating market activity. The equity market was driven by Bombay-based brokers who 
operated in relatively unfettered fashion, often more in their own interests than in those of 
issuers, intermediaries or investors (CR 1992, Gupta, 1990). The early 1980s saw an increase in 
stock market activity in response to the reforms initiated (as shown in Table 3.19) and also due 
to the following factors, which contributed, to the growth of stock market activity.
• Following the enactment of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), in 1973 and the 
government’s move towards the process of foreign equity dilution, a large number of FERA 
companies entered the new issues market to sell part of their foreign principals’ holdings and 
to issue further equity without proportionate foreign subscription, so as to reduce the 
percentage foreign holding in their companies down to prescribed levels. The reputation of 
good management and high profitability usually associated with foreign held or controlled 
companies were the attraction for the investing public. An estimated 115 companies offered 
about Rs. 125 cr. in the later half o f the 1970s, increasing the population o f the shareholders 
in the country to 2 million (Balasubramanian, 1993).
• A series of fiscal policy measures encouraged investments in equity securities and units, and 
led to an improved perception of corporate equities as desirable investments. A government 
requirement also required that allotment of shares be widespread in the case o f oversubscribed 
issues helped in increasing the shareholder populations enormously.
So, in India, like in many other developing economies, the State has been active in promoting the 
growth of stock markets (Singh, 1993).
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Table 3.19: New security issues during the period 1952-1999. (Rs. bn.) 
Annual average amounts__________________________________________
Year No. o f capital Issues Amount o f issues As % o f Net 
Domestic Savings
I Plan period NA .845 -
II Plan period 315 1.711 -
III Plan period 676 3.65 -
3 Annual Plan period 
(avg.)
333 2.686 -
IV Plan period 647 3.088 -
V Plan Period 594 4.084 -
1980 115 .912 -
1988-89 253 54.64 11.4
1989-90 379 122.87 18.6
1990-91 335 96.83 13.2
1991-92 572 134.50 15.6
1992-93 1038 281.95 18.9
1993-94 1165 309.33 20.3
1996-97 715 59.502 -
1997-98 52 10.475 -
1998-99 18 4.042 -
Source: Gangadhar V. et al (1996), Impact of Capital Market Reforms on Capital Issues
and Panda et al (1985) Corporate Sector and Institutional Finance in India and SEBI Annual Report, 1999.
In 1993-94, 1165 companies raised Rs. 309.33 bn. forming 20.3% of net domestic 
savings in India. This trend was in response to economic reforms coupled with setting up o f a 
large number o f companies as joint ventures with multi-national companies (MNCs). A very 
significant increase in number as well as amount of capital issues was evident in the aftermath of 
economic reforms in 1991-92 as shown in Table 3.19.
The following two tables 3.20 and 3.21 show how capital was raised i.e. through what 
market instruments.
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Table 3.20: Security-wise classification o f new issues during plan periods. (Rs. mn.)
Plan period Equity Shares Preference Shares Debentures
First Plan 511 890 245
Second Plan 1228 291 192
Third Plan 2620 300 730
Three Annual Plans 1340 349 997
Fourth Plan 2156 410 522
Fifth Plan 3699 210 1702
1980 553 184 3409
CD NCD
1981 2018 300 1319 769
1982 2297 750 2639 1365
1983 2400 210 773 5138
1984 3522 30 1877 7638
1985 6425 90 273 1,2184
Source: Tbid. and Center for Monitoring Indian Economy, Bombay.
In the mid 1980s the Indian capital market saw an expansionary phase in the number of 
capital issues, especially that o f NCDs (non-Convertible Debentures) due to the incentives 
offered to the investors introduced by the financial institutions in 1982-83 (Barua et al, 1994).
Table 3.21: Components o f Capital Issues
Year Equity & Preference 
Shares
Non-Convertible
Debentures
Convertible
Debentures
1988-89 1060 2649 1756
1989-90 1808 5216 5263
1990-91 1522 5714 2446
1991-92 2396 7396 3659
1992-93 16561 3618 8016
1993-94 19678 3560 7686
Source: Ibid.
But by 1993-94, equity and preference shares formed 63.6%, convertible debentures 
24.8% and non-convertible debentures 11.6% of total capital issues in India. During the pre­
reforms period non-convertible and convertible debentures formed 80.6% as against only 19.4% 
of equity issues.
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Table 3.22: Mode o f capital issues.
Year Public Issues through 
Prospectus
Rights Issues Private Placement
1988-89 2513 1362 5590
1989-90 4430 3397 4460
1990-91 2544 2666 4473
1991-92 3250 3917 6283
1992-93 14205 12464 1526
1993-94 18510 NA 12423
1994-95 1692
1995-96 1725
1996-97 882
1997-98 62 49 -
1998-99 32 26 -
Note: For years 1994 till 1997, the figures show total number o f  issues without any segregation between different types o f  issues.
Source: Ibid. and SEBI Annual Report, 1999.
In 1993-94, issues through prospectus formed 60% of total capital issues, while private 
placements accounted for 40%. By contrast, in 1988-89 equity issues formed 46%, private 
placements 29.1% and rights issues 24.9% of total issues as shown in Table 3.22.
Table 3.23: Pattern o f Capital Issues with reference to the Issuing Bodies.
Year Private Sector 
companies
Mutual Funds and Financial 
Institutions
Public Sector Companies
1988-89 2977 430 2058
1989-90 6771 1072 4444
1990-91 4432 791 4460
1991-92 4466 1263 5721
1992-93 20083 6833 1279
1993-94 22736 5444 2753
Source: Ibid.
Capital issues from public sector companies have declined steeply from 4-8% in the post- 
refonns period as against 36-46% in the pre-reforms era, whereas the private sector has increased 
its capital issues from 54.8% in 1988-89 to 73.5% in 1993-94 as shown in the above Table - 
3.23.
Issues in primary markets are plagued with three problems:
"first, the preference given to very small lots has resulted in unduly expensive 
administrative burdens for issuers, second, the size of minimum lots permitted, and because 
multiple applications from one source are not an offence, the market is characterised by multiple
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small lot applications in different locations which manual processing systems are incapable o f 
shifting out, and third, money for unsuccessful applications is not returned for long periods of 
time, despite the introduction o f a stoclcinvest scheme which places the applicant money in an 
interest bearing account in favour of the applicant. Issuing companies can no longer use these 
funds as free float". (Mistry, 1995)
As a result of many small lot applications, the governance structure of a company would 
typically include many diffused shareholders, which leads to free rider problem. Diffuse 
stockholders face more serious collective action problems and camiot be provided with 
confidential information, included on boards or given any other active role in firm governance. 
At the same time a single external shareholder generally has an incentive to overmonitor. 
Minority shareholders can verify the actions of controlling shareholder in a public company, only 
when companies are subject to stricter disclosure requirements and transparent accounting 
standards. But as Bhide (1993) argues that US stock market regulators have created market 
liquidity at the expense o f the efficient governance of firms. The liquidity promoted by US 
policies has obvious benefits; investors can encash their assets quickly and diversify cheaply. 
The same policies, however, impair governance by encouraging diffuse stockholding and 
discouraging active monitoring.
The secondary market is also riddled with problems of fraudulent practices o f the brokers
i.e. they arbitrarily change margin call requirements, short selling rules and occasionally market 
closes itself down when brokers wish to protect themselves on large, long or short positions. 
Although the number of retail shareowners in India increased from about 10 million in 1990 to 
20 million in 1997-98, an estimated 30-40% of the companies in which they invested cannot 
even be traced (Gupta, 1994). In an all India survey of nearly 3,000 middle and upper-middle
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class households, carried out by Society of Capital Market Research and Development 
(SCMRD), 79% of the respondents had either no or low confidence in company management 
64% thought similarly about statutory auditors. The Shankar Acharya Committee (1998) on the 
primary market also confirms that most companies enjoy little credibility with investors, which is 
one of the reasons for poor demand. So, the practices of both company managements and 
stockbrokers have led to lack of confidence of retail investors in the stock markets. The Indian 
Stock market has been described as:
“a snake-pit, lacking in fairness and integrity, prone to speculative excess and showing 
scant regard for the interests of small investors. "(Joshi and Little, 1994).
For the small sized firms listed on the BSE, there appears to be lack of effective 
monitoring by both external bloclcholders of debt and external shareholders. Malpractices of the 
companies and the brokers have led to low confidence in stock markets resulting in low 
capitalisation of small firms. But due to the many changes brought about by the capital market 
reforms, governance by large and small shareholders has improved compared to past standards 
(Sarkar et al., 1998).
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3. 3 DETERMINANTS OF DEBT-EQUITY RATIO:
The following Table - 3.24 shows the proportion of external and internal sources of 
finance for the corporate sector from 1951-52 onwards till the late 1980s.
Table 3.24: Corporate financing trends from 1951-52 to 1988-89. (Rs. inn.)
No. of Total Internal External As % o f total resources
Year Companies Sources
Equity Borrowi
ngs
Other Internal External B oito wings
1951-2 750 1160 590 70 360 140 50.86 49014 31.03
1952-3 750 290 270 30 -100 90 93.10 6.90 34.48
1953-4 750 470 390 60 10 10 82.98 17.02 2.13
1954-5 750 1010 510 40 310 150 50.50 49.50 30.69
1955-6 750 1270 680 110 320 160 53.54 46.46 25 .20
1956-7 1001 2680 980 240 990 470 36.57 63.43 36 .94
1957-8 1001 2450 690 290 1040 430 28.16 71.84 42 .45
1958-9 1001 1690 820 210 440 220 48.52 51.48 26 .03
1959-60 1001 1570 990 270 50 260 63.06 36.94 3.18
1960-1 1001 2780 1570 200 680 330 56.47 43.53 24.46
1961-2 1333 3280 1810 380 680 410 55.18 44.82 20.73
1962-3 1333 3450 1710 290 910 540 49.57 50.43 26 .38
1963-4 1333 3740 1920 290 1010 520 51.34 48.66 2 7 .00
1964-5 1333 4150 1930 240 1260 720 46.51 53.49 30.36
1965-6 1333 4300 1920 230 1530 620 44.65 55.35 35.58
1966-7 1501 6300 2620 270 2310 1100 41.59 58.41 36 .66
1967-8 1501 5430 2240 290 2080 820 41.25 58.75 38.30
1968-9 1501 5030 2530 400 1230 870 50.30 49.70 24.45
1969-70 1501 6050 3270 380 1120 1280 54.05 45.95 18.51
1970-1 1501 7020 4030 180 1390 1420 57.41 42.59 19.80
1971-2 1650 8090 4940 250 1290 1610 61.06 38.94 15.95
1972-3 1650 7190 5350 180 80 1580 74.41 25.59 1.11
1973-4 1650 12550 6540 180 2100 3730 52.11 47.89 16.73
1974-5 1650 19400 8920 290 4470 5720 45.98 54.02 2 3 .04
1975-6 1650 12960 5520 320 4310 2810 42.59 57.41 33 .26
1976-7 1720 11180 5080 290 2910 2800 45.44 54.56 26.03
1977-8 1720 13620 5710 290 3450 4170 41.92 58.08 25.33
1978-9 1720 17790 7640 460 4530 5160 42.95 57.05 25.46
1979-80 1720 25360 10910 470 6910 7070 43.02 56.98 27.25
1980-1 1720 31810 12200 290 9250 10070 38.35 61.65 29 .08
1981-2 1651 44830 12980 920 16530 14400 28.95 71.05 36.87
1982-3 1651 46400 14140 750 18840 12670 30.47 62.53 40.45
1983-4 1838 41980 15730 1850 16980 7420 37.47 62.53 40.45
1984-5 1838 51840 20360 1800 17000 12680 39.27 60.73 32 .79
1985-6 1942 75310 26020 1960 27690 19640 34.55 65.45 36.77
1986-7 1953 74390 22020 2540 29830 20000 29.60 70.40 4 0 .10
1987-8 1953 69640 24670 11590 24130 9250 35.43 64.57 34.65
1988-9 1885 87020 34780 7810 44430 3020 28.97 71.03 37.01
Source: Balasubramanian, N. (1993), Corporate Financial Policies and Shareholder Returns.
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Over the last four decades, two clear trends in corporate financing are discernible; first, a 
marked movement away from internal financing (primarily comprising of retained earnings and 
accumulated depreciation) particularly in the later part of the time period, and second within 
external funding, a growing reliance on borrowings in preference to risk bearing equity. After the 
initiation of financial reforms of 1991-92 and the deregulation of stock markets, equity financing 
has now become very dominant.
As most managers agreed (during the survey) that equity issues were unavoidable if  a 
company wanted to take advantage of growth opportunities, which were unleashed by the 
economic reforms. As a result many small companies, given the liberal financial rules, listed 
their companies on the stock exchange hoping to reap the benefits of the economic reforms. 
Table - 3.25 also shows that till 1973-74 internal sources have constituted an important source of 
financing the asset needs o f non-financial non-government companies.
Table 3.25: Relative roles o f different sources, Percentage annual average.
Individual Sources of Finance 1 plan 2 plan 3 plan Annual plan 4 plan
1. Total Internal 60.6 44.9 47.3 41.8 52.5
a. Retentions 24.2 16 14 9.9 18.2
b. Tax Provision 3.4 2.3 1.2 -0.9 1.2
c. Depreciation 33 26.6 32.1 32.8 33.1
2. Total External 39.3 55.1 52.7 58.2 47.5
a. Total Long term 9.8 13.9 12.7 17.5 7.8
i. New Stock Issues 8.8 13.4 6.7 5.5 2.3
ii. Debentures 1 -0.2 1.7 6.1 5.6
iii. Borrowings from Institutions - 0.7 1.1 5.1 -0.3
iv. Other Mortgages 3.2 0.8 0.2
b. Total Short-term 29.4 41.2 40 40.6 39.8
i. Bank Borrowings 7.3 19.7 19.8 19.2 9
ii. Trade Credit 22.1 21.5 20.2 21.4 30.8
Source: Kishor, B. (1980).
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Although the broad macroeconomic factors have an impact on the way firms finance their 
investments, there are obviously firm and industry specific characteristics, which have a bearing 
on the capital structure of the firms. The following two tables 3.26 and 3.27 indicate the paid up 
capital of come public limited companies.
Table 3.26: Paid up capital o f some private sector companies (Rs. bn.) between 1950-80.
Period Public Limited Companies Private Limited Companies
Number PUC Number PUC
1950-51 12568 5.665 15964 2.089
1955-56 9575 6.904 20299 3.338
1960-61 6702 9.482 19344 3.563
1965-66 6450 13.531 20137 3.997
1968-69 6535 18.339 21152 4.587
1969-70 7071 23.233 29964 6.626
1978-79 7893 26.880 42376 8.749
1979-80 8225 27.515 46730 9.068
Source: Balasubramanian, N. (1993), Corporate Financial Policies and Shareholder Returns.
Table 3.27: Paid up capital (Rs. bn.) o f public limited companies between 1987-98.
Year No. o f companies Paid up capital As %age o f total capital
1987-88 1908 556.14 12.9
1988-89 1908 609.42 12.1
1989-90 1908 670.34 11.1
1990-91 2131 820.47 11.2
1991-92 1802 86.78 10
1992-93 1802 105.11 9.7
1993-94 1720 145.22 9.6
1994-95 1720 145.22 9.2
1995-96 1730 170.83 9.1
1996-97 1930 211.43 8.4
1997-98 1948 235.89 4.3
Source: RBI Currency and Finance Bulletin, Various Issues.
Different authors have attempted to analyse empirically firm specific determinants of the 
D-E ratio of the Indian companies. Sinha (1994) in his study of differences in the D-E ratio of 
Foreign Controlled Companies (FCCs) suggests that FCCs in India have a lower D-E ratio than 
their Indian counterparts. According to the RBI Bulletin (1992), among Public limited 
companies, the average D/E ratio has been about 48% for FCCs as against 105% for ICCs 
(Indian Controlled Companies). Sinha (1994) points out reasons for the difference in the 
financial structure as; differences in the financial performance of FCCs relative to ICCs in terms
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of profitability and growth,134 FCCs may be concentrated in industries characterised by low D/E 
ratios, Government regulations and policies may force FCCs to adopt financial structures with 
low D/E ratio and the low D/E ratio may be the result o f financial policies o f multinationals with 
respect to their foreign affiliates. Almost all the factors accounting for this difference is outside 
the confines of “optimal capital structure” theories.
Bhat (1980) in his study of 63 firms from the engineering industry found that the firm’s 
financial leverage is not related to its size, the negative relationship between financial leverage 
and coefficient of variation shows risky firms are more likely to employ low percentage of debt 
in their financial structure, firm’s growth rate is negatively correlated to its leverage. There is a 
negative relationship between the dividend payout and the leverage ratio, though the cause and 
effect relationship between them is not clear. The earnings rate is also linked to firm’s leverage, 
the degree of operating leverage does not influence the use of debt and financial leverage and 
interest to Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) ratio are negatively related.
In a study of 743 companies from 18 industrial groups, Pandey (1985) finds that all 
companies in the sample have about 70-80% of their assets being financed by outside debt, 
including current liabilities. Companies equally employed trade credit as much as bank 
borrowings. Although the level of loans and advances including bank borrowings has declined 
but it has been substituted by other sources. It can be implied that Indian companies with access 
to institutional finance generally borrow upto the maximum permitted level and sometimes 
beyond their capacities. Interest tax shields and a relatively high rate o f inflation give Indian 
companies a tendency to make unrestricted use of debt. Higher rates of inflation should actually 
discourage the firms from using excessive leverage. His study also indicates that leverage and
134 A number of empirical studies suggest that firms with high profitability and low growth tend to have low D/E 
ratios.
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the type o f industry are not related and that size cannot be considered conclusively as having an 
impact on the degree o f leverage since his analysis also reveals that a large number o f small 
firms employ high levels o f debt.
According to RBI survey of finances of public and private limited companies the average 
debt-equity ratio over the period 1986-87 to 1988-89 was 87.8% for public limited companies 
and 76.6% for private limited companies. Among public limited companies the average debt- 
equity ratio is as low as 30.37% for the tea industry and as high as 159.23% for the cement 
industry. In the case o f private limited companies the variations are even larger with the debt- 
equity ratio ranging from only 4% for land and estate to 330% for grains and pulses. In Sinlia 
(1993) study on the differences between the D-E ratios of the public limited and private limited 
companies; debt ratio is regressed to asset type,135 profitability,136 risk,137 growth138and size.139 
He concludes that the difference in capital structure patterns of private and public limited 
companies may not be due to differences in ownership patterns but because o f differences in 
size. For public limited companies his results conclude that the debt ratio has a positive 
correlation coefficient of 0.67 with asset type and size has a negative coefficient.
If a larger proportion o f gross fixed assets to total gross assets leads to a higher debt- 
equity ratio, given that the collateral value of assets is likely to be higher for these firms resulting 
in lower costs of financial distress, then the correlation between the D-E ratio and size (definition 
of it based on the gross assets) should also be positive, contrary to the results obtained by the 
author. His final conclusions indicate that whereas in the case of public limited companies the
135 It is measured by the proportion o f gross fixed assets to total gross assets.
136 It is measured by the ratio o f operating income defined as gross profits plus depreciation, to total gross assets and 
by the ratio o f operating income to sales,
137 This is measured by the standard deviation of the growth rate in gross profits.
138 It is measured by the growth rate in gross assets.
139 The average size of firms in the industry is measured by dividing the gross assets by the number o f units included 
in the industry sample.
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debt-equity ratio is influenced by the return on assets in the case of private limited companies it 
is influenced by the margin on sales.
Venkatesan (1983) studies determinants of the financial leverage and analyses the 
relationship of such variables like industry categorisation, size, operating leverage, debt coverage 
ratio etc with the financial structure. Only debt-coverage ratio among all the independent 
variables was found to be the important variable significantly affecting the financial structure of 
firms, hi a study o f the capital structure of the chemical industry Rao (1989) observed significant 
negative correlation between age and D-E ratio, retained earnings and D-E ratio, profitability and 
D-E ratio, but a positive correlation between size and D-E ratio.
Mathew (1991) analysed the relationship between ownership structure and financial 
structure and concludes that where the management stake is high, the leverage will be low and 
vice-versa. The analysis was based on the hypothetical relationship between ownership structure 
and unsystematic risk, non-manufacturing expenses, and profit appropriation policies. Majumdar 
and Chibber (1999) study establishes that D-E ratio and profitability are negatively related. 
Profitability140 was explained by firm related, industry-related or aspects related to institutional 
environment.
None o f these studies on the determinants of the D-E ratio of the firms show unanimity. It 
is difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion on these studies because they deal with a wide cross 
section of companies and have analysed different time periods. But there is an agreement on 
certain variables and their effects on the D-E ratio i.e. risk, profitability, management stake, age 
and growth are all negatively related to the D-E ratio. For a particular industry as a whole, D-E 
ratios have a different relationship with the above-mentioned variables. My survey results of 
LCCs show a very different scenario in that debt-equity policy is more determined by the owner-
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managers on the basis of issues like, outside equity not entailing any commitments on the part o f 
the firm, lack o f close screening of a company before outside investors choose to invest in a 
particular firm. Thus, it can be implied that several o f these factors may determine the debt- 
equity ratio, but the debt decision is determined non-systematically by managers across firms 
(Kim and Sorensen, 1986), according to the requirement of the firm and its external 
environment.
140 Size, Diversity, Group, Advertising Liquidity, Excise, Time etc.
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3. 4 FINANCIAL REFORMS AND THE CHANGING CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 
COMPANIES
The financial reform agenda of the Indian Government in 1991-92 was rightly 
preoccupied with the banking sector and capital markets. Despite many shortcomings, the policy 
parameters defining the financial system’s operating limits have generally been better managed 
in India’s mixed economy than in much of the developing world for most o f its post­
independence history. Consequently, India has not suffered many o f the effects generally 
associated with financially repressed regimes (Mckinnon, 1973, World Bank, 1990). Monetary 
policy has been cautiously managed with swift intervention to avert inflationary trends from 
getting out of control (Joshi and Little, 1994). Fiscal policy until the second half o f the 1980s 
was managed acceptably with occasional excess spending being corrected (Acharya, 1988). But 
fiscal discipline vanished between 1986-91 (Jalan, 1991, Mundle and Rao, 1992). Given these 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, the State embarked upon the structural 
adjustment programme, which included financial reforms amongst other economic reforms.
By 1991 the environment in which banks operated characterised by the following:
1. Insufficient attention to prudential accounting nouns and capital adequacy
2. Extraordinarily high level of bank resources were reserved through the SLR and CRR
3. Excessive recourse to subsidised credit channeled through a complex system of administered 
interest rates
4. Inadequate internal control and rigidities in personnel policies and management structure 
(Patel, 1997).
The following table 3.28 shows a comparison between the proportion of non-performing loans 
and the losses made by banks in different countries.
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Table 3.28: Banking performance in different countries.
Share o f state- 
owned banks 
(1994)
Average rate 
o f return on 
Assets (avg. 
1990-94)
Non-interest 
Operating 
costs (% of 
total assets) 
avg. 90-94
Net
interest 
margins 
(% of total 
assets) 
avg. 1990- 
94
Loan-Loss 
Reserves (avg. 
1990-94)
Non -performing 
Loans
(Avg. 1995-95) 
%age o f total 
loans
Korea 13 0.6 1.7 2.1 1.5 1
Singapore 0 1.1 1.4 1.6 NA NA
Indonesia 48 0.7 2.4 3.3 2.6 11.2
Malaysia 8 1.3 1.6 3.0 9.6 8.2
Argentina 36 1.4 8.5 9.2 10.2 10.5
Chile 14 1.1 3.0 6.1 3.5 1.0
India 85 -0.07 5.2 3.1 1.6(1995-96) 17.3
US 0 0.8 3.7 13.7 2.7 1.6
Japan 0 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.0 3.3
Source: Patel (1997), Emerging reforms in Indian Banking International perspectives, Economic Political Weekly.
In addition to the stipulations (Appendix- 3.1) regarding the debt-equity mix, there were
some institutional and structural reforms in the financial sector, which the Narasimham
Committee Report (1991) recommended. Here, only those recommendations, which are
important from the point of view of the capital structure of the corporate sector, are stated below.
Lending practices o f  banks and financial institutions:
• the system of consortium lending was abolished and was replaced by the system of loan 
syndication and participation
• the practice o f a sharp dichotomy between working capital finance and term loans was re­
examined and the artificial segregation of business between banks and financial institutions 
was removed
• A Greater measure of competition between banks and financial institutions was to be 
promoted.
Structure o f  commercial banks and financial institutions:
• the banking structure should consist of,
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(a) 3 or 4 large banks, including the State Bank of India (SBI), which can internationalise its 
operations
(b) 8 to 10 national banks with a network of branches throughout the country
(c) Establishment of several new local and region specific banks
• there should be free entry into the financial sector and the establishment of new banks in the 
private sector should be allowed.
• the policy with regard to allowing foreign banks to open offices in India either as branches or 
as subsidiaries should be liberalised. Joint ventures between foreign banks and Indian banks 
should be actively encouraged.
• Introduction of new accounting and prudential norms related to income recognition 
provisioning and capital adequacy.
• Reduction in SLR
hi addition, banks were directed to maintain an 8% Capital to Risk weighted Assets Ratio 
(CRAR), and also to make provisions to the extent of 15% of the advances in the category o f 
non-performing assets. Banks were permitted to approach the capital market to mobilise funds. 
Nevertheless many steps remain to be taken in reduce the proportion o f bank's and FI's non­
performing assets, which have been difficult to administer or monitor. Despite the decrease in
the SLR, lending to productive sectors did not increase significantly, the increase in the 
availability of loanable funds being directed mainly to buy government securities.
Interest rate Policy:
• the bank rate should become a pivot for all interest rates in the financial system
• the concessional rates on the priority sector loans should be phased out
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• all discriminatory and ad hoc fiscal concessions in respect of different saving instruments 
should be eliminated over a period of time
• the ceiling on the bank deposit rates should be raised over a period of time
• the current lending rates of the FIs and banks should not be increased further.
Most of the proposals will undercut the resource base o f the developmental FIs and 
priority sectors could face the adverse consequences of it. But for the corporate sector, the 
deregulation o f interest rates on long term corporate securities abolishes the interest rate ceiling 
on debt instruments. The lending rates o f financial institutions and banks are also to be 
determined by market forces. So, all the corporate sector interest rates are left to the market 
forces. The rise in interest rates has reflected itself in the equity markets as well, equity prices 
has been facing a downward swing. It may be aggravated by the reduction in corporate earnings 
due to the expected increase in interest rates, hike in corporate taxes and reduction in 
depreciation. But these adverse factors can be counterbalanced by the new industrial policy, 
price and distribution decontrols etc.
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3.5 MARKET FOR TAKEOVERS IN INDIA:
The market for takeover provides efficient firms to govern the inefficient ones. But this 
mode of governance has served a very limited function for the Indian corporate sector. 
Chandrasekhar (1994) identifies three phases of oligopolistic rivalry in the post-independence 
India. Till the early 1980s Indian business houses sought to preempt entry by monopolising 
industrial licenses. These licenses provided them with monopoly power, as subsequent entry 
barriers were high (due to non-availability of capital). Development of capital markets, 
accumulation of capital by other than traditional business houses; reduced entry barriers led to 
emergence of new business houses. This led to attempts of restructuring by traditional business 
houses to face new competition. The reforms of 1990-91 enhanced external competitive 
pressures as well, the Indian coiporate sector now faces both internal and external competition 
simultaneously.
In general, a very active market for coiporate control was absent in India because of the 
existence of tight rules and regulations141 prior to the financial reforms o f 1991-92. It was 
virtually impossible to replace inefficient managements, hi certain cases, amalgamations were 
resorted to, in order to salvage operations of group companies or to arrest their tax losses 
(Venkiteswaran, 1993).142 hi a study of mergers in hidia, Kaveri (1986) found that 7 out o f 9 
mergers were between companies belonging to the same business group. But the introduction of 
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act in 1985 saw coiporate restructuring 
through mergers and acquisitions. As a result, in the late 1980s Indian economy witnessed a 
phase of rapid growth for some firms through takeovers and acquisitions of firms. These
141 The provisions o f the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTPA - all mergers and 
acquisitions) and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) controlled the activities o f both Indian companies 
and Multinationals.
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takeovers can again be categorised into three groups, entry and gradual consolidation of a few 
non-resident Indian groups by purchasing the foreign equity holding of mainly British controlled 
firms, oligopolistic strategic mergers (to increase market shares, strategies o f parent MNCs often 
have an impact on the domestic market), growth strategy (conglomeration).
The early 1990s witnessed another wave o f takeovers, which was a result o f the financial 
liberalisation, whereby existing firms either wanted to diversify into different lines of business or 
to increase their market share or consolidate group companies (in order to enhance promoter 
holdings in the post merger company), MNCs used the acquisition route143 to enter or strengthen 
their presence in Indian markets. Not all acquired firms belonged to their respective core 
business area. Since 1996-97 the Indian coiporate sector has witnessed yet another spate of mergers 
and acquisitions. Given the recessionary conditions, financial restructuring,144 ownership 
restructuring,145 divestitures, joint ventures, strategic alliances and also demergers146 have led to an 
increase in the M&A activity as companies tried to get rid of their non-core businesses. The 
following two tables 3.29 and 3.30 show the number of mergers and acquisitions that have taken 
place between 1991-97 after the initiation of financial reforms.
142 Each company is a separate tax entity and wholly owned subsidiaries are not considered as one entity with their 
parent companies for tax purposes.
143 In order to cut down bureaucratic delays and the long gestation period involved in setting up manufacturing and 
distribution units (Venkiteswaran, 1997).
144 Financial restructuring has been implemented through merger with a healthy unit with or without the intervention 
of the Board of Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR) or through debt renegotiations.
145 Changes in the shareholding structure without a change in the management, companies have issued shares to the 
management or the promoter s to increase their stake. The Indian affiliates o f the MNCs have issued targeted shares 
when the ceiling on stake holding was increased to 51% from 40% (Venkiteswaran, 1997).
146 Demerger involves spinning off o f an unrelated business/division in a diversified company into a standalone new  
company along with a free distribution o f its shares to the existing shareholders of the original company 
(Venkiteswaran, 1997).
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Table 3,29: Distribution o f Mergers and Acquisitions in India by various categories, 1991-97.
Type Mergers Acquisition
Horizontal 134(53.2) 107(73.8)
Vertical Backward 31 (12.3) 3(2.1)
Vertical Forward 8 (3.2) 2(1.4)
Conglomerate Related 26 (10.3) 11(7.6)
Conglomerate Unrelated 53(21.3) 22(15.2)
Total 253 (100.0) 145 (100.0)
Note: Figures in the brackets denote percentages. In about 74% cases, the merging companies belonged to the same group, in 16% 
cases the merging companies were unrelated and 22 cases, the relationship between firms could not be established.
Source: Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA) Database.
Table 3.30: Distribution o f Mergers and Acquisitions in India by identity o f the active company 1991-97.
Identity Mergers Acquisitions
Private Indian 221 (87.7) 88 (60.7)
Private Foreign 19(7.5) 47 (32.4)
Non-Resident Indian 1 (0.4) 6(4.1)
Joint Venture between Indian and 
Foreign
4(1.6) 2(1.4)
Others 7 (2.8) 2(1.4)
Total 252(100.0) 145 (100.0)
Note: Figures in the brackets denote percentages. 
Source: Ibid.
During regulatory regime there were restrictions on growth in any particular industry and 
firms grew through diversifications. As these restrictions were removed, companies are now trying 
to focus on their core competencies. The institutional investors have become more effective 
monitors by pressurising the management to enhance shareholder value. They achieve this by 
selling their stakes if they disagreed with company strategy. Even family members have been seen 
to sell their stakes following disagreements within the family over company policy (Business 
Today, 1998). In all these phases of takeovers, the major player has been the government’s 
financial institutions and banks. This gives the state considerable leverage vis-a-vis private 
capital and makes it an arbiter in most management tussles (Kumarasundaram, 1983).
Given that the market route of exit has become an effective mode o f governance only in the 
last few years, but still many o f the low capitalised firms exit their category through disciplinary 
action taken by the regulatory authority Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI, 1998). The 
market route of exit has been restricted to companies where FIs have considerable stake. LCCs with
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their lack of significant FI stake are not active in the market for takeovers and they continue in their 
status o f “low-cap” firms for long period of time, till they are delisted from the stock exchange by 
disciplinary actions o f SEBI.
Table 3.31: Companies delisted from 1995 to 1999 by SEBI.
Year of Delisting No. o f companies Reason for Delisting
1995 5 Merger
8 Amalgamation
216 Non-payment o f annual listing fees
1996 12 Merger
12 Amalgamation
91 Non-payment o f annual listing fees
1997 8 Merger
12 Amalgamation
5 Winding up business
173 Non-payment o f annual listing fees
1998 19 Amalgamation
1 Merger
11 Winding up
19 99 16 Amalgamation
2 Winding up
Source: BSE Internet Report, 2000.
As is evident from Table - 3.31, the exit route for most LCCs is through the disciplinary 
action of delisting by the regulatory body. Amalgamations are usually mergers between companies 
within the same group. Thus the market exit route is not an option for the LCCs.
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3. 6 CONCLUSION
This chapter looked at the different sources of finance for Indian Companies from the 
plan period. It also dealt with reasons which contributed towards the predominance o f a 
particular source of funding at a particular point of time, as well as with the peculiarities o f the 
market for coiporate control in India, with films restructuring through amalgamations within 
group companies.
The financial structure o f Indian firms given the regulated economy rules was biased 
towards debt financing. Through out the 1980s capital market reforms were initiated and this led 
to an increase in equity financing. After the 1990-91 financial reforms, there has been a marked 
increase in equity financing by a large number of new companies. Regulated economy also 
meant high entry and exit barriers for firms. These have been now considerable reduced, which 
resulted in an increase in the number of firms listed on the stock exchanges and also films 
exiting through market mechanisms.
This chapter looked at the different sources of finance for the Indian companies from the 
plan period. It also dealt with reasons, which contributed towards the predominance o f a 
particular source of funding at a particular point of time. And also the peculiarities o f the market 
for corporate control in India, with firms restructuring through amalgamations within group 
companies.
Given the macroeconomic conditions created by rules, regulations and licenses, industrial 
sector was a monopoly o f few traditional business houses. With the reduction in entry barriers a 
large number o f new firms are now part of the industrial sector. As many as 6000 companies at 
present are listed on the stock exchange. Many more are listed every year. Nearly half of these 
companies trade much below their par values. Many of these listed firms indulge in cheating the
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investors, for example out o f 3900 companies 2500 that were listed on the BSE between 1991-96 
have disappeared and in most of these disappeared companies, an individual or a group of 
individuals have taken decisions that benefited a small select group to the detriment o f the large 
body of shareholders (Murthy, 1999). The financial policies of these firms also point towards 
accumulation of returns o f the firm towards the benefit of owner-family members. A significant 
positive relation between dividend payout ratio and insider shareholding in chapter -7 provides 
evidence for the above statement.
Regulatory authority SEBI is now playing a stronger role in monitoring these companies 
much effectively than the market mechanisms. At present for most o f the LCCs the exit route is 
through their delisting from the stock exchange for not abiding with the rules of the exchange.
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Appendix -1
A. Stipulations Regarding the D-E Mix
Price controls on public issues of equity functioned as implicit taxes and spurred financial 
innovation. In India before June 1992, listed companies sold shares under the dictates of the CCI, 
which decided when, at what price and in what volume companies could make public equity 
issues. The price arrived at was often at a significant discount to quoted market prices, which 
conferred big capital gains on recipients. The Capital Issues Continuance o f control Act of April 
1947 was passed to check inflationary trends and to secure a balanced investment of the 
country’s resources in industry, agriculture and social services. In general the federal 
government’s consent to an issue o f capital is required in all cases including the banking and 
insurance field, hi the industrial and commercial field, the consent is necessary if  the capital to 
be issued during any 12-month period is more than Rs. 5 million with effect from April 1976. 
This limit was raised to Rs. 10 million in Feb. 1985. This limit has been further raised to Rs. 30 
million in Feb. 1989. The minimum public offer o f equity capital shall not be less than Rs. 18 
million o f minimum issues equity capital. From the point of view o f the companies, it was 
considered that the practice o f controlling capital issues would enable them to maintain a 
reasonable debt equity ratio. After 1991, existing listed companies are allowed to raise fresh 
capital by freely pricing their issues subject to their conforming to certain guidelines related to 
disclosure and investor protection.
• Guidelines fo r  Issue o f  Fresh Share Capital
Where the issue of equity capital involves an offer for subscription by the public for the first 
time, the value of equity capital subscribed privately by the promoters, directors, and their
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friends should not be less than 15% of the total issued equity capital, if  it does not exceed Rs. 10 
million, 12.5%, if it does not exceed Rs. 20 million and 10%, if it is in excess of Rs. 20 million.
The capital structure should be such that a debt-equity ratio of 2:1 is maintained, hi case 
o f capital intensive industries a higher debt equity ratio can be maintained according to each 
specific case. The equity-preference ratio of 3:1 was normally to be maintained. The rate of 
dividend on preference shares was to be within the ceiling as notified by controller of capital 
issues from time to time. And no premium was allowed in respect of a new company making its 
first issue o f shares.
Under the SEBI rules, new companies making their IPOs, depending on the size o f their 
issues, could opt either for the OTC Exchange where they can have the advantage o f lower 
requirement for minimum issue capital or minimum public offer compared to other stock 
exchanges. They are allowed to go to the market with public issues at par. hi this case the 
investor does not take any additional amount of risk other than what is inherent in any 
investment decision. For the first issues by existing Private Companies, the issue price is 
determined by the CCI largely in consultation with the company by taking the projected earnings 
of the company into consideration. But they are allowed to go to the market only at par. Another 
option for this type of issues is the OTC Exchange.
Listed companies which have made at least one issue earlier and have been paying 
dividends continuously will be permitted to fix the price for further issues, whether the issues are 
on rights basis or to the public.
Pherwani Study Group (1991) on establishment of new stock exchanges, made certain 
recommendations relating to the pricing o f issues which suggested the application of certain 
valuation guidelines for determining ceiling and floor prices. For companies, which have been in
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existence for less than 6 months, prior approval of CCI is required, with reference to a formula 
based approach.
Principles and method of valuation:
The objective of the valuation process is to make a best reasonable judgment of the value 
o f the equity share of a company. The best reasonable judgment of the value will be referred to, 
as the fair value and it will be arrived at on the basis o f the following:
Net Asset value147 
Profit earning capacity value148 
Market value in the case of listed shares149 
• Guidelines fo r  Foreign Participation
The new procedures stipulate that companies wishing to enhance their foreign 
shareholding upto 51% will be able to make issues at the price determined by the shareholders in 
a special resolution, which would be accepted by the CCI, provided it is not below the existing 
valuation guidelines. This will apply to private limited companies and to companies, which have
147 The net asset value is calculated as the total assets o f the company or of the branch minus all debts, dues, 
borrowings and liabilities, including current and likely contingent liabilities and preference capital.
148 The profit earning capacity is calculated by capitalising the average of the after-tax profits at the following rates:
1. 15% in the case o f manufacturing companies
2. 20% in the case o f trading companies
3. 17% in the case o f Intermediate companies i.e. companies whose turnover from trading activity is more than 40%,
but less than 60% o f their total turnover. This helps in estimating the future maintainable earnings o f the business.
149 1. The average market price is to be determined by taking into account the stock market quotations in the
preceding three years (after making appropriate adjustments for bonus issues and dividend payment) as under:
a. The high and the low price of the preceding 2 years.
b. The high and the low price o f each month in the preceding 12 months.
2. The average market price acts as a relevant factor while setting the fair value unless there are reasons to believe
that speculative transactions or manipulative practices vitiate the market price.
3. The reasonableness of the fair value is checked against the average market price on the following lines:
a. If the average o f the net asset value and the profit earning capacity value on 15% capitalisation rate is less than the
average market price by about 20% only; then the average will be regarded the fair value.
b. If, however, the average o f the net asset value and the profit-earning capacity value is less than the average
market price by a substantial margin, by over 20% then the profit earning capacity value is to be reworked by
changing capitalisation rate o f 15% in the following manner;
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no foreign shareholding at present. Foreign companies share participation in Indian joint 
ventures has been raised from 40% to 51%. The Government has allowed acquisition of 
additional capital by foreign companies at prevailing market prices with a discount o f 10% and 
the freedom to sell their holdings on the same basis.
These conditions are still in operation as it has been felt that given the conditions of 
inefficiency, lack o f transparency and prevalence of malpractice's in the Indian markets an 
unregulated freedom to price the issues based on imperfect market prices would place investors 
at considerable risk.
• Provision o f  Taxation
Computation o f profits after provision for taxation is postulated on the following basis: 
For widely held public limited companies, provision for taxation is at the current statutory rate 
under the Income Tax Act. If the “Actual Tax Liability” as shown in audited accounts of the 
company is more than the current statutory rate, then the actuals are subject to a maximum 
statutory limit of income tax plus surtax. “Actual Tax Liability” means the average of the tax 
liability (in percentage points) for the preceding 3 years or the actual tax liability in the latest 
accounting year, whichever is higher.
• Rights Issues
A rights issue without a public issue coming within a period o f three months after the 
announcement of a rights issue, the price for the issue is determined through AGM by the 
shareholders. If public issues come within 3 months it is treated as a composite issue. If there is a 
composite issue, it allows existing shareholders to benefit for having stayed with the company by 
giving them shares at a price lower than the price of the public issue.
If the average market price is more than 20% and 50% of the fair value, the capitalisation rate will be 12%. If the 
average market price is more than 50% to 75% o f the fair value, the capitalisation rate will be 10%. If the average
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• Debentures
During stringent money market conditions, companies find it difficult to attract equity capital 
or even preference capital. And since banks generally advance only on the security o f floating 
assets, the issue of debentures is regarded as the only other suitable alternative for raising capital. 
No permission from the CCI is required for convertible debentures exclusively placed with the 
financial institutions.
Rates of Interest
a. Convertible debentures 14% for non-MRTP and non-FERA companies 
12.5% for MRTP and FERA companies
b. All Non-convertible debentures 14%
In 1991 all restrictions on setting interest rates on debentures were removed, the interest 
rate on such instruments is therefore governed by the market forces and the companies are 
required to obtain credit rating from the already established credit rating institutions before 
floating these instruments. Credit rating for public sector companies issuing bonds, private 
placement of NCDs with Financial Institutions and banks, (Issues of NCD upto Rs. 50 million on 
private placement basis including with Mutual Fluids, issues of fully Convertible Debentures 
where these are to be compulsorily converted into equity within 18 months from the date of 
allotment at per-determined price),150 is optional,
a. Issues of Fully Convertible Debentures:
For free market pricing of FCD issues, compulsory credit rating is necessary if 
conversion is to begin before six months. Premium amount and redemption amount on
market price is more than 75% and above o f the fair value, the capitalisation rate will be 8%.
150 Press release i ssued by the Department of Economic Affairs, Office o f CCI on 3.10.1991.
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conversion at various stages is to be determined at the outset and is to be stated in the prospectus 
and the interest rate is freely determined.
b. Conditions for partially Convertible Debentures:
hi addition to the conditions for the convertible debentures, the discount on the non- 
convertible portion of the PCD in case they are haded and the procedure for their purchase on 
spot basis must be disclosed in the prospectus.
c. Conditions for Non-Convertible Debentures:
Same as in the case of the fully convertible debentures.
• Dividends
Statutory restrictions on the dividends have been imposed by the Companies (Amendment) Act 
1988.
Preference Shares:
Ceiling rate of dividend on preference shares was reduced to 14% from 13.5-15%.
Ordinary shares:
The profits are to be calculated after providing for depreciation and after adding to the reserves 
that percentage o f profits as may be prescribed, but not exceeding 10%.
Percentage of dividends Minimum %age o f current profits added to 
reserves
Less than 10 Nil
More than 10 up to 12.5 2.5
More than 12.5 upto 15 5
More than 15 upto 20 7.5
More than 20 10
The decision to limit dividend payments seems highly arbitrary and discriminatory. It 
does not make any distinction between companies, which have different records of past profits 
and dividends in relation to the capital employed. Thus, while highly profitable companies were
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required to cut down their dividend rate, moderately profitable concerns with low dividend 
record were affected adversely by the ordinance. This makes the moderately profitable 
companies to depend upon their own earnings instead of costly external finance. Dividend 
stipulations were not favourable to small investors.
B. Capital Market Related Issues:
The reform agenda here has focused on market regulation, primary market functioning, 
secondary market hading, development of a proper debt securities trading market, broker 
capitalisation, qualifications and behaviour broker liquidity settlements, delivery and 
misapplications of client funds, development of an integrated national market system; 
technological investment in exchanges and brokerages; and investor protection. SEBI has 
accordingly set up various committees to recommend on the above-mentioned issues.
SEBI has been advising stock exchanges to set up either Trade Guarantee Fund or 
Settlement Guarantee Fund to eliminate counter party risk. Upper limit for gross exposure of 
member brokers o f stock exchanges was fixed at 20 times the base minimum capital and 
additional capital of the member broker.
By 1998, 20 stock exchanges in the country, accounting for almost 99.8 percent o f the 
total all-India turnover, had shifted to on-line screen based trading. Rolling settlement o f T+5 
was made mandatory in the exchanges where trading in dematerialised securities was available 
since January 15, 1998. The SEBI appointed J. R. Varma Committee on Modified Carry Forward 
System which recommended a margin of 10 per cent on carry forward trades instead of earlier 15 
percent, enhancing the over all limit of carry forward trades by a broker to Rs 200 million from 
the earlier limit o f Rs 75 million, removal o f scripwise sub-limits on cany forward positions and 
removal of limit of Rs 100 million for badla financier. The recommendations were accepted and
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suitable directions issued to stock exchanges. Brokers were permitted to warehouse trades for 
firm orders of the institutional clients. The SEBI appointed a committee under the chairmanship 
of G. P. Gupta to study the concept of market making and to revive the institution o f market 
makers. The recommendations are awaited.
R. Chandrasekharan committee has recommended adequate safety and security features 
for security certification. The action for its implementation has been initiated. All stock 
exchanges were required to strengthen their Investor Protection Fund and Investor Services 
Fund. The Stock exchanges were advised to provide a special facility for attending investor 
complaints and dummy terminal for showing the on-line trades.
SEBI gave approval to three intermediaries to act as Stock Lenders under the Stock 
Lending scheme of SEBI. Settlement of trades in the depository was made compulsory from 
January 15, 1998 in selected scrips for institutional investors namely domestic FIs, Banks, 
Mutual Funds and Fils having a minimum portfolio of securities of Rs 100 million.
The SEBI permitted unlisted infrastructure companies making a public issue of pure debt 
instruments/convertible debt instrument and municipal corporations from the requirements o f 
Rule 19(2)(b) o f Securities (Contract) Regulation Rules, 1957, allowing them to list their debt 
instruments on the stock exchanges without the requirement for equity being listed first. The 
facility o f book-building was extended to the entire issue size for issuer companies which 
propose to make an issue of capital o f and above Rs. 1 bn. A Committee was set up to examine 
the draft regulations on Credit Rating Agencies prepared by SEBI and to recommend suitable 
modifications. Only coiporate bodies were allowed to function as merchant bankers. This new 
entity would undertake only those activities which are related to securities market including issue 
management activity. However, such entities need to seek separate registration if  they wished to
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act as underwriters or portfolio managers. Merchant Bankers are prohibited from carrying on 
fund-based activities other than those related exclusively to the capital market. SEBI (Registrars 
to an Issue and Share Transfer Agents) Regulations 1993 have been amended to provide for an 
arms length relationship between the issuer and the Registrar to the Issue.
SEBI appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr S.A. Dave to draft the 
Regulations on Collective Investment Schemes. SEBI stipulated that all existing schemes would 
continue to mobilise funds only after obtaining a rating from any of the recognised Credit Rating 
Agencies. It was decided that all advertisements by existing collective investment schemes 
would adhere to the advertisement code prescribed by the SEBI.
Securities and Exchange Board o f India (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 were also 
amended to address certain issues that are important for investor protection. Aggregate 
investments by a mutual fund in listed or to be listed securities o f group companies o f the 
sponsor would not exceed 25% of the net assets of all schemes o f the fund. Securities 
transactions with associate brokers would not exceed 5% of the quarterly business done by the 
mutual fund.
Unitholders’ approval would no longer be required for rollover of schemes and for 
converting close-ended schemes into open-ended ones, provided the unitholders were given the 
option to redeem their holdings in full at NAV based prices. Independent trustees who are not 
associated with the sponsor shall now constitute two-thirds of the Board o f Trustees instead of 
earlier provision of 50 per cent. The SEBI gave an option to the issuers to fix the minimum 
marketable lot on the basis o f offer price subject to the condition that the marketable lot should 
not be more than 100 shares.
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SEBI set up a working group to work out the modalities and guidelines for investment by 
domestic mutual funds in overseas markets. The SEBI regulations for merchant bankers, stock 
brokers, registrars to an issue, portfolio managers, underwriters, debenture trustees, bankers to an 
issue, custodian of securities, depositories, venture capital funds were amended to specifically 
include the concept of "fit and proper person" in their eligibility criteria that an applicant should 
be a fit and proper person.
SEBI instituted a number o f enforcement actions against a wide range o f violations. The 
main focus of reforms in the primary market was to safeguard and stimulate investor interests in 
capital issues by strengthening norms for raising standards of disclosures and streamlining 
procedures with a view to reducing the cost of issues. In the secondary market the emphasis 
remained on making the market transparent, efficient and modern. Trading infrastructure in the 
stock exchanges which was already modernised by replacing the open outcry system with on-line 
screen based electronic trading system was given further momentum and by the end of the year 
trading in 20 out of 22 stock exchanges were automated. The safety and integrity of the market 
were also further strengthened through the introduction of risk containment measures which 
included a comprehensive margining system, intra-day trading and exposure limits and setting up 
of trade guarantee funds. The clearance and settlement system, which had suffered from several 
bottlenecks, was considerably improved with measures taken to shorten the settlement period 
and accelerate the process of electronic book entry transfer through the depository. The new 
regulations for mutual funds (1996-97) were further refined and strengthened to help foster the 
growth of mutual funds and provide increased protection to the investors.
SEBI set up a committee under the Chairmanship of K. R. Chandratre, to principally look 
into the issue o f delisting of securities by the exchanges. It recommended exchanges to collect
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listing fees from the companies for three-year period in advance. Besides, companies opting for 
voluntary delisting should mandatorily provide an exit route to investors by offering buy-back 
facility to them. Given that delisting is an extreme measure of disciplinary action, which an 
exchange takes against a company, indiscriminate use of it could adversely affect the interests of 
the investors. The Committee prescribed the uniform conditions and norms under which delisting 
can take place and the manner in which the interests of the investors can be safeguarded in such 
cases.
• Investor Protection Fund and Investor Services Fund
All the stock exchanges are required to set up a fund called ‘Investor Protection Fund’. 
The purpose of the fund is to provide compensation, arising out o f disputes or defaults of the 
member brokers of the exchange to small investors. The amount o f compensation available 
against a single claim of an investor arising out of default by a member broker of a stock 
exchange is Rs. 100, 000 in case of major stock exchanges, Rs. 50,000 in case o f medium stock 
exchanges and Rs.25, 000 in case of smaller stock exchanges. Another Fund being maintained by 
the exchanges is the Investor Services Fund, whose purpose is to provide investor related 
services. A Committee was set up to bring about uniformity in the functioning o f these funds. 
Based on the initial recommendations o f the Committee, SEBI advised stock exchanges to 
provide various services including a desk for attending investor complaints and dummy 
terminals for showing the trades of the exchange. The number of Investor Service Centres set up 
by stock exchanges is being increased.
150
C. Institutions of Corporate Governance:
Institutions o f corporate governance in India have been formally in place for a number of 
years. There are four avenues through which corporate governance structures have been 
institutionalised.
• Companies Act:
The Activities of Indian Companies are regulated through the Companies Act. 1956. This 
Act ensures that interests o f creditors and shareholders are adequately protected. Along with 
this it also provides for a measure of government control over the functioning o f joint stock 
companies. Revised Version called the Companies Bill 1997 incorporates provisions of 
flexibility and greater disclosure and self-regulation of Indian companies. The legal rights 
that the Indian Shareholders possess under the Act are:
a. Voting Rights: Every shareholder shall have a right to vote, in respect of such capital on
every resolution placed before the company. All shares carry proportional voting rights. 
Voting through proxies is also permissible.
b. Board of Directors: Company boards are single tiered. Each company is governed by a board 
of directors comprising the Chairman and the Managing Director (one person can hold both 
posts) and other members who can be either executive or non-executive. Every public 
company should have at least three directors appointed by the company in general meeting. 
No person should be the director of more than 20 companies at one time. Directors are
subject to detailed disclosure requirements with respect to their financial interests in the
company.
c. Remuneration of Directors: Executive directors may be remunerated either by way of 
monthly payment or a specified percentage of the net profits of the company, or a
151
combination of both provided that except with the approval of the central government such 
remuneration shall not exceed 5% of the net profits if  there is one director and if  there are 
more then one director, 10% for all o f them together. Non-executive directors may be 
remunerated either by way o f monthly, quarterly, or annual payments with government 
approval or by way o f commission by special resolution, provided that the remuneration paid 
to one, or all o f them together, does not exceed 1% of the net profits of the company.
d. Removal of Directors: A company may, by ordinary resolution, remove a director before the 
expiry of his period of office subject to certain tenurial clauses like lifetime employment.
e. Annual General Meeting: Each company is required to hold a general meeting every year, i.e. 
annual general meeting. The board of directors is also empowered to call an extraordinary 
general meeting. The Companies Bill, 1997 has introduced new provisions incorporating 
internationally accepted corporate governance practices aimed at strengthening corporate 
democracy, protecting the interests of minority investors, and providing increasing flexibility 
to corporates in responding to market conditions (Sen et al, 1997 and Sarkar et al, 1999).
• Securities and Exchange Board o f  India:
Stock market activities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board o f India 
(SEBI). The SEBI Act o f 1992 gave SEBI statutory powers to protect interests of investors in 
securities, to promote the development o f the securities market and regulate the securities 
market. Under the SEBI Act companies have been given the freedom subject to stringent 
disclosure requirements, to price their issues and raise funds to meet their various types of 
business requirements. SEBI guidelines also contain a stipulation as to minimum promoters’ 
contribution and lock-in period thereof. It is to ensure that the interests o f the promoters of 
the issuing company are fairly tied up with the interests of the minority investors.
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• Market fo r  Corporate Control:
Takeovers are regulated through the Substantial Acquisitions of Shares and Takeovers 
Regulations, first promulgated in 1994 by SEBI. It tried to create a climate in which takeovers 
could fulfill the function o f effectively disciplining Indian firms,
a. Bhagwati Committee Draft Takeover Code:
The draft takeover code formulated by the Bhagwati Committee (1996), aims to protect 
the interests of shareholders, ensures fairness, transparency and equity without discouraging the 
process of takeover, the committee provided a framework of regulations in which takeovers 
could occur. Some o f the recommendations o f the committee were as follows;
1. Acquirers can take a company private, because it recommends doing away with the existing 
conditions of 20% public holding after the offer.
2. Acquirers have the option to buyout the remaining shares if  the public shareholding were to 
fall below 10% subsequent to a public offer.
3. Preferential offers, which are clearly approved by the shareholders have been exempted from 
public offer requirement subject to the fact it does not lead to a change in management 
control (Sen et al, 1997 and Sarkar et al, 1999).
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Chapter - 4
Models of Takeovers and Corporate Monitoring by Institutional
Debtholders
4. 1 INTRODUCTION:
This chapter deals with models of corporate disciplining (through Takeovers and 
Mergers) and monitoring mechanism (through Financial Institutions). Shareholders and 
the stock market collectively perform functions of corporate monitoring and disciplining 
a firm listed on the stock market. But for the “low-cap” family owned companies the 
stock market cannot effectively perform the role of either monitoring or providing the 
exit mechanism.
This chapter attempts to explain the absence of effective disciplining by the stock 
market in the case of the family owned LCCs. One explanation is based on the 
assumption o f information asymmetries and/or hidden information which prevent the 
emergence of a corporate control device i.e. takeovers. The essence o f the model is that 
by indicating their willingness to sell at a certain price, informed sellers show that the 
stock is really worth less than that certain price and buyers, knowing that the seller would 
only sell if they were overpricing, refuse to trade. These information asymmetries limit 
trade even when differences in risk preferences and circumstances might in the case of 
symmetric information have led to mutually advantageous exchanges. The buyer is never 
sure whether the seller is willing to sell because of inside information, which lets the 
seller know that the buyer is overpaying, or whether there are grounds for a mutually 
beneficial exchange. The scepticism related to no trading derives not only from the
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asymmetric information but also from the fact many people lack the training or patience 
to understand the consequences of policies (Stiglitz, 1989).
Another explanation concerns the lack of corporate monitoring of the low 
capitalised firm's policies. Block debt holders, given the ownership structure of the firm, 
perform corporate monitoring in India to a certain extent. This lack of interest towards 
monitoring LCCs results in their existence as “low-cap” firms for a long period of time, 
assuming that the diffused outside shareholders cannot perform the role of effective 
monitors due to free rider problem. Apart from outside shareholders other equity holders 
are the family members. It is generally accepted in the finance literature that policies o f a 
family owned firm usually do not harm inside stakeholders. Out of 3900 companies 2500 
that were listed on the BSE between 1991-96 have disappeared and in most o f these 
disappeared companies, an individual or a group of individuals have taken decisions that 
benefited a small select group to the detriment of the large body of shareholders (Murthy, 
1999). It is now almost impossible to trace these companies, as there are no annual 
reports or any other form of published information about them. Thus, only block debt 
holders can play an important role in effectively monitoring the firm given the existing 
ownership structure of the family-owned businesses (FOBs).
The structure of this chapter is as follows; the chapter has been divided into two 
broad sections, the first section deals with takeovers and the second one with corporate 
monitoring. Section -1 deals with the describing of a model of market for lemons and its 
applicability to the corporate control market in India, followed by concluding comments. 
Section -2 consists of a model, which analyses the conditions and scope of monitoring by
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a block debt holder, follows this section. And the last section contains the concluding 
comments.
SECTION -1 
Market fo r  Lemons and Takeovers
4. 2. INTRODUCTION:
Finance literature provides a description of factors which determine takeovers and 
M&A activities. Firm-performance related hypotheses151 of takeovers suggest that the stock 
market would be able to efficiently evaluate potential takeover targets. As Manne (1965) 
argues stock markets provide an objective evaluation of management performance through 
the price it places on a firm’s equity. A low share price will create an incentive for more 
competent managers to take control of a firm and drive it’s value back up. So, the worse a 
firm is managed, the lower its share price will be and therefore greater the potential capital 
gains to outsiders who buy the firm’s stock and run it more efficiently.
Nearly 3000 Indian companies quote much below their par values, some of them as 
low as 20 or 30 Paise per share.152 There are other companies, which belong to larger group, 
which may trade above par values, but are still considered low compared to their book 
values. Low stock market valuation suggests that wholesale acquisition o f such companies
151 Inefficient management hypothesis: It represents management, which is inept in an absolute sense and is 
not performing up to its potential.
Differential Efficiency: If the management o f Him A is more efficient than the management o f  firm B and 
if  after firm A acquires firm B, the efficiency o f firm B increases to the level o f firm A, efficiency is 
increased by merger.
Growth-resource mismatch hypothesis.
Industry disturbance hypothesis 
Size hypothesis
Market-to-book hypothesis: Mams' theory o f takeovers, the motivating factors o f  takeovers can be 
subsumed into and conceptualised in terms o f a single variable, the valuation ratio. The valuation ratio v, at 
any point o f time, is defined as:
V = stock-market value of a film's equity capital 
Book-value of its net equity assets
152 The par value is Rs. 10 and 1 Rupee = 100 paise.
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offers a cheaper alternative to new Greenfield or Brownfield investment in many industries 
(Venlciteswaran, 1997). Accordingly, firms listed on the BSE, which hade below par values 
for a long period of time, should have been subjected to the market disciplinary action 
through takeovers or mergers. But most of the takeover activity is restricted to a select few 
high and mid capitalised companies while LCCs have remained immune to mergers or 
acquisitions.153 On the basis of the existing hypotheses determining takeovers in the 
coiporate world, most of the LCCs can be deemed as potential takeover targets.
It has been observed that most of the LCCs have a large shareholding by the 
founding family, which acts as a likely deterrent to takeovers. It is possible that firms with 
a larger share o f insider ownership154 are not often threatened by a hostile takeover 
(Weston, 1979). Quite contrary to this, the Indian corporate sector has witnessed a 
phenomenon in which some of the members from the major shareholding family were 
willing to sell their stakes if  they had disagreements with company policies (Business 
Today, 1998). High proportion o f inside shareholding may not all circumstances act as a 
likely deterrent of any corporate restructuring.
153 According to a study on takeovers in UK by Singh (1971), the stock market is a poor disciplinarian 
when a firm's short-term profitability is taken into account. A firm, which is not very profitable and is not 
interested in increasing its rate o f profit, is not forced by the stock market to improve its performance in 
order to reduce the danger of takeover. This confirms to firms who after having achieved a certain 
satisfactory level o f profitability are able to pursue whatever other goals they place without affecting the
risk of takeover (Singh, 1971).
154 An increase in the proportion of shares held by the large shareholder results in a decrease in the 
takeover premium (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This acts as a likely deterrent for takeovers of FOBs. Given 
that the ownership pattern o f Indian industry is highly biased towards promoters (or foreign principals in 
the case o f multinationals) and the government owned FIs, it was extremely difficult to effect change of 
control through open takeover bids (Venkiteswaran, 1993). Pound (1988) finds that the block ownership is 
lower in successfi.il proxy contests than in unsuccessfiil contests and lower also in full control bids than in 
other types o f proxy challenges. However, the regression tests relating block ownership to dissident victory 
are sensitive to the specification of the block ownership variable. In pure percentage form the coefficient on 
block ownership is positive and statistically significant, implying that the higher is block ownership, the 
lower are dissident’s victory chances.
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As mentioned earlier, LCCs155 in India have not been subjected to any takeover 
threats, although they seem to be potential targets, which proposes that an informational 
asymmetric problem restricts this market phenomenon156 from occurring. This 
contributes to the increase in number of LCCs on the BSE. Veiy often markets are 
characterised by asymmetric information i.e. it is impossible for an individual to determine 
the quality of a good acquired and it is also impossible or very costly to monitor the actions 
of an agent. The problem of asymmetric information arises in many situations, i.e., when an 
individual purchases a used car, when an employer hires workers with different skills, when 
insurance is provided to individuals characterised by varying degrees of risk, when credit is 
granted to different types o f firms, or when shareholders must rely on managers to produce 
profits for their corporation. A  large literature has identified asymmetric information as 
the defining characteristic o f credit markets. But in the case of LCCs listed on the BSE, 
asymmetric information seems to be the defining characteristic o f takeover markets. 
Raiders taking over LCCs face uncertainty about the potential target firm's intrinsic value 
to the extent that they cannot observe some o f its characteristics and actions. However,
155 Venlciteswaran (1993) suggests that ideally under/non-performing companies should have contributed to 
an active market for corporate control in India, but this has failed to occur due to high exit barriers 
(Retrenching assets and labour). But these exit barriers have now been considerably reduced after the 
reforms o f 1991-92.
156 Stiglitz (1985) provides four reasons why takeovers have failed to be an effective control mechanism:
a. Given that insiders know more about the firm, when insiders want to sell their stake, it indicates that 
the firm attempting the takeover has paid too much; if  insiders refuse to sell, it indicates that the raider 
lias paid too little, takeovers are successful when the raider over pays too much.
b. If a discovery firm invites bids from other firms to takeover a particular undervalued firm; the expected 
profits for the first firm will be zero. It then implies the discovery firm expends its resources on 
evaluating the not too bad firms.
c. If the takeover is successful and as a result the market value of a share is increased, the shareholders 
that did not sell will free ride (Each small shareholder believes that what he does will have no effect on 
the outcome o f the takeover). It is in the interest o f each o f the shareholders to hold his or her shares. If 
he/she believes that the takeover will be successful and his/her shares will have lesser value, he/she 
will sell it. Thus value-decreasing takeovers are easy compared to value-enhancing ones (there is a 
rational expectations equilibrium in which all value decreasing takeovers are successful).
d. Current managers are often in a position to take strategic actions that deter takeovers.
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overtime in credit markets lenders resolve part of these informational problems. In the 
process o f lending, financial intermediaries are able to gather some proprietary 
information about borrower’s creditworthiness. Hence they acquire some degree of 
informational monopoly about their clients. But in the case of a takeover market, this fails 
to occur because the raider’s incentive to investigate target management are reduced as 
the threat of a takeover has a disciplinary effect on the management, which reduces 
wealth gains horn the actual takeover. As a result the raider may not be able to capitalise 
on private information about the inefficiency of the target (Boot, 1992).
Thus an analysis of the takeover market from the viewpoint of the “market for 
lemons” seems appropriate. The non-existence of takeover markets for LCCs is 
analogous to the phenomena o f the second hand car market, where equilibrium fails to be 
achieved even in the presence o f large number of prospective buyers and sellers. Stiglitz 
(1985) analysis of the failure of takeovers in monitoring the corporate sector stems from 
asymmetric information, but his analysis does not include the absence of takeover market 
due to inability of a raider in deciding upon his targets which can be restructured to suit the 
acquirer.
Takeover or mergers of the LCCs can lead to higher optimisation. As firms are 
supposed to be run more efficiently when inefficiently managed films pass into the hands of 
better management. Takeovers facilitate efficient redeployment of assets of bankrupt firms 
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998). LCCs, which employ considerable amount of resources, 
fail to generate profits because of the lack of competent managerial staff as well as lack of 
alternative investment opportunities.157 It was observed during the interviews with managers 
of “low-cap” Indian films that they lacked formal management education. In order to reduce
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wasting of valuable resources due to inefficient management, it is highly desirable that they 
are either taken over by or merged with other efficient managements. Mergers and takeovers 
are needed mostly for LCCs, but efficient companies are unwilling to invest in takeover or 
merger deals with LCCs. The reason being the uncertainty or risk related to achieving net 
present value benefits from the takeover or the merger. Again, the market for lemons 
syndrome seems to be the likely explanation, restricting the efficient firms from taking over 
LCCs. Although there is uncertainty regarding the sources of gains from takeovers, they are 
still desirable in order to restrict the inefficient management from managing valuable 
resources. But it is clear that the hostile takeovers, which allocate businesses to firms 
owning other related businesses, improve operating efficiency and increase market power 
(Bhagat et al, 1990).
This work tries to analyse the non-existence of takeover mechanism for LCCs on 
the BSE from the point o f view of the market for lemons.
4. 3 MODEL:
Non-existence o f equilibrium is possible in hidden information problems due to 
adverse selection. Analogous to the second hand car market, takeovers market can be thin 
for certain categories o f firms despite presence o f many potential buyers and sellers. The 
essence o f the Lemons phenomenon is that goods of different qualities are uniformly 
priced, because buyers cannot realise these differences. The average quality of goods 
offered for sale is however, a function of the market price. Low quality goods are 
supplied at a low price; high qualities are added as the price rises. Then, it may happen 
that at any positive price demand falls short of supply, a price reduction lowering average
157 Survey result.
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quality so much as to further reduce demand. The only equilibrium is then obtained at 
zero prices, with zero supply.
Assumptions:
1. The target firms158 belong to the low market capitalisation category o f the stock 
exchange. The target firms tend to be slower growing than average (Cosh et al., 
1989).
2. The acquiring firm is a well-established firm with a past record of high performance 
and hence, is less risky. Acquiring firms are bigger than average, and tend to be both 
faster growing and more profitable than companies in general. They may not always 
be more profitable, than the companies they acquire (Cosh et al., 1989).
3. In the target firms there is little separation between ownership and management.
4. Prohibitively high costs159 prevent acquirer films from conducting a thorough 
research into knowing individual firm qualities of potential targets listed on the stock 
exchange. If the acquirer firm expends its resources in gathering data about specific 
firm qualities, it’s cost of acquiring a firm increase and it would rather divert its 
resources towards not so uncertain quality companies.
5. Ownership patterns of the target firm are stable.
6. The consequences o f takeovers for managers of the acquired firm depend more on 
available resources and requirements of the managerial organisation of the acquiring 
company.
i5S There is a fair degree o f agreement in the literature that firms which themselves wish to sell is likely to 
be much greater among small firms. A number o f small companies find at some point that they have 
reached a certain stage o f development whereby further growth is possible if  they merge with bigger 
companies (Singh, 1971).
!59 Adverse selection prevails over favourable selection because o f the high cost o f appraising goods 
(Egidi).
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7. Two groups of firms, which are part of the takeover market cannot change their 
position160 freely i.e. from buyer to seller and vice-versa.
8. The founding family of the target firm faces a trade-off between retaining a majority 
stake holding in a highly risky entity and being less than a major shareholder in low 
risk entity.
9. But divesting161 the target firm after the takeover leads to no stake o f the founding 
family of the target firm in the combined entity.
60 If the quality o f the target firm were taken as an endogenous variable as in Kim’s model (1985), then 
quality in this case would mean that the acquiring firm needs some minimum incentive for it to takeover. 
Given his second assumption that the quality o f the target firm will depend on its owner through 
endogenous factors such as management (which may not be too efficient) of its resources etc. Kim (1985) 
criticises the Akerlof model on the ground that it overlooks the ability o f each agent to freely choose 
whether to be a buyer or a seller. An agent can change his position from buyer to seller or vice versa with 
little or no transaction costs. This critique would not be valid for the takeover markets because even if firms 
could change their positions from seller to buyer and vice versa, the argument o f the hidden information 
related to seller’s films act as a disincentive for a takeover o f LCCs. In his model, a firm has 2 periods; it 
starts its operations in the first period and becomes part o f the takeover market in the second period. In the 
new firm, a level o f management is chosen which determines an income flow. The income flow of a target 
firm depends on its management in the previous period when the firm started its operations. The quality o f  
the firm is endogenous, varying with the level o f management. If x is an index denoting the quality o f a 
firm, measuring its overall efficiency, then the quality o f a firm is solely determined by the management 
and other accounting measures in the previous period when the firm started its operations. All firms try to 
maximise two-period expected utility. If an acquirer firm takes over a target firm, the acquirer film ’s 
expected utility will be a linear function of the average quality of the target firms in the market. Kim (1985) 
proposes that the average quality o f non-traded used cars can be either higher or lower than that o f traded 
used cars. In some cases, the average quality of traded cars will be higher than that o f non-traded cars, thus 
contradicting the Lemons principle. The validity of this proposition is questionable for the takeover market 
as it is assumed that all the firms who become part o f the takeover market are LCCs. Whereas in the case o f  
higher quality firms the target management would oppose the takeover.
Heinkel’s (1981) model differs from Akerlof (1972) in that sellers are able to improve the quality 
before sale, at a cost and a penalty on the seller forces him not to sell sub-standard quality product. A 
penalty on the major shareholder o f the target firm would be liquidation o f the acquired firm and other 
personal disincentives, if  the acquired firm were found to be sub-standard expost. Sell offs are a pervasive 
consequence o f hostile takeovers, and in many cases result in liquidation or a near liquidation o f the target 
(Bhagat et al, 1990). This would provide the sellers to improve the film’s quality. Thus the sellers’ profits 
are now contingent upon ex ante quality improvement and an expost observation of the film ’s quality. The 
average quality o f a firm (before any improvement) differs amongst all the sellers and that the acquiring 
firm realises such a difference exists. Two films L and H, which are potential takeover targets; are identical 
in all the respects when evaluated by the first set o f criteria. Given this basic quality, if  both firm L and H 
are able to perform costly maintenance on their firms, they can raise the average firm quality. But Heinkel 
model assumes that there is uncertainty about product quality, as acquirers cannot observe the maintenance 
performed by each target management. Then in the equilibrium again there will not be any takeovers o f the 
low capitalised firms, as acquirers cannot observe the improvement or maintenance initiated by the seller.
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10. A firm has different values to buyers and sellers. A firm as a separate entity for the 
seller and the same firm as a combined entity to the buyer are different.
Most of the acquiring firms base their decision of determining potential targets on 
the basis of the stock market valuation of a firm, Tobin’s Q, incompetent management, 
asset redeployment, taxes etc. As there is no dearth of firms on the BSE, which confirm 
to the earlier mentioned features162 of a takeover target, acquiring firms will have an 
additional criterion to determine their potential target firm i.e. whether they will be able 
to restructure the target firm.
For acquirers targeting firms on the basis of the accounting measures could lead to 
potential misinterpretation of the real intrinsic value of the target firm in the presence of 
asymmetric information. Acquiring managers in friendly strategic take-overs are more 
familiar with the business of the target-company and have access to proprietary information 
in negotiations, which improves their accuracy in valuing the target. Once the kind of 
takeover targets have been identified on the basis of the criteria listed in the second 
chapter, the demand for a LCC in a takeover market will depend most strongly upon two 
variables,
Qd = D (p, jli)
1. Where p is the price the acquirer is going to pay for the target.
2. And p is the average quality of the target firm, i.e. asset redeployment163 in the new 
combined entity.
Profit maximisation function of the buyer:
Max rii — piyi - wiXi
162 See chapter-2 , p. no. 64 - 65.
163 The prospective value of the target firm in the new combined entity i.e. the capacity o f the target’s 
resources to be employed efficiently in the combined firm.
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Where pi = market value164 o f the new combined firm
yi = new combined firm
wi = cost of acquiring a target firm
Xu = any ith firm which is low capitalised
Hence, the buyer’s profit maximisation function depends upon the owned assets as part of 
the combined firm and the cost o f acquiring new assets.
The availability o f a firm for a takeover will depend on the following variable:
1. Price, S = S (p), the price at which shareholders who have a controlling interest in the
target firm are willing to sell their shares.
Profit maximisation function of the seller:
Max n 2 = piy2 - w2x2 
pi = market value of the combined firm. 
y2 = stake holding in the combined entity. 
w2 = market value o f the target firm on its own. 
x2 = stake holding in the target firm.
The sellers' profits are contingent upon ex ante market value o f the target firm on 
its own and an ex post observation o f the film ’s quality. The stake holding in the 
combined firm y2 will be 
y2 = 0 when pi < 0
y2 = 1 when Pi > 0
164 Although literature on takeovers suggest that share price of the acquirer falls in the aftermath of a 
takeover, it is assumed here that the ability o f the acquirer to restructure the target for its advantage (which 
is the stochastic variable) determines the market value o f the combined firm.
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In equilibrium the supply must equal the demand for any given quality. As the 
price (both selling as well as buying) falls, the quality will also fall.
The bidder and target are all initially equity firms. The bidder is able to finance a 
cash acquisition with internal funds or debt. The bidder knows its type but cannot 
credibly convey it to the target that it will not divest the target firm, whereas both the 
target firm and the acquirer have asymmetric information about the value of claims on a 
combined entity.
A market for takeovers fails to occur, because the ability to restructure the target 
firm to suit the acquirer is subject to random shocks. Therefore, at no price will any 
takeover take place in spite of the fact that at any given price there are sellers who are 
willing to sell their companies at a price which buyers are willing to pay.
4. 4 CONCLUSION:
Existence o f numerous LCCs on the BSE can be attributed to among other things 
lack of takeover activities for these firms. According to the traditional criteria of 
determining a takeover target, most of these firms can be potential targets. But they have 
not been subjected to any takeover threats or any mergers. This points to the fact that the 
market mechanisms have failed to reduce the high number of LCCs on the BSE. The 
market for lemons syndrome helps to draw a parallel between the used car markets and 
the takeover markets.
In recent years SEBI has introduced delisting of companies from the stock 
exchange as a disciplinary action, which has led to a drop in the number of listed 
companies. A new institutional figure is required in order to restore the virtuous 
mechanism of favourable selection, which the market alone cannot guarantee. Adverse
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selection prevails over favourable selection because of the high cost o f appraising goods. 
Decline of the market and eventually its disappearance does not automatically lead to the 
rise o f an alternative institution, which enables the system to achieve optimality. The 
mechanism of competition, which is expected to select virtuously the most competent 
behaviours, may be superseded by a vicious mechanism of adverse selection, which 
discourages the emergence o f efficient and competent behaviours. Consequently the 
economy may remain happed in a highly sub-optimal condition (Egidi, 1994).
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SECTION - 2
Institutional Debt holders and Corporate Monitoring
4 5 INXRODUCXION:
Monitoring in usual circumstances by large shareholders or debtholders165 
typically involves identification of companies whose actions are in conflict with their 
respective interests and an attempt is made to bring about change through negotiation 
with management, proxy fights, takeovers and involvement in the choice o f board 
members (Admati et al, 1994). In the case of small firms which are single family-owned 
and the proportion of outside shareholder is small and diffused, the effect of owner- 
manager’s actions is borne by majority family shareholders. As a result it is unlikely that 
owner-manager’s actions become detrimental to the interests of the existing shareholders. 
Given this argument, it can then be deduced that there is no scope for any monitoring 
activity in these firms and that they are efficient with the prevailing ownership structure 
of the firm. But majority of the firms which formed part of the sample set for this study 
portray a contradictory situation as these companies have failed to sustain a continuous 
pattern of profits, high growth rates and the market share price is a manifestation of 
inefficient production (in the secondary market share prices trade at below par values). 
This reflects on the operational deficiencies in the firm, making a strong case for an 
effective outside monitoring entity.
Lenders are only concerned with the bottom part o f the tail o f the distribution of 
returns; they may require that the firm undertake projects with relatively little risk, even
155 Block debt holders i.e. banks and FIs, frequently take large positions in a firm, the nature o f the loan 
contract enables them to do this without undertaking undue risk. At the same time, the nature o f the 
contract enables them to focus their attention on information gathering on a particular set o f issues: those
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though the expected return is much lower. One of the reasons of the low market 
capitalisation can be attributed to lack of monitoring by existing outside shareholders or 
bondholders.
For a small firm, a founder-manager who seeks funding from one or several 
financiers is primarily concerned with maintaining his or her private beneficial control. 
Usually the debt-equity ratio of a firm depends on the probability distribution of cash 
flows and on the firm’s investment opportunities (Stulz, 1990). But in the case of firms 
with high inside ownership the problem of determining the capital structure often reduces 
to the problem of how to obtain funding which will take away as little control as possible 
to financiers. Most financiers insist on some form of protection, so that the final 
compromise regarding most financial contracts for small firms is one resembling a debt 
contract (Bolton and Thadden, 1998). Even though lenders are more concerned with 
avoiding defaults than with maximising returns, in the prevailing situation166 they are the 
only outside entities who can provide monitoring of firm activities. As a result only 
debtholders can play an effective role in monitoring167 a small firm’s activities.
In diffusedly owned firms shareholders divide the output, net o f the compensation 
paid to the manager and retained earnings, in proportion to their stakes in the firm. 
Managers choose their actions in response to the monitoring by shareholders and
associated with the probability o f default and the net worth of the firm in those low return states (Stiglitz, 
1985).
166 a. Apart from the family shareholders, other outside shareholders are diffused.
b. Most o f the firms in the sample set have not shown continued profits or growth in their PAT (profits after 
taxes).
67 Financial literature also refers to existence o f a trade-off between concentrated ownership i.e. 
monitoring and diffused ownership i.e. liquidity. Presence of a large shareholder leads to following effects: 
Owning a larger stake makes the return on the company’s share more significant for the large shareholder, 
hence it biases her toward intervention (Lock-in effect167); and if  a larger fraction o f the total shares is 
owned by the large shareholder then fewer shares are held by households, making the market less liquid in 
these shares (Liquidity effect) (Maug, 1998).
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compensation policies, given their incentive to capture maximum possible returns from 
the firm’s payoffs. In a small firm, most of the managers belong to the controlling family 
and hence they have both individual as well as familial incentives to work diligently even 
in the absence o f any monitoring mechanisms. Inefficiency in small firms can then be 
attributed to as mentioned earlier (a firm’s value is dependent upon) lack o f investment 
opportunities.
An outside shareholder can provide a concentrated ownership structure under the 
following conditions when the returns of the firm are not too risky, when there is liquidity 
in the market, and the cost of monitoring is not too high. The investor who acquires a 
toehold before intervening in the management of the company can only gain if  the market 
cannot detect this purchase (Kyle and Vila, 1991). Usually monitoring activities by the 
diffused shareholders is negligible, because a partial owner who wants to play the role of 
a monitor underinvests in oversight as the product of his/her vigilance is divided pro rata 
among all stockholders, while he/she alone bears the costs. This shows that several 
different initial shareholders free ride on each other’s monitoring activities. Expected 
improvements in profits of the monitored firm are always incorporated or reflected in the 
share prices. The market share price is a manifestation of the free-rider problem for all 
gains are shared with non-monitoring shareholders (Maug, 1998).
This work fries to formulate a model depicting the scope o f monitoring (by an 
outsider) a firm, which is operated by a group of managers belonging to the controlling 
shareholder family and is simultaneously owned by outside diffused shareholders and 
also has a presence of large creditors. One among the creditors i.e. specialised financial 
institutions is usually responsible for the monitoring and oversight of the firm. This firm
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structure is common to most of the small sized domestic companies listed on the BSE. It 
also describes set of conditions in which the FI considers it is worthwhile to invest in 
monitoring a firm, given the relative position of a firm in the overall debt portfolio of the 
FI.
4. 6 MODEL:
The output of the firm depends on the owner-manager’s actions and their choice 
of operating and investment decisions. But the value of the firm is an endogenous 
function of an underlying stochastic variable describing the film ’s product market and 
also actions taken by the management. Thus the real character o f the film will include 
both operating choices (for example, firm size or fixed asset utilisation) and external 
economic factors, which affect the profitability and risk of operating cash flows (Jensen 
et al). Monitoring operating decisions falls on the FIs, which may or may not effectively 
observe the company, depending on how important the firm is to the FI.
Assumptions:
1. A model with three dates: 0, 1, and 2.
2. Capital markets are open at each date.
3. Firm’s assets in place at date 1 yield a random non-negative liquidating cash flow F at
date 2 which the management can either invest in new projects or payout.
4. Financial institutions or block debt holders provide debt and simultaneously hold 
equity in different films at the same point of time.
5. The firm raises funds at date 0 and date 1. At date 0, investment projects are
envisaged and funding is sought and at date 1 the project is implemented. And this
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project is assumed to have a positive NPV.168 At date 2, when returns of the project 
are realised, consumption takes place. At date 0 when the project is chosen three 
possibilities can arise:
a. If  owner-managers and FIs are uninformed, they agree to undertake project O due to 
the assumed lower expected return of randomly choosing one of the N projects.
b. When owner-managers are informed and outside shareholders and FIs do not make 
any changes to the manager’s plan. In this case of accepting o f his/her project, he/she 
chooses his/her preferred project that increases bonus to him/her with certainty.
c. If both the manager and the block holder are informed, the latter exercises her/his 
control rights. She/he implements her/his preferred project that yields Q  to all 
shareholders with certainty and there is less scope of managers hoarding the firm’s 
cash flows as bonuses. Monitoring169 takes place from period 0 onwards. No further
168 Management utility increases with the consumption o f perquisites and that this consumption is a 
function of date 1 investment only. Each unit o f investment is assumed to produce a non-stochastic positive 
amount of perquisites that is an increasing function o f the investment’s NPV. This assumption ensures that 
management invests in the positive NPV projects first. It can be motivated as follows: negative NPV 
projects consume corporate resources in the future whereas positive NPV projects increase these resources. 
Consequently, management that values investment would rather invest in projects that enable it to increase 
future investment (Stulz, 1990).
160 The word monitoring is used as a comprehensive label for all value-enhancing activities; it comprises 
intervention in a company’s affairs as well as information acquisition and is also used synonymously with 
shareholder activism. Shareholder activism is then defined to include monitoring and attempting to bring 
about changes in the organisational control structure of films not perceived to be pursuing shareholder 
wealth maximising goals (Smith, 1996). It is generally accepted in the finance literature that a large 
shareholder or debtholder has a large enough stake that it pays for him or her to monitor the activities o f the 
incumbent management. Large investors intervene for the following reasons;
1. Monitoring a company in order to benefit from the capital gain on their shares.
2. Trading on private information in public markets (Kyle and Vila, 1991).
3. Guarding against the danger o f making the company insolvent by placing a limit on dividend
payments.
There are different ways in which large blockholders of shares or debt instruments bring about value-
increasing changes in corporate policy;
i. When they cannot monitor the management themselves, large shareholders can facilitate third
party takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares with the bidder.
ii. Through proxy contest, since the board o f directors has the legal authority to replace the officers
of the firm, gaining a majority o f seats on the board is tantamount to gaining control o f the operating
decisions o f the corporation and lastly,
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trading takes place during period 0 and 1.
6. One large risk averse investor, L, called the controlling family shareholder; his/her 
ownership fraction is % s [0, 1] o f the stock of an all equity corporation, as he/she has 
resources to hold this significant fraction of the shares.
7. The remainder of the stock is dispersed among n minor or small shareholders i.e. (1- 
X)/n. The pair (%, n) is the ownership structure.
8. More than one financial institution holds debt in large blocks and one of them is 
assigned the role of monitoring firm activities. Usually when debt is held by a number 
o f block holders the free rider problem becomes severe if  an arrangement for the 
mutual distribution o f monitoring activities is not agreed upon. In this model it is 
assumed that one of the many block holders of debt is assigned this work by which he 
or she becomes a nominee director on the company’s board.
9. D the large debt holder has an endowment of the bonds of a firm. But bonds cannot 
be traded in the securities market very freely. D chooses a vector of monitoring level, 
m.
10. Ownership and managerial responsibilities are not veiy separate. And ownership 
patterns do not change.
The output o f the firm is x = p + a0i,
Where a  is a constant, and 0] is distributed normally with zero mean and unit variance.
The effort applied by the manager is p. The manager incurs cost XA  p2 in producing effort
p. The major shareholder family determines the base salary of the manager. The
Through informal negotiations with incumbent management to institute changes. This means influencing 
policy as a jawboning mechanism. It is practically costless and is used to make less valuable improvements 
(Vishny and Shleifer, 1986).
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manager’s compensation is also contingent upon the output level, x, a bonus, ax. 
Coefficient a measures the power o f the incentives in the contract. A compensation 
contract based 011 x will have a time lag between the application o f effort and the 
realisation of value170 and outside shareholders camiot observe it. The manager receives a 
bonus, ax, contingent on the output and a salary, b. Thus the contract offered to the 
manager will be S = ax + b.
Given that the variance o f y is tp at a cost, the monitoring debt holder can get a 
noisy signal of the output x, y = p + (p0 2  of the manager’s effort level and their operating 
policies on the basis of performance measures. The cost of y or monitoring the owner- 
manager is ccp"2 (Huddart, 1993)171.
The monitoring debt holder’s problem reduces to foreseeing the controlling 
family’s choice o f incentive power, a, and maximising the monitoring intensity, tp, so that 
he or she can avoid the costly administrative and legal expenses attached to bankruptcy. 
The monitoring efforts are affected by the perceived risk of uncertainty o f cash flows. A 
larger firm with larger cash flows also has greater risks of sustaining those returns and 
hence, financial institutions will be more inclined to monitor it intensely. D will hold a 
lower fraction o f small firm than that of a large firm;172 that is, he/she will not monitor 
those firms for which costs o f monitoring173 are higher. As a result, it is not worthwhile 
for a financial institution to monitor a small firm in normal circumstances. The
170 It depends on the market reception to the products o f the firm.
171 See Huddart (1993), p. no. 1409.
172 A large firm usually has existed for a longer period o f time with a record o f past growth and profits 
whereas a small firm could have existed as a private limited company earlier but is newly formed public 
limited company with little history o f production and profits and is hence subject to random stochastic 
shocks.
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monitoring intensity, y, depends upon the position of this firm in the portfolio o f the debt 
holder, M/TD, where M is the proportion of the firm’s debt and TD is the total debt lent 
by the financial institution.
If the firm faces N + 1 projects i s  {0, 1, 2, .........N}, yielding verifiable security
benefits to the shareholders and non-verifiable private benefits ax to the owner-managers. 
The project choice is observable by informed parties, but is not verifiable. The firm has
stochastic returns in t = 2, 3 ..... , which are both determined and publicly observed and for
simplicity assumed to be identical. With probability P the firms earn high returns, y = R 
in both periods, and with probability 1 - P returns are low, normalised by y = 0. In a good 
state, corporate monitoring is undertaken so that the firm continues to maintain its good 
state. The financial institution will intervene more rigorously when a firm is in a bad state 
for a continuous period o f time and force management to take efficient 
continuation/reorganisation.174 D is assigned the role of a monitor but his or her 
commitment of specific monitoring levels cannot be predicted prior to period 2. If at 
period 2 the firm is successful with its project, then accordingly the financial institution175 
has an incentive to monitor activities of the firm so that the firm sustains its good state. If 
the firm’s position in the financial institutions’ portfolio is lower monitoring will not be 
sustained if  the firm fails to achieve success in period 2. Thus monitoring by the financial 
institution depends on both the relative position of the firm, in the overall portfolio of the
173 Banks may view requests for loans from small businesses less favourably than those from larger firms 
because of informational problems may. This is because smaller firms are less likely to be professionally 
audited, and are both difficult and costly for a bank to monitor (Bopaiah, 1998).
174 In case o f continuous losses made by a firm, FIs are forced to take part in the decision making process 
by which it tries to increase the mean o f company’s returns and reduce uncertainty o f final payoffs.
175 Burkhart, Gromb and Panunzi (1995) argue that the optimal ownership structure o f a firm depends on its 
performance. When it is performing well, diffuse ownership may help to limit the degree of undesirable
174
financial institution and also the performance of the firm in period 2.
Shareholders have incentives to sell their stake as soon as the firm’s profits 
decline so in a bad state it is not possible that there could be monitoring by shareholders. 
A long run association with the firm in that case is not possible until they are bound by a 
contract176. Dining a bad state, a large debt holder has no alternative but to monitor firm’s 
activities, as it is difficult to find a buyer at this stage to buy his or her bonds. 
Intervention will occur only if  the financial institution perceives that the firm can be 
reorganised instead o f going through the costly procedure of bankruptcy.
4. 7. CONCLUSION:
In case o f owner-managed corporate units listed on the BSE where the major 
shareholder is the family and its members occupy all the managerial positions in the firm, 
the possibility o f monitoring by a large outside shareholder is limited. Given this 
situation, only financial institutions to a limited extent can perform the role of monitoring 
managers of these companies, as the source of debt for most o f these companies are 
specialised financial institutions. For reasons cited in previous sections, a financial 
institution can retain a long-term relation with the firm and hence, can be more effective 
as monitors o f film ’s activities.
For large shareholders if  stock markets are not liquid, large shareholders will 
engage in less monitoring. In order to avoid the commitment to monitor, they will hold 
more diversified portfolios; they will have smaller stakes in more companies. A more 
liquid stock market leads to more monitoring because it allows the investor to cover
interference from investors. However, when a firm is performing poorly then concentrations of share 
ownership may be desirable to encourage active control (OECD Working Paper, No. 48).
176 If the large shareholder is able to commit to retain a given stake in the firm or purchases of stock by the 
large shareholder is made pro rata from the minor shareholders.
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monitoring costs through informed trading (Maug, 1998). But liquidity or the lack of it in 
markets does not affect the role o f FIs.
Founders o f a company can affect the likelihood of future monitoring by large 
shareholders by increasing majority requirements; provided that the required stake 
needed by the large shareholder does not exceed a certain threshold. This requirement 
extracts rents from potential monitors, providing that large shareholders are allowed to 
hold sufficient number o f shares. This helps founders of the firm not to have a large 
outside shareholder, and hence the role o f the FI becomes crucial. Although the role of 
the FI is crucial for monitoring in all states i.e. ex ante before the returns are realised. 
There are three stages when FIs find it worthwhile to monitor the activities o f a firm:
1. Ex post i.e. after the firm realises its return and based on the success o f the project,
2. When the firm is making continuous losses for a long period of time.
3. If the firm’s relative position in the financial institution’s total portfolio is high.
Thus, it can be deduced that monitoring by a financial institution is limited and lack of 
effective monitoring at all times can be attributed to the under-performance o f LCCs.
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Chapter - 5 
Dividend Payout Policy
5. 1 INTRODUCTION:
The corporate policy on the payment o f dividends occupies an important place 
in the overall firm's policy as it affects the market price o f the firm's outstanding 
shares, and therefore on the change in its shareholders' wealth.177 Hence, the well 
established characteristics o f dividends are prevalent in the finance literature; the 
positive correlation between dividend change announcements and stock returns, and 
given the effects o f dividends on the market value o f shares, the reluctance o f
1 75?managers to change dividends. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) describe 
dividend initiations and omissions as "extremely visible, qualitative changes in the 
corporate policy." This chapter analyses the behaviour o f the “low-cap” family owned 
businesses179 through their dividend policy. Dividend payout policy to a large extent 
reflects functioning o f a firm.
Dividend behaviour o f public companies with high family ownership in this 
chapter has been analysed from the point o f view o f information asymmetry180 and it
177 The concept o f shareholders' wealth is the product o f the number o f  shares owned, multiplied by the 
current share price. The change in shareholders' wealth over a given period o f  time is the ordinary share 
price difference at the beginning and the end o f  that given period, plus if  the firm has distributed a 
portion o f its net income to shareholders i.e., the sum o f dividend receipts during that period. Thus 
shareholder wealth is the total return from holding a share o f common stock. Shareholder wealth is 
maximised through the combination o f  stock price appreciation and dividend payments. The 
appropriate measure o f  a firm's financial performance is the market value o f the shareholder wealth 
(Botha et al, 1987).
178 As Ambarish et al (1987) suggest that some firms may choose to continue to distribute dividends, 
even when faced with the need to raise outside equity, as a means o f  boosting stock prices.
179 Managerial risk aversion and constraints on managerial wealth limit the ability and willingness o f  
managers to become owners. So, insider ownership is inversely related to the size o f  the firm 
(Crutchley and Hansen, 1989).
180 The interaction between financial policies and insider ownership can be linked to informational 
asymmetries between insiders and external investors. The informational advantage includes 
information about the firm’s prospects, the manager’s level o f  effort, and perquisite consumption. Debt, 
dividend policies and insider ownership may have redundant benefits in reducing agency or 
informational asymmetry problems. At the same time, there are costs associated with using each o f  
these tools. Insider ownership is costly to managers who become maldiversified. Debt reduces free 
cash flow only by creating new conflicts between creditors and owners. Similarly dividend policy
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also includes valuation effect o f these dividend payments. Agency theory mainly the 
Easterbrook hypothesis (1984) suggests that dividends can act as a means o f 
subjecting a firm to monitoring by the capital market by forcing it to raise outside 
equity rather than relying on retained earnings (as a source o f capital), thereby 
reducing agency costs. Other information asymmetric analysis suggests that managers 
who make dividend decisions have exclusive information about the firm, which is not 
available to the investors; hence the choice o f dividends can be used to convey 
information to the market. The valuation181 effect o f dividends has been generally 
studied from the points o f view o f tax,182 transaction costs, and liquidity. Due to the 
inadequacy o f agency theory alone in explaining the dividend behaviour o f low 
capitalised firms, this chapter incorporates another information asymmetry model and 
also the valuation effect o f dividends.
Usually, dividend payouts are at the discretion o f firm managers. 
Management, in setting dividends, focuses to maintain some stable proportionality183 
with non-transitory earnings. Hence, LCCs try either to maintain a stable dividend184
reduces informational asymmetry only i f  dividend changes are a costly signal (Crutchley and Hansen, 
1989).
181 The capital market response to the dividend announcement is defined as the cumulative abnormal 
return on the announcement day and the previous trading day (Bom and Rimbey, 1993).
182 Dividend payout ratio (dividends/earnings) is the reflection o f the dividend strategy o f  a firm. An 
increase in the dividend payout ratio implies a higher dividend payout strategy and will be 
accompanied by a decrease in the share price if  taxes on dividends are greater than taxes on capital 
gains. If the payout ratio is a signal o f  investor beliefs about the future dividend policy o f  a firm, then it 
follows that investors penalise firms, which increase their dividend payouts and reward firms, which 
decrease their dividend payouts. Investors shunning dividends can be attributed to preferential tax 
treatment o f capital gains compared to dividends (Divecha and Morse, 1983).
183 A particular stylised fact has emerged over the years that firms smooth dividend payouts from the 
following hypotheses:
1. Managers attempt to attain some long-term payout ratio between dividends and earnings.
2. In setting dividends they focus on the change in the existing payouts rather than the level.
3. Dividend changes are likely to follow large unanticipated and non-transitory changes in earnings.
4. Managers avoid raising dividend payouts if  they feel that there is a good chance o f  them being 
reversed in the near future (Cyert et al, 1996).
184 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that US firms tend to spread dividend reductions over more 
than one year, making a small cut each year rather than concentrating the dividend reduction in a single 
year. Using a similar economic logic, it can be deduced that low capitalised films maintain a certain 
dividend payout rate throughout.
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payout rate or more likely no dividends, but have taken advantage o f rights issue185 or 
private placement o f  shares for further capital. Table 5.1 shows the incidence o f rights 
issue and Private placement o f shares by companies in the sample set.
Table 5.1:  Public issues, rights issues and private placement o f  shares by the sample LCCs between
1991-99.
Industry Group Public Issues Rights Issues Private Placement Total
Heavy 13 3 3 19
Light 15 3 3 21
Other 15 6 2 23
Although financial literature on dividends suggests that management would
1 R6try to avoid any uncertainty related to payment o f dividends, the same reasons do 
not apply to the dividend policy o f LCCs. Given the high inside ownership187 in these
companies, there is a dominant tendency to accumulate free cash flow. The extent o f 
the free cash flow is shown by calculating the proportion o f dividends and retained 
earnings in profits after tax (PAT) as in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Proportion o f  Dividends and Retained Earnings in PAT in the sample LCCs.
Industry Group Dividends/PAT Retained Eamings/PAT
Heavy 0.1759 0.8212
Light 0.2757 0.7115
Other 0.1634 0.8319
185 Residual theory suggests that when investors' are not informed well about the profitability o f  growth 
opportunities, a firm in need o f  finance may be forced to sell risky securities at less than a fair price. 
This underpricing causes a transfer o f  wealth from existing shareholders to new shareholders. As a 
result, managers avoid external financing for a project whenever possible and especially when the 
investment opportunity is highly profitable (Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988).
186 For a firm avoiding uncertainty in its dividend policy suggests the following basic features:
1. Firms focus on the dividend adjustments in response to possible changes in the environment, i.e. 
changes in earning prospects.
2. Levels o f dividends are not optimised on the basis o f a long run optimisation model, but they are 
usually set according to industry conventions, firm history etc.
3. Firms maintain simple rules o f  thumb in relation to acceptable dividend adjustments. For e.g., 
dividend adjustments may be required to be close to some preset pay out ratio.
4. Shareholder/Investor attitudes towards given dividend adjustments may change or shift over time 
as their information sets and net worth evolve over time. Accordingly firms may attempt to avoid 
adjustments which may be reversed in the near future rather than predict shifts in shareholder 
responses (Cyert et al, 1996).
187 Financial policy is used to minimise agency costs and exploit tax benefits. Empirical studies o f  
Hansen and Cmtchley (1989) and Jensen (1992) suggest tiiat after controlling for real firm-specific 
attributes affecting insider ownership, neither dividend policy nor the debt policy provide any 
information about the level o f insider ownership a firm will take. Their results support the proposition 
that financial decisions and insider ownership are interdependent and insider ownership has a negative 
influence on a film ’s debt and dividend levels. The causality runs from insider ownership to financial 
decisions and not vice-versa.
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If  higher retained earnings are associated with high growth rates, then over time the 
proportion o f dividends to PAT should have also risen. Although the proportion o f 
retained earnings does not say much about the volume o f retained earnings, it can be 
seen below (Table 5.3) from the correlation between lagged retained earnings and 
PAT how the high proportion o f retained earnings are being used.
Table 5.3: Correlation between Lagged Retained earnings and PAT in the sample LCCs.
Industry Correlation Coefficient
Heavy .0463
Light .7743
Other .0461
Only light industry shows that the high proportion o f retained earnings do 
relate to a high correlation between PAT and retained earnings. But “other” industry 
group shows that retained earnings may not always be ploughed back into the firm for 
future investments. And the growth in PAT was as follows:
Table 5.4: Growth in PAT in the sample LCCs
Industry Group Growth in profits after tax
Heavy -.9304
Light .2230
Other -.9112
Apart from the light industry the other two industry groups have had negative 
growth rates, which is quite surprising because firms in the "other" group were 
computer software companies and companies which claimed that they had surplus 
capital (more than their investment avenues).
The above analysis and table 5.5 show that dividends do not correlate to
1 RRearnings (lagged) o f the company.
Table 5.5: Correlation between earnings and dividends in the sample LCCs
Industry Correlation Coefficient o f  earnings and dividends
Heavy .3088
Light .3145
Other .3794
188 The partial adjustment model suggested by Lintner (1956) assumes that the target level o f  dividends 
is given by: Dt* = rEt 
0 < r < 1,
Dt* represents the optimal value o f dividends associated with the current level o f earnings Et, and r is 
the target or the optimal payout ratio.
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As such the monitoring function o f dividends mitigating agency costs is 
rendered irrelevant, as companies depend on their retained earnings189 and for further 
capital needs, on rights issues and private placement o f shares. Given the low 
correlation between earnings and dividends, the signalling feature o f dividend is also 
not very strong for LCCs. Consequently, the effect o f dividends on the stock prices is 
not sustained for long time.
By modelling the dividend behaviour pattern o f the low capitalised companies, 
this chapter provides another evidence towards lack o f effective monitoring by 
outsider investors, which adversely affects the performance o f the firms. Along with 
the model in the previous chapter 4, section - 2 on institutional debt holders and 
monitoring, this chapter reinforces the fact that ineffective monitoring leads to the 
status quo o f LCCs, given that the market based exit routes in BSE are limited.
Institutional investors wish to own stocks which are dividend paying and 
individual investors wish to own stocks which are not dividend paying190 (Redding, 
1997). Hence both the supply and demand factors contribute towards the family 
owned companies paying low dividends and also the incentive to monitor the firms' 
activities is reduced. Continuous low or nil dividends for a long period o f  time have 
had a negative impact on the share prices. And this leads to their low market 
capitalisation.
This chapter is structured in the following manner; the next section 6.2 
provides a critical summary o f the theories, which analyse the dividend behaviour o f 
firms. The section 5.3 is the model, which describes the dividend policy o f the low
189 According to Easterbroolc (1984) low dividend paying firms are growth firms, which seek funds 
regularly from the market and also that the firms with lesser rate o f growth pay more dividends.
190 Given the nature o f  ownership, monitoring mechanisms, and also die investors' preference for 
capital gains compared to dividends, announcement o f  dividend increases will not have a positive 
effect on the prices as investors would interpret this as lack o f  access to growth opportunities and vice
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capitalised firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange, followed by a section on 
concluding comments.
5.2 THEORIES OF DIVIDEND POLICIES AND THEIR CRITIQUE:
5.1. A. AGENCY THEORY:
As equity and debt are considered governance structures, dividends also provide a 
governance tool to the outside shareholders. Dividends are for equity what interest is 
for debt. Agency theory focuses on the role o f dividends as a disciplinary and 
monitoring mechanism. Managers choose their stock ownership in the firm, the firm ’s 
mixture o f outside debt and equity financing, and dividends to reduce the costs o f 
agency conflicts. Managerial stock ownership and dividends especially are relevant in 
reducing the conflict between managers and shareholders. It reduces the amount o f 
free cash flow 191 and forces managers to submit to the discipline o f  the financial 
markets.
Easterbrook (1984) suggests that the problems associated with agency conflicts 
can be mitigated if  managers regularly go to the investment community to raise 
capital. Disclosures associated with raising external capital serve as powerful 
monitoring opportunities. Hence dividends serve the purpose o f keeping the firms in
versa. Reduction in dividend payout ratios signal enhanced access to profitable investment 
opportunities (Cyert et al, 1996).
191 Jensen (1986) argues that managers o f public corporations have incentives to expand their firm 
beyond the optimal size even if  this requires investment in negative NPV projects. Overinvestment is 
done using internally generated cash to avoid monitoring associated with raising capital from the 
markets. The free cash flow problem refers to the managers' investing this cash in negative NPV  
projects rather than paying it out to shareholders i.e. a lower return on reinvestments o f  the free cash 
flow than the market requires. This tendency o f  managers is due the following reasons:
1. Cash retention gives managers autonomy, which they would lose if  they had to go frequently to the 
capital markets to raise new capital.
2. Increased firm size enhances corporate prestige and managers' salaries.
3. Companies tend to reward middle managers through promotions rather than bonuses, which 
creates a bias toward growth (Kallapur, 1994).
And free cash flow is measured as the ratio o f (Holder et al, 1998):
Net income + depreciation + interest expense - capital expenditure 
Total assets
182
capital markets and in mitigating effects o f poor investment and other organisational 
inefficiencies associated with free cash flow.
Easterbrook (1984) also indicates that the market can monitor managers and 
adjust the level o f risk taken by managers and different classes o f investors. 
Accordingly, paying dividends increases the chance that external equity capital will 
be raised. Easterbrook (1984) indicates that by doing this, firms are constantly in 
capital markets and new investors can study the behaviour o f managers and then 
decide to invest.
Sometimes firms issue new stock at or around the time they pay dividends. Firms 
may seek additional funds from markets after announcing dividends, and this usually 
signals the growth potential o f  the firm. If  this situation is reversed, when dividends 
follow equity issues,192 dividends in this case will be used as a tool to attract funds. 
Firms may announce a new issue earlier than dividend payouts, which is quite evident 
from the following table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Dividends o f  sample LCCs following Equity Issues after 1990.
Industry Group Dividends after Issues Issues after Dividends Public Issues and no 
dividends
Heavy 5 6 6
Light 8 13 1
Other 5 14 3
Dividends in this case, may not provide outside shareholders with tools to monitor 
activities o f the firm. Fluck (1995) and Myers (1995) have also presented agency- 
theoretic models o f dividends, based on the idea that shareholders can threaten to vote 
to fire managers or liquidate the firm, and therefore managers pay dividends to hold 
off shareholders. But these models do not address the problem o f  free riding problem
i.e. dispersed shareholders getting organised to threaten management.
192 As Ambarish et al (1987) suggest only the high-value firms choose investment and dividends jointly  
to separate themselves from low value firms. But this suggests that dividends are not a residual 
payment as implied by classical finance theory.
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W hen costs o f flotation are taken into consideration, a firm may not prefer to go to 
the capital markets frequently. Crutchley and Hansen (1985) confirm firms, which 
expect to incur higher equity flotation costs, pay lower dividends. As flotation costs 
decrease with the size o f offering, a firm can combine infrequent flotation with 
declaring dividends. Easterbrook (1984) analysis is also consistent with the 
observation that low dividend paying firms are growth firms,193 which seek funds 
regularly from the market and also that firms with lesser rate o f growth pay more 
dividends. Shibalcawa and Iwaki (1992) also confirm these findings in their study o f 
the Japanese firms, which do not pay high dividends to stockholders, even in the case 
o f high earnings. But this is due to the network o f mutual stock ownerships among 
many industrial companies and main banks. In fact this financial system contributed 
to the agency cost o f external financing in Japan. Their paper theoretically and 
empirically showed the existence o f hierarchy o f financial sources. This indicates that 
large trans-company mutual stock ownerships194 do affect leverage issues.
Rights Issues195 and private placement o f shares help to raise additional capital 
without any flotation costs. It can be suggested that rights issue and private placement 
o f shares can serve the same purpose o f reducing the agency costs, as there will be re­
193 Financial literature has related dividends to the firm’s future profitability. One plausible explanation 
for the decision to omit dividends entirely rather than maintain a reduced payout can be traced to the 
alternative uses for the funds. A large number o f  firms omit cash dividends due to financial distress. 
However, it is also possible that dividends are sometimes omitted for legitimate reasons other than 
financial distress. For example, a firm might face a profitable investment opportunity and because o f  
borrowing constraints the firm may find it optimal to finance the project internally. Under such 
conditions the market might not respond to growth-motivated announcements o f  cash dividend 
omissions in the same manner in which they would react to firms omitting cash dividends due to 
financial distress (Christie, 1994). Greater business risk makes the expected direct relationship between 
current and expected future profitability less certain. So, greater business risk will be associated with 
lower dividend payments. Myers and Majluf (1984) also confirm that profitable firms with good 
investment opportunities may be forced to choose between dividend payments and capital 
expenditures. Frictions in capital markets lead to a sort o f  competition between dividends and 
investment projects as potential uses o f profits. This competition is the reason why high growth firms 
with strong investment opportunities often pay low dividends.
194 Companies o f  the same original family-owned business group in India are characterised by a
dividend policy o f each subsidiary which itself may be publicly listed is often determined by the central 
holding company based on the cash needs o f other companies in the group (Glen et al, 1995).
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examination o f the manager’s behaviour by existing investors. Given that outside 
shareholders are less informed about the profitability o f growth opportunities, a firm 
might have to underprice its shares. This underpricing causes a transfer o f wealth 
from existing shareholders to new shareholders. As a result, managers avoid external 
financing for a project whenever possible and especially when it is risky (Ghosh and 
Woolridge, 1988). This provides incentive for issuing o f rights along with flotation 
costs.
Noronha et al (1996) suggests that if  a firm's dividend decision is based on 
Easterbrook's monitoring rationale, then its dividend and capital structure decisions 
should also be made simultaneously.196 Shareholders o f dividend-induced monitoring 
not only obtain benefits .but also bear costs i.e. tax burden and flotation costs. A 
Rights Issue or private placement o f shares does not impose any tax burden or any 
flotation costs as mentioned earlier on the shareholders. For firms, which are driven to 
the capital market by other factors such as the need to finance high growth 
(Easterbrook, 1984), and LCCs, which may not always use free cash flow for negative 
NPV investments,197 the dividend device to control agency costs has little relevance. 
Table 5.7 shows the number o f sample LCCs that have invested in either mergers or 
acquisitions since 1990.
Table 5.7: Mergers and Acquisitions by the sample LCCs since 1990.
Industry Type No. o f Companies in each group No. o f  takeovers
Heavy Industry 13 3
Light Industry 11 2
Other Industry 10 1
Refer to Chapter-3 ,  Table 3.22.
196 Validity o f  the monitoring rationale for dividends and the consequent simultaneity o f  dividend and 
capital structure decisions are dependent on the characteristics o f the firm as they relate to its growth 
opportunities and to the existence o f  non-dividend mechanisms for controlling agency costs. Given that 
the free cash flow identifies takeovers and other expansionary activities as investments with negative 
NPVs, there are few instances o f  takeovers by the sample LCCs.
197 Given high insider ownership, these firms may not invest in negative NPV projects, as it will affect 
the family shareholders.
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Apart from dividends there are other non-dividend monitoring mechanisms i.e. 
incentive components o f the managerial compensation package, which serves to align 
manager-shareholder interests and the presence o f a single large outside shareholder 
or block debtholder, which serve as external monitors. Noronha et al (1996) also 
postulate that a firm with high growth opportunities and/or availability o f  these non­
dividend-monitoring mechanisms, the dividend payout decision is unrelated to firm 
variables proxying for the agency cost-transaction cost trade-off. But for firms low in 
both attributes, the monitoring rationale for dividends is hypothesised to be valid. 
LCCs have a strong incentive mechanism for owner-managers to work for the value 
maximisation o f the firm, as they are the largest stakeholders, it can be safely 
concluded that the dividend policy o f these firms will not depend on the surrogate 
measure o f agency costs.
Jensen (1986,1988) provides alternative explanations for dividend payments, 
which derive from a specific type o f non-value maximising activity on part o f the 
managers, namely the inappropriate use o f a film's free cash flow or 
overinvestment.198 According to Jensen, value-maximising managers w ill distribute 
this free cash to shareholders in the form o f higher dividends. Although owner- 
managers can be considered value maximisers, these companies maintain a low or nil 
dividend payout in order to create incentives for subscription o f rights issue for future 
capital needs. This dividend policy does not play the role o f an effective disciplinary 
mechanism but the need for further capital ensures maintenance o f a steady dividend
198 An average Tobin's Q ratio (ratio o f the market value o f  the film's equity and debt to the 
replacement cost o f  its asset) greater than unity is a necessary condition for a firm to be at the value- 
maximising level o f  investment and an average Q ratio less than unity is the sufficient condition for a 
firm to be overinvesting. Jensen (1986) suggests that value maximising films with their P (Average rate 
o f return on investment) >IC (Cost o f  capital) are able to withstand capital markets' monitoring, whose 
investment is carried to the point where the marginal Q is unity, whether marginal investment is 
financed internally or externally. For value maximising firms, the level o f investment is independent o f  
the dividend. For overinvesting firms the level o f  investment is inversely related to the dividend.
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policy199 without any uncertainty. This steady dividend policy suggests low 
correlation with earnings and accumulation o f free cash flow, which may he used for 
the personal benefit o f  owner-managers. Thus monitoring rationale associated with 
dividends is only a partial explanation o f the dividend policies o f LCCs.
Debt creates an incentive for owner-managers to under invest and expropriate 
bondholders’ collateral. One way to do this is by paying out dividends. This leads to 
the wealth expropriation hypothesis, which suggests that dividends should increase 
after new debt is issued. Firms may not like to always exploit bondholders through 
dividend policy for two reasons; to preserve reputation and block debtholders possess 
enough bargaining powers to stop the firm from expropriating their wealth.200 If  
managers deliberately expropriate bondholders' wealth, future capital market dealings 
will be more costly because o f the firm’s tarnished reputation. Hence both monitoring 
rationale o f dividends and presence o f  debt do not guarantee dividend payouts.
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) estimated independent equations for debt,201 
dividends and insider ownership. They use 5 film specific characteristics i.e.
199 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et al (1992) investigate dividend adjustments o f  
troubled NYSE firms and firms with losses, respectively. They report that firms cut their dividends in 
periods o f  financial distress and that there is usually a strong reluctance to omit dividends, especially 
when the firm has a long history o f  paying dividends. Moreover, dividend cuts are most often observed 
for firms with persistent losses, whereas firms with transitory losses usually don’t cut their dividends 
immediately. These results imply that the interaction o f losses and subsequent dividend changes 
convey some private infoimation to outsiders about the managers' perception o f  the severity and the 
duration o f  the problem. A  dividend cut may cause an immediate negative reaction from investors, but 
it may not have a negative impact on the current and the future business opportunities o f  the dividend- 
cutting firm. A dividend cut may not send an adverse signal to suppliers and customers to abandon 
their relationship with the firm immediately.
200 See Chapter-2 for more details on agency costs o f  debt.
201 Leverage ratio is measured as the average outside leverage ratio, ratio o f  outside debt to outside 
financing;
LEVERAGE = 1/no. o f  years. LLTDEBT/(LTDEBT + MVCS)
LTDEBT = total long term debt
MVCS = market value o f  common stock held by non-managers = TOTSHRS x MPRICES 
TOTSHRS — total number o f  shares o f  common stock held by outsiders 
MPRICES = year end closing market price o f  common stock
202 DIVIDEND = 1/no. o f  years. 2  COMDIV/(TOTSHRS x MPRICES)
COMDIV = total common stock cash dividends
203 It is measured as the average percentage o f common stock held directly by the officers and 
directors;
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earnings volatility,204 advertising and R&D expenses 205 flotation costs,206 a measure 
o f the diversification loss to managers from holding the firm ’s common stock207 and 
firm size. But Jensen et al (1992) show empirically that a firm’s debt,208 dividend209 
and insider ownership210 levels in addition to being related to similar firm specific 
attributes are also directly related to each other.
Since the agency explanation o f dividend payments was not pertinent211 
enough for Indian markets, another asymmetric information model i.e. signalling 
theory along with the valuation o f dividends was therefore included in the analysis.
5. 2. B. SIGNALLING THEORY:
The observed systematic connection between unexpected changes in the dividend 
payoffs and their stock prices has also focused attention on the possible signalling role
OWNERSHIP -  1/ no. o f  years. 2  (O&DSHRS/TOTSHRS)
O&DSHRS = total number o f  shares held by officers and directors ownership 
TOTSHRS = total number o f  outstanding shares o f  common stock.
204 Earnings volatility is measured by the standard deviation o f  the return on assets;
EARN VOL -  STD (NOI/ASSETS)
NOI = net operating income = sales less operating expenses.
205 The level o f firm’s discretionary investment;
ADV + R&D = 1/no. o f  years. 2(R&D + ADV)/SALES 
SALES = total sales.
200 A firm’s historical average floatation cost is a preferred measure, but it is possible that many firms
would not have issued stock in recent years, then the following proxy measure has to be used;
FLOTCOST =  a +  6STDRET + cSIZE
STDRET = standard deviation o f  common stock return
SIZE = the amount o f capital raised
207 It is measured by the ratio o f  the firm’s equity risk premium divided by total equity risk.
DIVERSE =(E (R;) - Rf)/<Ji
E (Rj) = expected return on common stock 
Rf = risk free interest rate 
Cj = standard deviation.
208 The determinants o f  debt level (ratio o f  long-term debt to the book value o f total assets) are; 
business risk, profitability (ratio o f  operating income to total assets), research and development 
expenditures, and fixed assets (ratio o f  fixed assets to total assets).
209 Dividends (ratio o f  dividends to operating income) are related to a film ’s future profitability, which 
in turn is determined by, current profitability, investment (expenditure for plant, equipment, and R&D 
as a percentage o f total assets), growth (average o f  the number o f years growth in sales) and business 
risk.
210 The determinants o f  insider ownership (percentage o f  shares held by insiders) are; business risk 
(standard deviation o f the first difference in operating income divided by total assets), firm size (log of 
total assets), the number o f operating divisions o f  the firm (number o f divisions operated), and research 
and development expenditures (ratio o f  R&D expenses to total assets).
211 Use o f  rights issue for further capital needs, dividends follow new equity issues, presence o f debt, 
will render the monitoring rationale o f  dividends ineffective.
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of dividends in a world where managers are better informed about their firm’s 
economic prospects. Unexpected changes (Miller) in dividends provide the market 
with clues about unexpected changes in earnings, which in turn trigger price 
movements that look like responses to dividend decisions. Bhattacharya (1979, 1980) 
argues that firms pay dividends because dividends signal the private information o f 
managers and thus help market participants value the firm.
This section also explains the impact o f dividend announcements on stock prices. 
Capital market response to dividend announcements is defined as the cumulative 
abnormal return on the announcement day and the previous trading day (Born and 
Rimbey, 1993). Since dividend payouts are unexpected the entire amount o f the 
dividend yield is unexpected. The market reaction to a dividend change is a function 
o f the unanticipated news content and the intensity o f the market reaction is a function 
o f how much information is revealed. So a simultaneous announcement o f growth 
prospects212 can reduce the adverse impact o f dividend reductions (Ghosh and 
Woolridge, 1988).
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that once the investment decision o f a firm is made 
unanticipated dividends signal changes in the earnings and the cash flows. Given that 
information asymmetries exist between managers and investors, Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) suggest that investors will interpret a change in dividends as a 
change in management's view o f future profit prospects o f the firm. Fama and Babialc 
(1963) find a relation between annual dividends and earnings that is consistent with
212 Simultaneous announcement variables:
1. Cases where dividend cut/omission is preceded by announcements o f  loss or lower earnings, 
downward revisions in firm outstanding debt by rating agencies (the coefficient will be positive).
2. The effect o f  poor earnings announced simultaneously with the dividend reduction. Simultaneous 
reporting o f earnings decline and a dividend cut causes more adverse stock market reaction than 
that caused by isolated events. The coefficient for this variable is predicted to be negative.
3. Whether management offers any rationale for the dividend decision other than a change in 
expected earnings. Growth motivated dividend cuts are interpreted favourably by the market so 
that the coefficient o f  this variable should be positive (Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988).
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the view that dividend-paying firms increase their dividends only w hen management 
is relatively confident that the higher payments can be maintained. I f  managers have 
information about the future and/or current cash flow that investors do not have, 
investors will interpret a dividend increase as a signal that management anticipates 
permanently higher cash flows, and a dividend decrease as a signal that management 
expects permanently lower cash flows.
In a firm, which is initially owned by a large inside shareholder and managed by 
an incumbent manager, who seeks funding for an investment opportunity, the 
shareholder and the manager have private information regarding the firm's prospects. 
This asymmetry o f information in capital markets engenders an adverse selection 
problem. Announcements o f dividend changes convey information to the market. 
Information asymmetry models argue that as managers know more than investors do 
about the firm's prospects dividends reveal some o f that information to the market. It 
also helps explain the observed reluctance o f managers to change dividends. Thus, 
dividend-signalling models describe how managers can optimally convey their private 
information to lesser informed outside investors (Bessler and Nohel, 1996). Cash flow 
volatility213 is the sole source o f quality difference among firms. Finns then use levels 
o f debt and dividends to convey information to the market regarding variance o f their 
underlying cash flow or firm's risk (Brick et al, 1998 and Healy and Palepu, 1990).
According to Noe and Rebello (1996), when shareholders dictate the financial 
decisions, the optimal policy calls for minimising managerial rent appropriation via a 
strategy o f high dividends and complete reliance on competitively priced external 
debt financing. W hen management determines financial policies all equity structures 
that maximise managerial rent appropriation are optimal. Given the ownership
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structure in LCCs, the family shareholders who are also managers in the firm dictate 
financial decisions; the optimal policy in this case would be equity structures, which 
maximise inside shareholders’ rent appropriation.
The cash flow signalling hypothesis also predicts that announcements o f dividend 
changes by firms with average Tobin Q's less than unity (over investing firms) will 
cause investors to revise their cash flow expectations in the same direction. As a result 
the average return in response to announcements o f sizeable dividend changes is 
larger for over investing firms than for value maximisers (with average Q's greater 
than unity). Accordingly as Kallapur (1994) suggests the stock price reaction to 
dividend changes is significantly larger for firms with Tobin's Q less than unity. In the 
presence o f free cash flow problem, Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) depend 
positively on payout ratios because shareholders prefer that earnings be paid out as 
dividends rather than be wastefully retained. Announcements o f dividend changes by 
over investing firms will also change investors' expectations about the size o f the 
firm's future investment in negative-net-present-value projects. An increase in 
dividends, all else being equal reduce the extent o f over investment and increase 
market value o f the firm. A  decrease in the dividend will have the opposite result (it 
signals that more negative-net-present-value projects will be undertaken). A positive 
association between dividend-change announcements and stock price movements 
supports the free cash flow hypothesis. John and Williams (1985) and Ambarish et al 
(1987) also predict a positive association between dividends and stock prices.
Whereas announcements o f dividend changes by value-maximising firms, 
therefore, will have no impact on investors' expectations about investment policies, 
and should on average have no effect on the firm's stock prices. For firms with
213 Financial signalling models generally assume that firms have identical cash flow  variances but
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average Tobin’s Q greater than unity,214 agency and signalling hypotheses predict that 
announcements o f large dividend increases will have little or no impact on investors' 
current cash flow expectations.215 For the same firms the predicted impact on returns 
o f announcements o f dividend changes is larger in absolute value for dividend 
decreases than for increases (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). As a result any change in 
the dividend policy has an immediate effect on the share prices but this effect is not 
sustained for a long time given that the financial press coverage o f LCCs is very scant 
as shown in table 5.8.216
Table 5.8: No. o f  News items covered by the different financial press o f the sample LCCs.
Year No. o f news items o f  each Industry Group
Heavy Light Other
1996 - - 1
1997 14 8 11
1998 7 5 4
1999 25 13 31
2000 - 3 4
hi firms with lower levels o f agency conflict and information asymmetry as in the 
case o f Japanese firms, Dewenther and Warther (1998) suggests that dividends do not 
act as a signal o f information or as a disciplinary mechanism and that Japanese 
managers may not fear adjusting dividends in response to earnings changes. As a 
result they are less averse to cutting dividends and they cut their dividends more often 
and they respond to poor performance by cutting dividends more quickly than their
different means.
214 Assuming that LCCs are value maximising given high insider ownership, investment in negative 
NPV projects would be limited.
215 Announcements o f dividend changes o f  value maximising firms signal change in cash flows or 
earnings from current assets and vice versa, but the net present value o f  future investments is assumed 
to be unaffected (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989).
216 Most o f the news covered by the financial press o f  these sample companies are restricted to the 5 IT 
companies in the "other' industry group. In the "heavy" industry group, only 6 companies were covered 
by the financial press. Out o f  34 companies 23 companies were in the news during this time period.
The same news about a company covered by different newspapers gives the number o f  news items 
about a company.
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US counterparts. For these firms the dividend yield217 will not be a correct measure o f 
the dividend intensity, but the payout ratios will be (Dewenter and W arther, 1998).
The above-mentioned reasons are applicable to LCCs and they provide no 
incentive for them to pay dividends. Thus distribution o f firm's residual returns does 
not depend on either the traditional agency or signalling explanations. Thus, there is a 
strong tendency to appropriate firm's undistributed returns for personal consumption 
o f owner-managers.
Shareholders' reaction to dividend changes depends on their interpretation o f 
changes in related interactive variables. According to Kane et al. (1984) the 
interaction effects o f contemporaneous dividends and earnings announcements, and 
not these variables individually, are significant in explaining immediate stock market 
response to dividend change announcements.
Investors' dividend preferences218 that invest in LCCs are not likely to prefer 
dividends due to the associated tax penalties, whereas institutional investors often 
prefer dividends, both for tax and for fiduciary reasons.
5. 3 MODEL:
This section builds a model o f the dividend paying behaviour o f  LCCs. Given 
that the monitoring rationale o f dividends is limited and these firms being value 
maximisers, the dividend policy is characterised by a lack o f pressure from outside 
investors to pay dividends and a tendency to accumulate residual returns for the 
personal benefit o f the owner-managers.
217 A company's dividend yield equals the dividend paid in the period prior to the omission or the 
annual dividend announced in the initiation announcement, divided by the stock price the day before 
the announcement.
193
Assumptions:
1. Firms are assumed to maximise the wealth o f shareholders who are price takers. 
Given the market manipulations219 in the stock exchange, a firm can be defined as 
an entity participating in financial markets, like an active, strategic trader220 
manipulating the market to its shareholders’ advantage.
“The corporation acts as a ‘manipulator’ o f its share value price in financial markets 
and attempts to maximise the price taking shareholders’ wealth” (Chatterjea et al, 
1994).
2. Agency problems exist between the outside shareholders and family shareholders 
or the owner-managers.
3. The choice o f dividend policy is made by the owner-managers who in order to 
minimise the cost o f equity capital enact dividend policies in accordance with
991their investors' wishes and the need for future capital.
4. The owner-managerial compensation scheme takes the form:
C = mVo + mVi + S
Where Vo is the firm's perceived amiounced value at time 0, V] is the true realised 
value o f the firm at time 1. Assuming that the owner-manager receives in each
218 Dividend preferences o f investors are con’elated with the size o f the companies in which they 
choose to invest (Redding, 1997).
219 Market manipulations can be classified into three categories:
Action based manipulation: Manipulation based on actions that change the actual or perceived value of 
the assets o f the firm.
Information based manipulation: Manipulation based on releasing inside information or spreading false 
rumours.
Trade based manipulation: Manipulation due to buying or selling securities, without taking any actions 
to alter the value o f  the firm or to release false information, which changes its value.
The first two categories o f  manipulations are termed as fraud. Manipulations o f  these two kinds can 
happen when the manipulator camouflages his actions with less innocuous deeds or projects a false 
image to the other market participants.
220 The corporation can be viewed as an action based manipulator. The actions involves its real 
investment decisions i.e. taking on all projects with positive net present value and financial
restr ucturing decisions like the choice o f  debt/equity ratios and dividend decisions. A Corporation can 
also be considered as information based manipulator i.e. that the information it controls flows from its 
production and investment decisions. Lastly, it can also be viewed as a trade based manipulator, trading 
its equity and debt to maximise share price.
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period a constant proportion m, o f the firm's value. Managers are compensated as 
a function o f the asset size o f the firm (Wallcling and Long, 1984). As the owner- 
manager's compensation is directly tied to the value o f the firm, there is no 
incentive to deviate from the objective o f firm value maximisation. S is the salary.
5. The investor population can be grouped into two classes: individual investors and 
institutional investors.
6. An individual investor is likely to own fewer shares than an institutional investor, 
while individual investors are not likely to prefer dividends due to the associated 
tax penalties; institutional investors often prefer dividends, both for tax and for 
fiduciary reasons. The dividend-averse small investors choose to purchase small 
company stocks. Stock o f large companies are purchased by large dividend-loving 
investors who are attracted by their superior market depth222 (Redding, 1997).
7. An investor's portfolio allocation decision between a large or a small company 
stocks will depend on the scale o f his investments, on the transaction costs 
resulting from the imperfectly liquid markets and the difference in expected 
returns223 on the two sizes o f company shares.
8. The value o f the firm in each period is assumed to depend on its investment 
decision at time 0. The investment decision produces the following stochastic 
earnings X, which is realised at the end o f the period:
X (e) = a  + e
Where a  is the mean earnings and e is the random error term. The quality o f the 
firm, which is given exogenously, is unalterable by the manager. The owner-
221 Dividend preferences o f  investors are correlated with the size o f the companies in which they
choose to invest.
222 Market depth is defined as the size o f  extra demand required to push up the market price by one unit
o f  currency.
223 The gross return from investing a portfolio o f  size i in shares o f  type j is therefore the appreciation
o f  a share multiplied by the number o f shares held.
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manager will choose the level o f dividends that maximises the level o f  his or her 
compensation. As dividend payment increases, the level o f  compensation 
decreases at a constant rate.
9. When the size o f a firm increases it improves its access to the capital markets as 
the average fixed costs o f flotation decrease.
The value o f a firm at a particular point o f time depends on:
V = X/K + I (R-K/K) T
The first term is the contribution o f the firm's existing assets to its market value and
O') Athe second is the net present value o f future investment (Lang and Litzenberger, 
1989). And for a given debt-to-asset ratio, a firm's exogenous growth rate G driven by 
retained earnings and debt at a specific dividend payout rate P is given by 
G = (1 - P) R 
Where,
X = expected earnings from existing assets 
K = cost o f capital
R = average rate o f  return on equity225 
I = anticipated level o f current investment 
T = firm's finite growth horizon 
(1- P) = Retention rate 
P = payout rate
Each film  has a target payout rate P so that its target dividend at time t is the 
target payout ratio times earnings at time t or PXt. Firms usually do not move 
immediately to the new target dividend, but instead smooth out changes in their
224 Usually investment bankers and other financial intermediaries certify the net present value o f the 
future investment, evaluate proposed projects and declare that the new securities are backed by 
represented earnings potential.
225 Net income to shareholders/common equity.
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dividends by moving part o f the way to the target dividend each year. The return on 
equity is low in the small capitalised companies because the net income for the 
outside shareholders is restricted by the accumulation o f tree cash flow by the family 
shareowners, hence in order to maintain a higher G the payout rate needs to be either 
low or nil.
P = f  (A)
P = the dividend payout rate (ratio o f the five year arithmetic average o f a firm's 
dividend divided by the five-year average o f income available to common 
stockholders.)
A = vector o f variables proxying for the equity agency costs-transaction costs 
tradeoff.
P -  f  (INH, FI, G l, G2, FK, SJV)
INH = fraction o f insider holding
FI = fraction o f block debt holder holding
G l = previous five year average growth rate o f revenues
G2 = forecasted future five year average growth rate o f revenues
FK = future capital needed for new projects
SIV = Simultaneous information variables associated with earnings, i.e. financial 
press coverage o f a Finn’s performance.
The speed with which the managers adjust dividends is captured by the speed- 
of-adjustment parameter c, which indicates how responsive a firm's dividends are to 
changes in earnings.226 A higher value o f c indicates a speedier adjustment 
(Dewenther and Warther, 1998). But in the case o f LCCs, dividends are not highly
226 Lintner’s (1956) study suggests that major changes in earnings not related with existing dividend 
rates are the most important determinant o f  the company’s dividend decisions. However, because 
managers believe that shareholders prefer a steady stream of dividends, firms tend to make periodic
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correlated to earnings (given that the controlling family's interest in accumulating free 
cash flow) the value o f c will be low.
D t= Dt-i + a + c (PXt - Dt-i)
Dt and Dt_i are dividends at time t and t-1 
Xt = earnings at time t 
P = payout ratio 
c = speed o f  adjustment 
a = intercept term
5. 4 CONCLUSION:
The study o f the dividend policy given the varied characteristics o f the firm 
suggests that small changes in the dividend payouts do not affect the stock price 
considerably, unless the dividend changes are drastic. Dividend policies have a 
monitoring role according to the agency theory. Firms usually float new equity issues 
after the announcements o f dividend payouts. New equity issues guarantee a review 
o f the firm's policies by the investors. This entails the monitoring mechanism o f the 
dividend payouts.
But dividend payouts may not have the ability to monitor firm activities in all 
circumstances. Firms in India, which are family controlled, restrain from paying 
dividends. For any further need o f capital, may depend on rights issues or private 
placement o f new shares. This saves the firm from not incurring any flotation costs 
and the investors save on taxes. Rights issues also have a monitoring function like that 
o f dividends but in a very restricted sense, i.e. review o f firm's policies by the existing 
shareholders. There is a large tendency in these firms to pay very little dividends or no 
dividends and thereby accumulate free cash flow. This free cash flow is not always
partial adjustments toward a target payout ratio rather than dramatic changes in payout. Thus, in the 
short run, dividends are smoothed to avoid frequent changes.
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used for negative NPV projects; and thus in the traditional sense these companies 
would be value maximising firms. But non-distribution o f residual retmns o f the firms 
for personal consumption o f the owner-managers is something which none o f the 
outside stakeholders can curb.
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Chapter - 6 
Analysis of Survey Results
6. 1 INTRODUCTION:
This study analyses the low average market capitalisation o f the BSE and it 
proposes that two o f the main factors contributing to the low average capitalisation 
stem from the fact that monitoring by outside shareholders and block debt holders is 
restricted. Lack o f effective monitoring is reflected in the nature o f  the dividend 
policy, which affects the market value o f a company. In addition to testing these 
hypotheses empirically on the basis o f the independent variables suggested in other 
studies, it was considered important to understand the management’s perception about 
the above-mentioned critical factors. As the Indian industrial structure is peculiar 
given the macroeconomic environment, within which it functions, owner-managers 
may or may not consider certain variables, which are emphasised in the literature as 
valid. In order to get an insight into factors, which owner-managers o f  the Indian 
domestic firms consider important in determining their policies, it was necessary to 
conduct a personal-interview-based survey o f these aspects, I asked a sample o f 
corporate financial managers227 what factors they considered most important 
regarding the dividend policy, which in effect helped to account for the factors 
determining their firm ’s dividend policy.
Objectives o f this questionnaire survey were as follows:
1. To get an insight o f the factors related to dividends i.e. non-payment o f dividends 
rights issue etc.
2. To examine the management’s perception o f signalling and clientele effects.
227 Financial managers usually were employees o f  the firm and were not part o f  the major shareholding 
family.
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3. To also examine the dynamics o f monitoring role o f the financial institutions.
Pandey (1985) conducted a survey on the managers’ conceptual understanding 
o f the cost o f different sources o f capital. He suggests that the factors influencing 
financing decisions are highly complex and subjective in nature since capital markets 
in India are underdeveloped. 87% o f the managers from the total sample o f 30 Indian 
companies regarded ordinary share capital as the most expensive and 77% o f them 
regarded long-term debt as the cheapest source followed by bank borrowings. The 
common arguments o f managers for preferring borrowings were, tax deductibility o f 
interest on debt, higher return to shareholders due to gearing, complicated procedures 
for raising equity capital, no dilution o f ownership and control, equity financing 
entails permanent commitment as compared to debt. In addition to these, companies 
regarded internal and external factors, which influenced the financing choice. The 
internal factors were driven by the purpose for which funds were needed i.e. earning 
capacity, existing capital structure, ability to generate cash flows, investment plans 
etc. The external factors were capital and money market conditions, stipulations 
regarding debt-equity mix and convertibility clause etc. majority o f the managers 
regarded quality o f management, profitability and security as important factors, which 
helped FIs and the banks in making lending decisions.
But there has been a marked change in the above-mentioned managerial 
perceptions as a result o f the financial reforms o f 1991-92. In the interviews that I 
conducted during 1997-98, managers felt that raising equity finance was not difficult 
anymore, for tapping further growth opportunities equity finance was considered vital 
and that the permanent commitment towards outside shareholders was just payment o f 
dividends.
The remaining portion o f this chapter consists o f three sections. Section 6.2 sets
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forth the survey design. Section 6.3 and 6.4 outlines with the theoretical 
underpinnings o f the dividend policy and monitoring by debt holders respectively, 
section 6.5 presents the research findings. Section 6.6 discusses conclusions and 
limitations o f this study.
6.2 SURVEY DESIGN:
6.2.A. DATA:
The firms surveyed were listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.228 A  total o f 34 
firms were surveyed on the basis o f availability o f data and access to managerial staff 
for the interviews. The choice o f the companies included in the study was randomly 
selected from a group o f films, which did not belong to any o f the indices calculated 
by the BSE229 or the Standard & Poor (S&P). These indices highlight a particular
228 BSE started compiling and publishing the BSE 30 index number (Sensex) o f  equity prices from 
1986. A ll the scrips included in the Sensitive Index are part o f the specified group shares consisting o f  
150 scrips. The selection has been made on the basis o f  liquidity, depth, and floating-stock-adjusted 
depth and industry representation. The financial year o f 1978-79 is the base year. Considerations for the 
choice were the price stability during that year and proximity to the period o f  intr oduction o f  the index. 
The compilation o f  the index values is based on the 'weighted aggregates' method (The price o f  a 
component share in the index is weighted by the number o f  equity shares outstanding so that each scrip 
will influence the index in proportion to its respective market importance). The current market value for 
any particular scrip is obtained by multiplying the price o f the share by the number o f  equity shares 
outstanding. The index on a day is calculated as die percentage o f  the aggregate market value o f  the 
equity shares o f all the companies in the sample on that day to the average market value o f  the same 
companies during the base period. This method o f  compilation has the advantage tiiat it has die 
necessary flexibility to adjust for price changes caused by various corporate actions. The methodology 
o f calculation is the same as the one employed in many o f die popular indices such as the Standard & 
Poor USA, D ow  Jones Index, HangSeng Index, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Composite Index 
and FT-SE 100 Index. It measures wealth whereby the prices are weighted by market capitalisation. In 
such an index the base period values are adjusted for subsequent rights and new issue o f equity. This 
adjustment prevents a distorted picture and gives an idea o f  wealth created for shareholders over a
period.
229
BSE National Index: BSE started compilation and publication o f an index series called "BSE 
National Index" from 1989. The equity shares o f 100 companies from the "Specified" and the "Non- 
Specified" list o f  the five major stock exchanges, viz. Mumbai, Calcutta, Delhi, Alimedabad and 
Madras have been selected for the purpose o f  compiling the BSE National Index. The criteria for 
selection had been market activity, due representation to various industry-groups and representation o f  
trading activity on major stock exchanges.
BSE -100 Index
BSE-200: A new broad-based index series reflecting the present market trends in a more effective 
maimer and providing a better representation o f  the increased equity stocks, market capitalisation and 
also the newly emerged industry groups. BSE has launched from 1994 two indices i.e. the BSE-200 and 
the DOLLEX. Besides market capitalisation, the market activity o f the companies i.e. volumes o f  
turnover and certain fundamental factors were considered for the final selection o f  the 200 companies.
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firm's market capitalisation, turnover volumes, liquidity, industry representation, 
depth etc. Once a preliminary set o f “low-cap” firms was chosen, the next task was to 
check if  data was available for the selected companies. Availability o f  data became an 
important criterion on the basis o f which firms were retained in the final sample set. 
LCCs have very limited coverage in the financial press, and on further inspection it 
was realised that companies did not maintain a very good record o f their accounts. It 
proved difficult to gather past data on the firm’s performance.
It is quite possible that the agency costs o f equity are higher in firms, which 
could not provide continuous data. The last criteria was accessibility o f their 
managerial staff for the personal interviews and upon further pursuance, it was 
recognised that certain firms did not exist any longer or were in the process o f being 
liquidated, but they were still listed on the BSE. The earlier sample set o f  80230 
companies was then reduced to 34 companies. Out o f these 34 companies 3 have been 
de-listed (2 in 1998 and 1 in 1999) and one was taken over. This sample size cannot 
be deemed as representative o f the whole universe o f LCCs in the BSE, rather this 
study is indicative o f  the functioning o f an LCC.
6.2. B. INDUSTRY GROUPS:
The 34 firms belonged to a varied selection o f industry groups i.e. 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, heavy machinery, fertilisers, trading, paper and paper 
products, off-shore drilling, granite and marble, steel, textiles, capital services,
Dollex: BSE felt the need to design a yardstick by which growth values can be measured when the 
investment and the return are expressed in dollar terms, given the participation o f  foreign investors and 
foreign financial institutions in the country. This was facilitated by the introduction o f  a dollar-linked 
version o f the 'BSE-200'.
BSE 500 
S&P Mid Cap
There are 598 companies listed on all these indices, all the indices have overlapping listed companies.
230 It was realised that some o f  the 80 companies did not exist anymore although BSE provided its 
price. There was no way to contact those companies, follow-up o f their existing contact addresses did
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electronics, cement, colour prints, batteries, gas, non-conventional energy sources, 
feiTo alloys, wires and cables, bearings. These industries were then divided into three 
broad industrial groups. This was done in order to circumvent the problem o f lack o f 
adequate number o f firms in each individual category. Steel, cement, heavy 
machinery, ferro alloys, wires and cables, o ff shore drilling, and bearings were 
grouped as Heavy Industry. Whereas textiles paper and paper products, chemicals, 
colour print technology, batteries and electronics were categorised as light industry. 
Remaining firms were highly distinct and diversified firms, which were classified as 
“Other” industrial group. This category included firms from the industries like, capital 
services, information technology, non-conventional energy sources, gas and trading. 
The 34 companies when divided among the three industry groups yielded the 
following percentages: 11 Light Industry (32.35%), 13 Heavy Industry (39.18%), and 
10 in “other” group (29.41%).
6.2. C. NATURE OF THE FIRMS:
M ost o f the firms in the sample set existed as private limited companies and had 
made their first public issue in the late eighties or early nineties. As a result for most 
companies the data points were limited and also not all data points begin in the same 
year.
Table 6.1: Year o f Incorporation o f  the sample LCCs
Industry Group Incorporation Year in 80s and 
90s
Public limited company in 90s
Heavy 8 4
Light 9 7
Other 7 6
It can be deduced then that as these firms are newly established public 
companies they tend to face initiation problems and as a result under perform. But it 
may not be true o f all the companies in the sample set, because the sample set consists
not yield any results i.e. they were untraceable.
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o f companies that have become public limited enterprises recently but show a steady 
growth in income and profits. The gestation period is industry specific and as such 
finns in the computer software and textiles sectors have shown steady increase in their 
profits even though they were established fairly recently, at the same time other 
manufacturing units in heavy machinery, energy resources seem to be affected by 
initiation problems. But it needs to be added here that firms involved in the production 
o f heavy machinery who are part o f an already established business house have also 
failed to achieve the consistent growth rates. Many o f the firms are also separate 
entities o f already established business houses. One interesting aspect o f the 
conglomerates, often based on an original family-owned business, is that the dividend 
policy o f each subsidiary which itself may be publicly listed is often determined by the 
central holding company based on the cash needs o f other companies in the group 
(Glen et al, 1995). Firms in the sample set belong to a varied cross section o f industry 
groups i.e. manufacturing, mining, computer software, pharmaceuticals, textiles and 
garments, NBFCs (Non-bank financial companies) etc. All the firms in the sample 
have a high proportion o f inside shareholding and a very marginal stockholding by the 
Financial Institutions and Banks. There are few companies in the sample where the 
insider shareholding is less compared to the others in this case 25% or more stock is 
owned by other corporate bodies.
Table 6.2; Percentage Equity Ownership in the sample LCCs.
Industry Group Average Percentage 
Shareholding by Insiders
Average Percentage 
shareholding by the FIs
Heavy Industry 26.36% 13.60
Light Industry 37.99 6.77
Other Industry 25.44 4.98
6.2. D. QUESTIONNAIRE:
A personal interview based questionnaire was designed to obtain information 
about the dividend payout policy and FI’s monitoring. The questionnaire consisted o f
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two parts:
i. A general query o f the firm which included questions about such items as the 
firm ’s D-E ratio, ownership structure in the firm, sources o f  finance, decision 
making hierarchy etc. This was crosschecked with the published data for 
authentication to the other responses.
ii. Open-ended queries related to the various factors related to the dividend policy 
and financial institution’s role in the firm.
A preliminary test o f  the questionnaire was conducted among 5 o f the selected 
firms; the modified responses o f these firms in the second round o f the interviews 
were included in the final sample. The survey was conducted between Dec. 1997 and 
May 1998.
6.3 THEORETICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE DIVIDEND POLICY:
The corporate policy on dividend payouts occupies an important place in the 
overall firm's policy as it affects the market price o f its outstanding shares, and 
therefore on the change in its shareholders' wealth231. Hence, the well established 
characteristics o f dividends are prevalent in the finance literature; the positive 
correlation between dividend change announcements and stock returns, and given the 
effects o f  dividends on the market value o f shares, the reluctance o f managers to 
change dividends. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) describe dividend initiations 
and omissions as "extremely visible, qualitatively changes in coiporate policy." As 
Ambarish et al (1987) suggest that some firms may choose to continue distributing 
dividends, even when faced with the need to raise outside equity, as a means o f
231 The concept o f  shareholders' wealth can be expressed as the product o f the number o f  shares owned, 
multiplied by the current share price. The change in shareholders' wealth over a given period o f  time is 
the difference in ordinary share prices between the beginning and the end o f that given period, plus if  
the firm distributed a portion o f its net income to shareholders - the sum o f dividend receipts during that
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boosting stock prices and thereby reducing dilution.
Dividend behaviour has been analysed from different points o f view i.e. 
Information Asymmetry, Agency Conflicts, Residual and also Self-control theory. The 
Agency theory mainly Easterbrook's hypothesis (1984) suggests that dividends act as a 
means o f subjecting a firm to monitoring by the capital market by forcing the firm to 
raise outside equity rather than relying on retained earnings as a source o f capital, 
thereby reducing agency costs. And hence, new equity issues are announced around 
the time o f dividend payments.
Management in setting dividend payouts tries to maintain a steady rate. From the 
study o f Cyert et al (1997), it can be hypothesised that firms try to smooth dividend 
payouts, i.e. managers attempt to attain some long-tenn payout ratio between 
dividends and economic earnings, in setting dividends they focus on the change in the 
existing economic payouts and not the level, and they also try to avoid raising 
dividend if  they stand a good chance o f being reversed in the near future. Dividend 
changes are likely to follow large unanticipated and non-transitory changes in 
economic earnings. Stylised facts to the above mentioned hypothesis comes from the 
study o f DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo (1992) on dividend 
adjustments o f troubled NYSE firms and firms with losses. Their study concludes that 
US firms tend to spread dividend reductions over more than one year, making a small 
cut each year rather than concentrating the dividend reduction in a single year. They 
report that firms cut their dividends in periods o f financial distress and that there is 
usually a strong reluctance to omit dividends, especially when the firm has a long 
history o f paying dividends. Moreover, dividend cuts are most often observed for 
firms with, in retrospect, persistent losses, whereas firms with transitory losses usually
period.
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do not cut their dividends immediately. These results also imply that the interaction o f 
losses and subsequent dividend changes convey some private information to outsiders 
about the managers' perception o f the severity and the duration o f the problem. A 
dividend cut may not have a negative impact on the current and the future business 
opportunities o f the dividend cutting firm; i.e. a dividend cut may not send an adverse 
signal to suppliers and customers to abandon their relationship with the firm 
immediately.
Dewenther and W arther (1998) find that close ties between managers and 
investors substantially reduce information asymmetries and agency conflicts. Their 
study suggests that due to lower levels o f information asymmetry and agency conflict 
in Japanese films, dividends do not act as a signal o f information or as a disciplinary 
mechanism and the Japanese managers need not fear adjusting dividends in response 
to earnings changes. And they are less averse to cutting dividends and they cut their 
dividends more often and they respond to poor performance by cutting dividends more 
quickly than their US counterparts. As pointed out in earlier chapters, the intensity o f 
agency conflicts in the small-scale family owned enterprises is low and hence, 
dividends do not play a role as a signal o f information to the investors. Investors'
999dividend preferences that invest m small companies are not likely to favour 
dividends due to the associated tax penalties, whereas institutional investors often 
prefer dividends, both for tax and for fiduciary reasons. For these firms the dividend
• 9 9 9 * • •yield will not be a correct measure o f the dividend intensity, but the payout ratios 
will be.
232 The dividend preferences o f  investors are correlated with the size o f the companies in which they 
choose to invest (Redding, 1997).
233 A company's dividend yield equals the dividend paid in the period prior to the omission or the 
annual dividend announced in the initiation announcement, divided by the stock price the day before the 
announcement.
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6.4 THEORETICAL ISSUES RELATED TO MONITORING:
The word monitoring is used as a comprehensive label for all value-enhancing 
activities; it comprises intervention in a company’s affairs as well as information 
acquisition and is also used synonymously with intervention and shareholder activism. 
There are different ways in which large block holders o f shares or bonds bring about 
value-increasing changes in corporate policy:
1. When they cannot monitor the management themselves, large shareholders can 
facilitate third party takeovers by splitting the large gains on their own shares with the 
bidder,
2. Through a proxy contest, since the board o f directors has the legal authority to 
replace the officers o f the firm, gaining a majority o f seats on the board is tantamount 
to gaining control o f the operating decisions o f the corporation and lastly,
3. Through informal negotiations with incumbent management to institute 
changes. This means influencing policy as a jawboning mechanism. It is practically 
costless and is used to make less valuable improvements (Vishny and Shleifer, 1986).
An outside block shareholder has more incentives in a liquid market to speculate 
rather than monitor. And he/she may behave like an arbitrageur, which frequently 
turns over his/her portfolio o f stocks in order to capitalise on all possible short-term 
gains (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). The large shareholder because o f his/her position 
may receive information about the value o f the firm before other market participants 
and as a result it creates information asymmetry for other market participants at the 
stock market (Burkart et al, 1997). A block shareholder can sell his claims as soon as 
he or she perceives a bad return state and in other states can speculate on the basis o f 
his or her exclusive access to the private information about the firm. Thus a large 
shareholder does not always guarantee monitoring and liquidity or lack o f  it in the
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market does not change monitoring behaviour o f the large shareholder. A  block debt 
holder can only monitor a firm in this situation, as a block shareholder fails to emerge 
ex-ante after trading in the stock market (Huddart, 1993).
Finns in countries where the stock market is poorly developed are forced to rely 
more extensively on debt (King, 1977). Creditors in those circumstances who make 
longer-term loans commonly place appropriate claims against durable assets. As the 
exposure to risk increases, these debt-holders become more concerned with the details 
o f the film's operating decisions and strategic plans. And with high debt-equity ratios 
the lenders become more like shareholders and greater consultation between the 
management and its principal creditors takes place. Thus, long-tenn lenders usually 
carefully align incentives and protect themselves with safeguards. In these atypical 
circumstances, lenders are also represented on the board o f directors in a voting 
capacity (Williamson, 1985). For lenders who commonly make short-term loans for 
general business purposes, proof that the firm is currently financially sound, coupled 
with short maturity, provides protection for them. And as a result they do not need 
additional representation on the board. A banking presence becomes very crucial 
when films are experiencing adverse conditions. But this changes as evidence o f 
recovery progresses, when the lender does not have to play a very effective role in 
monitoring the film ’s activities.
The above paragraphs justify the role o f a block debt holder in monitoring a firm 
in different states, h i normal circumstances the monitoring is restricted to jaw  boning 
whereas in other adverse conditions it involves active participation in decision making 
or facilitating other efficient managements to take over the inefficient firm.
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6. 5. RESULTS:
6.5. A. APPROACH TOWARDS THE ISSUES INVOLVING DIVIDEND POLICY: 
The study’s objective was to investigate financial managers’ perceptions o f above- 
mentioned theoretical issues related to the factors influencing dividend policy. The 
respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement about each o f the 
11 closed-ended statements. Table -  6.3 provides summary statistics on the responses 
to each o f the 11 statements related to the dividend policy.
There is a strong agreement for statements 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 and 11. This implies that 
although most managers agree that dividends do affect the share prices but are o f the 
opinion that investors need to judge the company not only from the point o f  view o f 
dividends but also from other attributes o f the firm. They perceive no adverse impact 
o f dividend cuts as outside shareholders realise the intrinsic value o f the firm who 
want to have a long-term investment plan with a firm. Easterbrook's analysis of 
dividends as a means o f monitoring the firm’s activities by the market is not true o f 
Indian corporate sector. Thus the findings o f Ambarish (1987), Cyert et al. (1997) and 
DeAngelo et al. (1990) do not hold good for the Indian companies. Family 
shareholders make all the decisions related to the firm; all decisions related to the firm 
and the choice between debt and equity also depend on the promoters’ policies. The 
managers i.e. who were just employees, did not play any role in the decision making 
process. Managers whose responses were not valid for the statement 9, equity issues 
in their cases were used for the following:
1. Because o f restrictions on drawing funds for working capital purposes from banks 
and financial institutions especially the IT companies, firms with growth 
opportunities, find the restrictions hampering their growth chances and hence 
depend on equity finance.
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2. Newly established companies, which have not started any production, use the 
equity finance for buying machinery, factory buildings, stocks and other assets.
3. Recognition o f the company was an important consideration for a public issue 
although their need for public funds was not imperative.
There is a strong disagreement about statements 3, 4, 8, and 10. This corroborates 
to their agreement with the above-mentioned statements. This implies that they want 
investors not to judge the firm only from the dividend payouts, which could be 
misleading because if  the firm has any growth opportunity, they would rather divert 
the dividend payments towards new investment opportunities. Thus, non-payment o f 
dividends, drastic cuts and fluctuating dividend payouts are all justified by the 
managers on the ground that the earnings are retained for the investment purposes.234 
Strong agreement w ith statement 5 proves this. Although the financial literature 
suggests that managers are reluctant to cut dividend payments drastically as it 
adversely affects the share price o f their firm. The above-mentioned propositions 
suggest that the discretionary behaviour o f owner-managers is dominant in 
formulating policies o f the firm and as a result few o f the hypotheses suggested in the 
traditional literature are valid for LCCs. This discretionary behaviour can then be 
extrapolated to the accumulation o f free cash flow for the benefit o f the owner- 
managers.
Managers did not express any strong opinion about rights issue and its valuation 
effect. They thought that rights issues were one o f the ways by which their existing 
shareholders could be rewarded but were not sure o f its valuation effects on the 
outstanding shares.
234 Refer to Chapter -  5, tables 5.2 and 5.4.
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Table 6.3: Results o f  responses related to dividend policy
Statements Agree D is­
agree
Invalid Mean S.D. Prob.
x2
Industry
group
1. Reasons for dividend policy changes 
should be adequately disclosed to the 
investors, which also contribute to 
transparency.
17.64
%
11.76% 3.333 1.414 3.380 O
11.76 5.88% 20.58 4.333 2.516 H
14.70 17.64 3.666 0.707 L
2. Dividend payout affects the price o f  
the common stock and also future 
public issues.
23.52 5.88 3.333 4.242 2.849 O
23.52 11.76 2.94 4.333 3.511 H
23.52 2.94 5.88 3.666 3.785 L
3. Dividend payments provide a 
signalling device o f  the future 
prospects.
5.88 17.64 5.88 3.333 2.309 7.324 O
2.94 23.52 11.76 4.333 3.511 H
17.64 8.82 5.88 3.666 2.081 L
4. Management should be responsive 
to its shareholders’ preferences 
regarding dividends.
11.76 8.82 8.82 3.333 0.577 7.236 O
2.94 23.52 11.76 4.333 3.511 H
17.64 11.76 2.94 3.666 2.516 L
5. New capital requirements o f  the firm 
generally have an effect on modifying 
the pattern o f  dividend payouts.
20.58 2.94 8.82 3.666 3.055 2.233 O
14.70 2.94 20.58 4.333 3.055 H
17.64 2.94 8.82 3.333 2.516 L
6. Does a Rights issue achieve the 
desired impact on the stock price as the 
dividends?
11.76 14.70 3 0.707 .2009 O
14.70 26.47 4.666 2.828 H
11.76 20.58 3.666 2.121 L
7. Financing decisions should be 
independent o f  a firm’s dividend 
decisions.
17.64 8.82 2.94 3.333 2.516 2.387 O
29.41 2.94 5.88 4.333 4.932 H
20.58 8.82 2.94 3.666 3.055 L
8. A firm should strive to maintain an 
uninterrupted record o f  dividend 
payouts.
17.64 11.76 3.333 1.414 2.770 O
26.47 11.76 4.333 3.535 H
29.41 2.94 3.666 6.363 L
9. Equity is meant for expansion, high 
capital intensive and risky investments.
23.52 5.88 3.333 4.242 2.940 O
23.52 8.82 5.88 4.333 3.214 H
20.58 11.76 3.666 2.121 L
10. Concern about maintaining or 
increasing stock price.
11.76 17.64 3.333 1.414 8.135 O
2.94 26.47 14.70 5 4 H
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23.52 2.94 3 4.949 L
11. A ll the decisions pertaining to the 
firm’s policies are determined by the 
controlling family shareholders.
26.47 5.88 3.666 4.949 7.525 O
17.64 20.58 4.333 0.707 H
23.52 2.94 2.94 3.333 4.041 L
O = Other industry, H = Heavy Industry, L= Light Industry
6.5. B. APPROACHES TO ISSUES RELATED TO MONITORING BY THE 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
The second objective o f this survey was to investigate financial managers’ 
perceptions o f FI’s in monitoring firms. Managers were again asked to indicate their 
agreement or disagreement about each o f the 8 closed-ended statements. Table 6.4 
provides summary statistics o f the responses to each o f the 8 statements related to 
monitoring by FIs.
There is a very strong agreement for statements 2 and 8, which suggests that most 
firms used debt for working capital purposes and buying fixed capital. Debt has been 
used for mainly capital expenditure o f tangible and durable tools o f production and the 
preference for debt was due to debt tax shield. FIs in nonnal conditions examined the 
firms' progress through informal inquiries, Strong agreement with statements 1, 3 and 
7 suggests that in addition to informal inquiries about the firm's performance, officials 
from FIs visited the factories occasionally. In most firms FIs are nominee directors on 
the board o f directors, in addition to professional directors (including technical 
directors and industrialists). In certain companies they have more than one nominee 
director participating in the board. Some managers also believed that by appointing an 
official from the FI helped the firms to secure more loans. This suggests that small 
firms face problems o f accessing different sources for funds. A member from the FI 
on the board o f a firm ensures access to funds from the FI. This also helps the firm to 
acquire funds during adverse states. When the firm is likely to go bankrupt, it is
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difficult to acquire equity finance for reasons suggested by Myers (1977), during this 
time managers are forced to depend on debt from banks and financial institutions.
There is a strong disagreement for statement 4. Neither the FI nominee directors 
on the board or the FIs in general played any role in any decision-making process o f 
the firms in normal circumstances. To a large extent, a loan from FIs did not 
automatically imply effective monitoring by the outside stakeholder. This suggests 
that the importance o f a firm to a FI determined monitoring o f  that firm.
Most of the responses related to FIs were not valid for m ost o f the firms 
because these firms considered debt from banks and FIs as expensive. They did not 
depend on any long-term debt from FIs; their sources o f finance were equity and bank 
loans for working capital. As Williamson (1985) suggests short-term lenders do not 
require any additional representation on the board o f a firm.
hi situations where firms were making continuous losses for long periods o f 
time, FIs played a greater role as members o f the board o f directors and contributed in 
the decision making process. Although the evidence to this is very limited because for 
most firms this queiy was not valid, some o f the managers o f these loss-making 
companies agreed to the fact that FIs played an important role in their restructuring
235process.
Table 6.4: Results o f responses related to FIs
Statements Yes No Invalid Mean S.D. Prob.
x2
Industry
group
1. Do FIs visit the factories? 5.88% 23.52% 3.333 4.242 7.274 0
23.52 5.88% 8.82 4.333 3.214 H
17.64 2.94 11.76 3.666 2.516 L
2. Do they enquire into the 
progress o f the company?
14.70 14.70 3.333 0 3.767 O
26.47 2.94 5.88 4 4.358 H
23.52 2.94 5.88 3.666 3.785 L
235 This provides evidence to the fact that agency costs o f  debt are absent in normal circumstances for 
the LCCs and the costs might rise with the rise in the market value o f  a firm and that only FIs can 
provide monitoring in adverse situations.
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3. Are they on your board? 2.94 11.76 11.76 3 1.732 6.080 O
11.76 2.94 8.82 2.666 1.527 H
17.64 20.58 11.76 5.666 1.527 L
4. Do they play a role in the 
decision making process in the 
firm?
2.94 14.70 11.76 3.333 2.081 1.837 O
11.76 17.64 8.82 4.333 1.527 H
5.88 14.70 11.76 3.666 1.527 L
5. In case o f  the company 
making loss continuously, do 
they play a role in decision 
making then?
26.47 3 6.428
O
8.82 5.88 23.52 4.333 3.214 H
32.35 3.666
L
6. Do they ever pressurise the 
board to change its existing 
policies?
2.94 5.88 20.58 3.333 3.214 6.320 O
11.76 2.94 23.52 4.333 3.511 H
14.70 17.64 3.666 0.707 L
7. Does it help to acquire 
additional funds from the FIs if  
they have their nominee director 
on the board?
5.88 23.52 3.333 4.242 3.729 O
14.70 5.88 17.64 4.333 2.081 H
11.76 20.58 3.666 2.121 L
8. Debt is acquired for working 
capital and fixed capital 
purposes?
20.58 8.82 3.333 2.828 2.158 O
23.52 5.88 8.82 4.333 3.214 H
26.47 2.94 2.94 3.666 4.618 L
6. 5. C. INDUSTRY INFLUENCE ON DIVIDEND POLICY:
This study's another objective was to investigate differences in m anagers’ attitudes 
across the three industry groups. R ozeff (1982) concluded that a com pany’s industry 
does not help to explain its dividend payout ratio. Chi-square analysis was used to test 
the differences in these responses among the three industry groups. Further Chi-square 
tests were performed using pair-wise comparisons between the industry groups on all 
statements. The null hypothesis being that there is no association between the 
responses and the difference in industry groups. This suggests that the dividend policy 
is determined by firm factors rather than by industry related factors. Kim and Sorensen
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(1986), in their empirical study test whether the cross-sectional variations o f corporate 
leverage ratios can be related to agency costs. They conclude that although several o f 
the variables determine the debt decision, the debt decision is determined non- 
systematically by managers across firms. Likewise, dividend policy is also determined 
by non-systematically by owner-managers, irrespective o f the industry groups.
Results reveal that the industry group had no significant differences in responses 
related to dividend policy determinants at the .05 levels. Only with regard to the 
statement 8 related to dividend policy, we can reject the null hypothesis at .05 levels. 
And the same is evident for the responses related to monitoring by the financial 
institutions.
6. 6 CONCLUSION:
Before drawing any conclusions, several limiting aspects o f  this survey are 
mentioned as follows:
This survey typically involves selection bias on the basis o f data and access to 
managers. Although steps were taken to ensure to include as many companies as 
possible in the final sample, this study is no exception. The companies for which 
continuous data was not available could be the worst cases o f  agency conflicts. Views 
for this survey in most cases were obtained from the financial managers who did not 
form part o f the major shareholding family. These managers were involved in 
providing inputs and implementation o f policies o f the board. As a result o f random 
selection o f the firms in the first instance, not all industry groups are represented in 
this study. The other drawback is that firms were classified very broadly in three 
groups, and in the "Other" group, there are companies as varied as IT, NBFC, Non- 
conventional energy sources etc. This is has significantly effected the Chi-Square 
results.
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Respondents believed that dividend policy affects share value but also think 
that by proper infonnation dissemination, they can convince the investors o f their 
growth opportunities. W ith regard to rights issue, the survey does not provide any 
evidence to reasons behind the issue o f rights issue.
Agency theory o f debt suggests o f a conflict o f interest between debt holders 
and shareholders. Debt holders o f LCCs in India i.e. FIs are not in a vulnerable 
position in a conflict o f interest situation. FIs monitor the firms only during adverse 
states and in other states are not actively involved in oversight. This is true o f LCCs 
because their individual debt with the FI does not form a major proportion o f FI's 
overall loan portfolio. The conflict o f interest between inside shareholders and outside 
shareholders is more prominent in LCCs. Given that most o f the managers feel that 
higher risks can be taken with equity finance, a project if  successful, returns are 
retained by the inside shareholders i.e. accumulation o f free cash flow, which may not 
be used for takeovers or mergers as suggested by Jensen (1986).
218
Chapter- 7 
Econometric Analysis
7. 1 INTRODUCTION:
Agency conflicts are measured with the help o f mainly three surrogate 
measures, which are prevalently referred to in the literature (Prowse, 1990, Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Smith and Watts, 1986; Long and Malitz, 1985). The three 
measures are as following:
• I Agency measure: 1 -  (Gross Fixed Assets/Total Assets)
This represents the proportion o f company’s assets not tied up in fixed plant 
and equipment. Monitoring the usage o f fixed assets, either if  they are sold or if  they 
are used for a different purpose is relatively easy. It therefore reduces the possibilities 
for shareholders to engage in wealth transferring investment projects. To the extent 
that the company’s assets don't comprise o f such assets, whose application is easy to 
monitor, there is a potential for wealth appropriation and hence can be used as a 
surrogate measure o f principal-agent conflict situations.
• II Agency measure: Cash and marketable Securities/Total Assets
It attempts to assess the extent o f liquidity in the company’s assets. This has 
been used as a proxy for the ease with which the assets can be manipulated and hence 
render monitoring an expensive activity for the debtholders.
• m  Agency measure: Sales and Promotion expenses/ Total sales
It measures the extent o f promotional activity required to support the sales 
activity o f the company. The effectiveness o f such expenses cannot be easily 
established, hence difficult to monitor by outsiders (including debt holders). A firm
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that has substantial expenses under sales and promotion has a wide range o f options to 
indulge in discretionary behaviour.
But none o f these measures were useful to measure the free cash flow 
syndrome that is predominant in a family owned business. The dividend policy is 
dominantly affected by the free cash accumulation behaviour o f  the family 
shareholders and the monitoring rationale o f it is rendered irrelevant. Rest o f this 
chapter is structured in the following manner; section 7.2 outlines the hypotheses o f 
this thesis, which are tested empirically in this chapter. An explanation o f the nature 
o f the data, sample and characteristics o f the firms included in the sample is given in 
section 7.3. This is followed by section 7.4, which gives a brief description o f the 
variables in the model determining the dividend policy o f a firm. The next section 7.5 
deals with the methodology used for the econometric analysis, results and its 
economic interpretation. Section 7.6 provides concluding comments.
7.2. HYPOTHESES:
The hypotheses brought forward by this thesis are as follows: if  accumulation 
o f free cash flow is dominant in the firms, then the dividends should be weakly 
correlated with earnings.236 The other variables, which influence dividend payout ratio 
are insider ownership, FI’s stake in the firm, past and forecasted growth in earnings, 
future capital needed for new projects, simultaneous information variables associated 
with earnings etc. Future capital needs are proxied here by rights issues or private 
placement o f shares. The simultaneous information related variables help reduce the 
adverse impact o f dividend reductions. Hence, dividend payout ratio is determined by 
inside shareholding, F I’s shareholding, past earnings o f the firm and forecasted 
earnings o f the firm for the five years, future capital needs and information variables.
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DPR -  p0 + Pi  P- EARN + p2 FIS + p3 INSIDER + (34 F. EARN + p5 F.COV + p6
RIGHTS + j u l
Where,
DPR = Dividend payout ratio
FIS = Financial institution’s stake in the firm
INSIDER = stockholding o f  the family members in the firm
P.EARN = Past growth o f earnings
F.EARN = Forecasted growth o f earnings
F.COV = Financial press coverage o f a firm
RIGHTS = Rights issue or private placement o f shares
p = Error term
The second hypothesis is related to Bank and NBFFs role in monitoring firms. 
It is suggested that the level o f monitoring is directly proportional to the percentage o f 
ownership o f these institutions in a firm. It is the not the stockholding o f the FI which 
determines the monitoring ex ante, but the position o f a particular firm in the FI's 
portfolio. The FIs and banks have a marginal stockholding in most o f the firms in the 
sample set.237 The external monitors consist o f FIs and diffused shareholders and due 
to their small stockholding in the firms, they have no incentives to monitor the firm 
activities. Given the lack o f monitoring and tendency o f the family shareholders to 
accumulate free cash flow, the firm ’s returns are not distributed amongst outside 
shareholders.
The final hypothesis deals with the market for corporate control, despite the 
presence o f many LCCs, the takeover market is not very active in BSE. The reason for
236 Refer to Chapter-5, Table -  5.5.
237 Refer to Chapter -6, Table - 6.3.
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this, stems from the “market for lemons” syndrome, whereby LCCs are considered 
equivalent to second hand cars and due to asymmetric information, equilibrium in the 
market for takeovers fails to achieve in spite o f presence o f many buyers and sellers. 
But this hypothesis238 is not empirically dealt with in this thesis.
7.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:
7.3.A Data:
Data on the firm ’s performance was mainly collected from two sources, i.e. 
PROWESS and individual company accounts. PROWESS is an online database o f  the 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt. Limited. Data for the econometric 
analysis consisted o f parameters representing financial performance o f a company. A 
personal interview based survey o f managers o f these companies was carried out to 
gather insights into the position, status and power o f managers and also certain 
subjective estimates o f the firm i.e. decision making hierarchy. In addition, the 
questionnaire was designed to gather understanding o f the managerial preferences 
regarding different financial instruments i.e. debt or equity, information dissemination 
about the firm ’s policies, firm ’s relation with FIs and nationalised banks etc. This data 
source was the only accessible integrated database, which provided information about 
a range o f films for the past few years. The companies’ annual reports were not 
available on a continuous basis over the entire period o f 1990-99.
7.3. B SAMPLE PERIOD:
The empirical analysis is done for the period between 1990-99; the choice o f this 
period stems from the fact that the initial part o f this period witnessed an introduction 
o f radical financial reforms, which sought to change the financing pattern o f the 
Indian companies. The reforms o f 1991-92 ended the state-regulated environment in
238 But none o f the companies had felt a threat o f a takeover or friendly merger.
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which most companies; financial institutions, banks and stock markets functioned. As 
a result many o f the firms, which existed as private limited companies in the past 
could access the equity markets and thus became public limited companies.239 The 
number o f companies as a result listed on the BSE increased from 1031 companies in 
1981 to 5860 in 1998. Prior to these reforms the period between 1981-90 was a period 
o f gradual but significant financial changes and although effects o f these refonns were 
witnessed throughout the decade, 1990 can be taken as a year by which time many o f 
the reforms had had their impact on the financial system. The peculiarities o f the 
capital structure cannot be attributed entirely to a bias towards equity financing 
resulting in the aftennath o f  an overhaul o f the then existing financial system. During 
the period o f 1981-90 capital markets were becoming a significant source o f funding 
corporate growth. M ost o f the companies in the sample set existed as private limited 
companies during this period.' So the sample period provided appropriate conditions to 
study the capital structure features in Indian firms, as equity markets had become an 
important source o f finance for the corporate sector by this time.
7.3. C SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE:
The choice o f the companies included in the study was randomly selected from a 
group o f firms, which had very low market capitalisation over a period o f time. Once 
a preliminary set o f “low-cap” firms was chosen, the next task was to check if  data 
was available for the selected companies. Availability o f data became an important 
criterion on the basis o f  which firms were retained in the final sample set. LCCs have 
very limited coverage in the financial press, and on further inspection it was realised 
that companies did not maintain a very good record o f their accounts. It rendered 
gathering o f past data on the firm’s performance difficult. The last criteria was access
239 Refer to Chapter - 6, Table- 6.2.
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to their managerial staff for the personal interviews and upon further examination, it 
was recognised that certain firms did not exist any longer or were in the process o f 
being liquidated. The earlier sample set o f 80 companies was then reduced to 34 
companies. The sample is thus influenced by both availability o f data and access to 
their respective managerial staff. Although these availability constraints have 
introduced a significant bias in the sample, it is equally distributed amongst different 
industry groups.
7.3.D NATURE OF THE FIRMS:
Most o f the firms in the sample set existed as private limited companies and had 
made their first public issue in the late eighties or early nineties. And as a result the 
data for most o f these companies is available from early nineties onwards. The firms 
in the sample set belong to a varied cross section o f industry groups i.e. 
manufacturing, mining, computer software, pharmaceuticals, textiles and garments, 
NBFCs (Non-bank financial companies) etc. The firms were broadly divided in three 
industry categories, heavy, light and other industry. All the firms in the sample have a 
high proportion o f inside shareholding and a very marginal stockholding by the 
Financial Institutions and Banks. Out o f the 14 firms in the heavy industry group, 6 
firms had family ownership between 20%-75%, and 4 have ownership percentage 
between 5-20. hi the same group 4 firms had FIs' and banks' stake ranging between 
10-35%. hi the light industry group consisting o f 9 firms, 7 had family ownership 
ranging from 15-75%, there is only 1 firm which has 35% bank stake, h i the last 
category o f ‘other’ industry group, which had 11 firms, 6 had a family stake between 
20-70%, and the bank’s stake ranged from 1-10%. There are few companies (5 firms 
o f the heavy industry group and 2 from the light industry group) in the sample where 
the insider shareholding is less compared to the others in this case between 25-50% of
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the stock was owned by other corporate bodies. Equity holding pattern o f  6 firms was 
not known.
Under performance o f  most companies in the sample can be attributed to initiation 
problems given that most companies were established in the early nineties or late 
eighties. But it may not be true o f all the companies in the sample set, because the 
sample set consists o f companies that have become public limited enterprises recently 
but show a steady growth in income and profits. The gestation period is industry 
specific and as such firms in the computer software and textiles sectors have shown 
steady increase in their profits even though they were established fairly recently, at the 
same time other manufacturing units in heavy machinery, energy sources seem to be 
affected by initiation problems. But it needs to be added here that firms involved in 
the production o f heavy machineiy who are part o f an already established business 
house have also failed to achieve consistent growth rates. Many o f the firms are also 
separate entities o f already established business houses.
7.3.E BSE SENSEX COMP AM ES:
In order to check the robustness and the applicability o f this model on dividend 
payout a comparative analysis was done with the data o f the 30 top listed companies 
(Sensex) o f BSE. The companies in the BSE Sensex also belong to a cross section o f 
industry groups and they have been broadly classified in three groups i.e. heavy, light 
and other. There are 12 firms in the 'heavy' industry group, 9 firms in 'light' industiy 
and 9 firms in 'other' industry. The nature o f  the top listed companies is summarised in 
the following table 7.1:
Table 7.1: Equity ownership pattern in BSE SENSEX companies.
Industry group Insider ownership FIs stake Foreign Holdings
Heavy 3.69% 35.91 30.42
Light 2.26 19.81 40.03
Other 7.02 40.24 15.48
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There are 6 companies out o f the 30 companies, which have more than 45% o f  their 
stake with foreign holdings and 6 companies where the government stalceholding is 
more than 50%.
Table 7.2: Ratio o f  dividends and PAT and retained earnings and PAT in BSE SENSEX companies:
Industry Group Dividends/P AT Retained Earnings/P AT
Heavy .3142 .6749
Light .4539 .5315
Other .1922 .8004
Table 7.3; Correlation between retained earnings (lagged) and PAT in BSE SENSEX companies:
Industry Group Correlation Coefficients
Heavy .7204
Light .5894
Other .7087
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 suggest that the high rate o f retention o f earnings show a 
high correlation with profits after tax in the next year. This would imply that retained 
earnings are being used for future investments rather than for the benefit o f the owner-
managers o f  the companies.
Table 7.4: Growth in PAT in the BSE Sensex Comisanies:
Industry Group Growth in PAT
Heavy .3595
Light .3943
Other .3620
Table 7.5; Rights, Private Placement and Public Issues o f BSE SENSEX companies between 1991-99.
Industry Group Rights Issue Private Placement Public Issues Total
Heavy 9 54 79 142
Light 5 14 17 36
Other 8 49 65 122
Table 7.5 shows that rights issues and private placement o f shares is a widely 
employed by BSE SENSEX companies as well LCCs.240
240 Refer to Chapter - 5, Table - 5.1,
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7.4 V ARIA BLES:
The following are the list o f the variables, which explain the first hypothesis, and 
additionally about the financial institution’s role in monitoring the firms.
1. Dividend payout rate: The dividend payout rate i.e. ratio o f dividend payments and 
earnings is the dependent variable relating to the first hypothesis. For firms, which 
have low agency conflicts, the payout ratio is a correct measure o f  the dividend 
intensity (Dewenther and Warther, 1998). The variables, which determine dividend 
pay out rate in the model are growth in the past earnings, forecasted growth of 
earnings, news related to the firm, inside ownership, FI’s stake in the firm. In the 
agency framework, mainly Easterbrook's hypothesis (1984) suggests that dividends 
can act as a means o f subjecting a firm to monitoring by the capital market by forcing 
the firm to raise outside equity rather than relying on retained earnings as a source o f 
capital, thereby reducing agency costs. Outside debt is difficult to attain for most o f 
the low capitalised companies as they are not considered credit-worthy by the 
financial institutions and are thus forced to rely on outside equity. Announcements o f 
dividend changes by over investing firms will change investors' expectations about the 
size o f the film's future investment in negative-net-present-value projects. As a result 
an increase in the dividend will, all else being equal, reduce the extent o f over 
investment and increase the market value o f the firm. Validity o f  the monitoring 
rationale for dividends and the consequent simultaneity o f dividend and capital 
structure decisions are dependent on the characteristics o f the firm as they relate to its 
growth opportunities and to the existence o f non-dividend mechanisms for controlling 
agency costs. By encouraging firms to seek additional funds from the market, they 
result in evaluation o f the firm’s activities by the investors. In the case o f family 
owned firms listed on BSE, dividends may not fully play the role o f a monitor, but
227
they still assure that firms may at least depend on rights issue for further needs o f 
capital, if  not, on other new capital issues. In this case o f rights issues, firm ’s activities 
are assessed by the existing shareholders.
2. Past growth in Earnings: The partial adjustment model suggested by Lintner (1956) 
assumes that the target level o f dividends is given by:
Dt* = rEt
0 < r <  1,
Dt* represents the optimal value o f dividends associated with the current level o f 
earnings Et, and r is the target or the optimal payout ratio (Lintner, 1956).
But dividend changes are likely to follow large unanticipated and transitory changes in 
economic earnings. Given that growth in earnings can be volatile depending on the 
firm ’s performance in the market, firms try to smooth dividend payments through 
time. Managers attempt to attain some long-term payout ratio between dividends and 
economic earnings and they avoid raising dividend if  they stand a good chance o f 
being reversed in the near future (Cyert et al., 1996). Likewise, dividend reductions 
are spread over more than one year, making a small cut each year rather than 
concentrating the dividend reduction in a single year. It is also possible that in order 
not to cut dividends firms may use the accumulated earnings o f the past years to pay 
dividends in the current year. Dividends in the absence o f any free cash flow 
accumulation by firm ’s insiders should be positively related to the growth in earnings. 
Past performance o f the firm determines how the earnings are distributed. W hen the 
earnings are declining, the firm may decide to invest its current earnings in improving 
its productive capacity for which it may need additional finance. M ost o f  the family 
controlled firms use dividends as a last measure to attract investors if  their equity 
issues are not being subscribed well. For additional finance, firms depend on rights
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issue and to provide an incentive for prospective subscribers they announce payment 
o f dividends after the announcement o f rights issue. These companies do not hesitate 
to cut dividends if  the firm does not anticipate any additional need for further finance 
from the market. Thus dividends are not paid on continuous basis and there are wide 
fluctuations in the dividend payouts. The past growth rate o f earnings and dividend 
payouts will be negatively related unless it is accompanied by increase in dividends.
3. Forecasted growth rates o f earnings: For this variable data availability restricted 
further calculations. From the queries addressed to managers related to target growth 
rates and their firms achieving them, it was seen that almost 60% o f the firms did not 
meet their targets. M ost managers agreed that targets were not achieved on a 
continuous basis, which shows that any forecasted growth o f revenues could give 
spurious results. In the heavy industry category out o f 13 firms 3, in the light industry 
group o f 10 firms 5 and in the ‘other’ industry group, 5 out o f 11 firms were achieving 
their target growth rates. This variable is o f importance to firms, which formulate their 
dividend policies judiciously, keeping in mind the adverse impact o f sudden decrease 
in dividend payouts. The forecasted growth o f earnings should be positively related to 
dividend payout ratio.
4. Inside ownership: This variable plays an important role in the dividend policy. 
Studies o f insider ownership241 and financial policy assume that any causality among 
these choices runs from insider ownership to financial policy. Insider ownership is
241 But Demsetz and Lehn (1985) make a persuasive case that insider ownership choices are 
endogenous outcomes o f  value-maximising behaviour. The four real determinants according to them, o f  
insider ownership are:
Business risk 
Firm size
The number o f operating divisions o f  the firm 
Research and development expenditures
These variables capture various real attributes that help to determine the benefits and costs o f insider 
ownership.
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typically viewed as exogenous and its determinants are not subjected to economic 
analysis. R ozeff (1982) found a negative relationship between insider ownership and 
dividend payments among firms. Firms that use a high percentage o f insider stock 
ownership to reduce agency costs tend to pay small dividends while firms with low 
stock ownership are characterised by high dividend ratios. R ozeff (1982) developed a 
model o f a firm, which chooses dividend payout ratio to minimise the sum o f its 
agency costs and transactions costs, where transaction costs are an increasing function 
o f the dividend payout ratio. Rozeff (1982) concludes that an increase in insider stock 
ownership leads to lower agency costs and therefore, to a lower optimal dividend 
payout ratio. Going to the capital markets to raise new funds has associated 
transaction costs. O f course, raising the dividend payout ratio increases the need to 
obtain new equity capital through new stock issues; therefore, transaction costs are an 
increasing function o f the dividend payout ratio. But in the low capitalised firms, the 
relation between insider ownership and the dividend payout is manifested in the 
following two ways. Transaction costs argument is valid here as well but the strong 
presence o f family shareholders makes accumulation o f free cash flow very dominant. 
Although free cash flow may not be always utilised for takeovers or mergers, in most 
cases it is a source o f finance for future investments. The return on equity242 o f the 
family owned shares determines the value o f  inside share ownership. But the share 
capital owned by the insiders (Directors, relatives and top 50 shareholders) was 
calculated at current market prices, to provide market value o f the insider share 
ownership. If the insider ownership is high, then the tendency o f  accumulating
242 ROE = PAT(Profit after Taxes)/NW(Net Worth)
Net worth = Reserves and surplus + Share capital. In order to calculate NW  for this case, the share 
capital o f only family members was taken. In India, the term reserves and surplus is used for retained 
earnings, Pandey (1995).
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earnings is higher. The proportion o f dividends in earnings is reduced which leads to a 
positive relation between insider ownership and dividend payouts.
5. Rights Issue: Rights Issues or private placement o f shares are important for small 
family owned companies because the inside shareholders do not prefer losing control 
through dispersion o f their company stock. Although monitoring by outside 
shareholders is restricted in this case, rights issue provides opportunities for the 
existing shareholders to evaluate the firm ’s performance. Due to investors' lack o f 
information about the profitability o f firms' investments, a firm needing finance may 
be forced to sell risky securities at less than a fair price. This under pricing causes a 
transfer o f wealth from existing to new shareholders. Consequently, managers avoid 
external project financing whenever possible and particularly i f  the investment 
opportunity is highly profitable (Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988). Easterbroolc’s 
hypothesis o f dividend induced monitoring suggests that after the announcement of 
dividends firms usually float new issues o f capital and hence dividends usually 
precede new equity issues. Although in most firms the relation between the two 
variables i.e. dividends and announcements o f rights issue is positive, the order of 
occurrence is opposite o f what is cited in the Easterbrook’s hypothesis. This shows 
that firms consider dividends as important tools to attract investors, but the monitoring 
rationale o f  it becomes irrelevant. By paying dividends after the announcement o f 
public issues suggest that outside investors may be misled and may not consider other 
characteristics o f the firm before subscribing to the rights issues. Announcement o f 
dividends after equity issues may discourage outside investors to undertake effective 
evaluation o f the firm ’s policies. Rights issue or private placement o f shares saves the 
firm o f flotation costs. The firm ’s purpose o f paying dividends is to encourage already 
existing shareholders to subscribe to the rights issues. So the relation between
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dividends and rights issue or private placement o f shares is positive. Dummy variables 
were used to quantify both the rights issues (R l) and whether dividends followed 
rights issues or vice-versa. Dummy variables i.e. RD or DR (according to the order o f 
occurrence o f rights issues and dividends) were also introduced to check the order o f 
occurrence, which would determine the monitoring rationale o f dividend payouts. RD 
would be an indication that dividends will be paid so the relationship between RD and 
dividend payout will be positive. The relationship between D R and dividend payout 
will also be positive and this will suggest that the monitoring rationale o f  dividend 
payouts is strong.
6. Financial Institution's role: For small firms, a founder-manager who seeks funding 
from one or several financiers is primarily concerned with maintaining his or her 
private beneficial control. Most financiers insist on some form o f  protection, so that 
the final compromise regarding most financial contracts for small firms is one 
resembling a debt contract. The equity holding pattern o f LCCs is thus biased towards 
family ownership with diffused outside shareholders. In these circumstances, only a 
block debt holder can monitor the firm effectively as there is no scope for an outside 
large shareholder to emerge and as debt holder has limited claim 011 the returns o f the 
firm, their intervention cannot constrain the managerial initiative. A block debt holder 
with a sufficiently large stake may be willing to monitor the firm and guide 
managerial decisions. Block debt holders recognise that their loans to companies 
having greater scope for wealth appropriation are more vulnerable and hence act by 
increasing their proportionate holding o f equity to have increased control.
The F I’s stake is calculated by dividing the product o f shares held by them in a 
particular firm and the current share price o f that particular film by the sum total o f 
the quoted (equity) investments o f FIs in the entire corporate sector. This provides the
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relative position o f a firm in the F I’s portfolio. The relative position would determine 
the monitoring o f  the firm by the FI. The wealth expropriation hypothesis suggests 
that dividends increase after new debt is issued. But firms may not like to always 
exploit bondholders through dividend policy for two reasons; to preserve reputation 
and block debt holders possess enough bargaining power to stop the firm from 
expropriating their wealth243. This bargaining power is exercised with companies 
having a higher position in the FI's portfolio and dividends will be lower. But if  a 
firm's position in the FI's portfolio is lower, there is less monitoring o f the firm and 
firms will pay dividends based on their discretion.
7. News about the firm: Coverage o f the firm ’s policies in the financial press affects 
the share prices o f the firm in the market. Lintner (1956) argued that investors would 
welcome the decision o f  a firm to change its dividends only i f  the dividends are 
related to the firm's earnings or some other public information pertaining to the 
company. W hen management offers rationale for the dividend decision other than the 
earnings, it may adversely affect the market value o f the outstanding equity, at the 
same time growth motivated dividend cuts are interpreted favourably by the market. 
The simultaneous information variable reduces the adverse impact o f  dividend cuts. 
The higher news coverage o f a firm will lead to more information available to the 
investors and dividend payments are justified through the information variable. 
Dummy variables were used for this explanatory variable to quantify the type o f news, 
which would affect the market favourably or adversely. N1 and N2 are the two 
dummy variables, which depict good news or bad news respectively. The relationship 
between good news and dependent variable is positive whereas the relationship 
between bad news and dividend payments is negative. XN shows the number o f times
243 See Chapter-2 for more details on agency costs o f  debt.
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the financial press has covered a particular company and it has a positive relationship 
with the dependent variable.
7.5 METHODOLOGY:
The nature o f this data combines both time series and cross sectional 
characteristics. This analysis is based on panel data or the longitudinal data. In this 
case it models heterogeneity across firms in their dividend payment behaviour. There 
were many missing data points in this data set, which is not very uncommon in panel 
data sets. And accordingly, sizes o f the group differ across groups. This data is an 
unbalanced panel. Given the nature o f the data, it was transformed into log form 
before the regression analysis. Groups in this study were the individual firms, which 
were again categorised into three main industry groups i.e., heavy, light and other 
(which included many IT firms). In order to differentiate the firms on the broad 
industry categories, dummy variables were included. The data was stored in long 
form.
The basic model o f the panel data is o f  the following form: 
yit =  oii + P Xit + vit + Sit
In this model, Vj + Sj is the residual, Vj is the unit-specific residual; it differs between 
units but for a particular unit, its value is constant. 8; is the usual residual with 
properties like mean 0, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with x, uncorrelated with 
v and is homoscedastic. There are 5 regressors in xit, not including the constant term. 
x it is the value o f x for firm i at time t. The individual effect is aj, which is taken to be 
constant over time and specific to the individual cross-sectional unit i. When the ofs 
are same across all units, ordinary least squares provides consistent and efficient 
estimates o f a  and p. The fixed effects approach takes otj to be group specific constant
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term in the regression model. The random effects approach specifies that ct j  is a group 
specific disturbance, similar to Si{.
The variable name corresponding to index / in x;t is 'id' in the sample, which 
identifies the firms by numbers. The variable name corresponding to index t in Xjt is 
'year' in the sample, which records the time or the year.
Both fixed and random effect models have been estimated in this chapter. It has 
been suggested that the distinction between fixed and random effects models is an 
erroneous interpretation.244 The fixed effects estimator by using OLS estimates the 
following equation:
(yit— yit) = (x n -  xit)p + (sit- sit)
In this case the firm specific residuals are treated as fixed and estimable.
Whereas the random effects estimator estimates the following equation:
(yit— 0  yit) = (1  - 0 )  a  + ( x it -  0  Xit)p +  [(1  -  0 )  Vi +  (Bit - 0  Sit)]
The random effects245 estimator produces more efficient results with small sample 
properties. Hausman Test is done to check for the equality o f  the coefficients 
estimated by the Fixed and Random effects estimators. If the coefficients differ 
significantly, either the model is misspecified or the assumption that the random 
effects Vi is uncorrelated with the regressors Xjt is incorrect. It measures the 
appropriateness o f random-effects estimator.
244 According to Mundlak (1978), individual effects should always be heated as random. The fixed 
effects model is simply analysed conditionally on the effects present in the observed sample. Certain 
institutional factors or characteristics o f  the data argue for one or the other, but unfortunately this 
approach does not always provide much guidance. Fixed effects model assumes that the error terms are 
independent through the cross section and time. Whereas random effects model assumes that individual 
effects are uncorrelated with other regressors and it may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted 
variables. Hausman test is based on the difference between the two estimates o f  fixed and random 
effects model. Under the null hypothesis the two estimates should not differ systematically.
7.6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS:
The following tables 7.6 and 7.7 shows the results o f the panel data analysis by 
both the fixed effects and random effects estimation.
Table 7.6: Results o f  panel data analysis o f  BSE Sensex Companies.
BSE SENSEX Companies (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Variables Insh Patgr Fis N1 N2 XN R1 Constant R2
Coefficient .0007864 -.0018701 -.0062869 .0006929 -.000056 .00010445 -.0015714 1.023246 .2016
Std. Error .0032139 .0004438 .002902 .0009054 .0009479 .0002669 .0008888 .0045975
t-values .245 -4.214 -2.166 0.765 -.060 .391 -1.768 224.695
.805 .000 .032 .445 .953 .696 .079 .000
BSE SENSEX Companies (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients- -.0008246 -.0019067 -.0039439 .0006084 -.0000518! .0001586 -.0015445 1.023259 .2830
Std. Error .0012604 .0004384 .0012475 .0008934 .0009342 .0002589 .0008653 .0030457
z-values -.654 -4.349 -3.161 .681 -.055 .613 -1.785 252.527
.513 .000 .002 .496 .956 .540 .074 .000
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
.001611 .0000366 -.0002343 .0000845 -4.64e-06 -.0000541 -.00002691
Other Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients .003371 -.0013146 -.0065959 -.0001757 .000579 -.0001538 .000011 1.024313 .5769
Std. Error .0013306 .0006551 .0011567 .0007337 .0007107 .0002298 .0006457 .0022961
t-values 2.534 -2.007 -5.702 .239 .815 -.670 .017 446.105
.015 .050 .000 .812 .419 .506 .986 .000
Other Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients .0005001 -.0021762 -.0011507 -.0000925 .001147 .000152 .000479 1.011154 .2023
Std. Error .0005388 .001054 .000513 .0011703 .001159 .000322 .000945 .0020977
z-values .928 -2.065 -2.243 -0.079 .990 .472 .507 482.030
.353 .039 .025 .937 .322 .637 .612 .000
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
.002871 .0008617 -.005445 .0002682 -.000568 -.000305 -.000468
Light Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.005827 -.001136 .0002036 -.002958 .0005073 -.000911 1.030999 .2056
Std. Error .003307 .0005535 .0015718 .001681 .000374 .0015554 .0061398
t-values -1.762 -2.053 .130 -1.759 1.356 -.586 167.919
.084 .045 .897 .084 .181 .560 .000
Light Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.0024491 -.001129 -.0047271 -.0002071 -.003593 .0005259 -.002329 1.03978 .2922
Std. Error .0030959 .0006088 .0035553 .0017056 .0018171 .000412 .001654 .0080369
z-values -.791 -1.853 -1.330 -1.21 -1.978 1.276 -1.408 129.376
.429 .064 .183 .903 .048 .202 .159 .000
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
-.0033787 -7.24e-06 .0004107 .000635 -.000018 .001417
Heavy Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.002765 -.011617 .0006224 .000251 -.000214 -.003037 1.053456 .2701
Std. Error .001157 .0037162 .0017436 .001928 .000639 .009128 .0122557
t-values -2.390 -3.126 .357 .130 -.335 -1.575 85.957
.019 .003 .722 .897 .739 .120 .000
Heavy Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients .000814 -.0031936 -.0046242 .0008954 .001197 .000136 -.001738 1.027603 .0867
Std. Error .001949 .001227 .0025036 .0018511 .002012 .0006375 .001928 .0081773
z-values .418 -2.602 -1.847 .484 .595 .214 -.902 125.666
.676 .009 .065 .629 .552 .831 .367 .000
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
-.0004277 -.0069932 -.000273 -.000946 -.000350 -.001298
245 Random effects estimator is a (matrix) weighted average o f the estimates produced by the between 
and within estimators.
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Table 7.7: Results o f  panel data analysis o f  the sample LCCs.
Sample Companies listed at BSE (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Variables lush Patgr FIS N1 N2 XN R1 Constant R2
Coefficient .1157031 .0494889 -5.101681 -.034643 -.069958 .0263914 .1785598 4.174967 .1411
Std. Error .3475205 .0107172 7.083855 .2014095 .1753129 .0568762 .128951 7.03357
t-values .333 4.618 -.720 -0.172 -.399 .464 1.385 .594
.740 .000 .472 .864 .690 .643 .168 .554
Sample Companies listed at BSE (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients- .1731286 .0506186 -2.85927 -.035185 -.079729 .0114559 .1802839 1.948696 .1787
Std. Error .2151695 .0101627 6.591608 .1860379 .1626795 .0546611 .1225901 6.574718
z-values .805 4.981 -.434 -.189 -.490 .210 1.471 .296
.421 .000 .664 .850 .624 .834 .141 .796
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
-.057425 -.0011297 -2.242411 .0005423 .0097704 .0149355 -.001724
Other Industry Group in the Sample (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients .6167767 .0317195 -270.048 .3395433 -.644659 .0334012 .151624 268.6781 .1870
Std. Error .0013306 .0006551 .0011567 .0007337 .0007107 .0002298 .0006457 .0022961
t-values .726 1.219 -.954 .674 -1.615 .367 .615 .949
.472 .231 .346 .505 .115 .716 .543 .349
Other Industry Group in the Sample (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.2360139 .0538042 -370.4608 .254466 -.617047 .0466475 .04669319 370.1538 .2441
Std. Error .6112084 .0224907 257.803 .3614991 .3216553 .0835412 .2236417 257.658
z-values -.386 2.392 -1.437 0.704 -1.918 .565 .209 1.437
.699 .017 .151 .481 .055 .572 .835 .151
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
.8527907 -.0220847 100.4361 .0850773 -.027611 -.0132464 .104931
Light Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -1.2142047 .0328785 10.17959 .2555758 .8169529 -.2526515 .8878132 -9.413455 .2632
Std. Error .7899959 .0221093 33.57596 .252344 .26448221 .1062363 .1939012 33.51674
t-values -1.537 1.487 .303 1.013 3.089 -2.378 .453 -.281
.130 .143 .763 .316 .003 .021 .652 .780
Light Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.53651941 .0553747 -32.33844 .1036163 .5336411 -.2756131 .16696929 32.39493 .3235
Std. Error .4765948 .0209075 28.52404 .2462529 .24116291 .0998215 .17581684 28.53988
z-values -1.126 2.649 -1.134 .421 2.213 -2.761 .950 1.135
.260 .008 .257 .674 .027 .006 .342 .256
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
-.67768467 -.6224962 42.51803 .1519596 .2833118 .0229616 -.079156
Heavy Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Fixed Effects Estimation):
Coefficients -.002765 -.011617 .0006224 .000251 -.000214 -.003037 1.053456 .2701
Std. Error .001157 .0037162 .0017436 .001928 .000639 .009128 .0122557
t-values -2.390 -3.126 .357 .130 -.335 -1.575 85.957
.019 .003 .722 .897 .739 .120 .000
Heavy Industry Group in BSE SENSEX (Random Effects Estimation):
Coefficients .000814 -.0031936 -.0046242 .0008954 .001197 .000136 -.001738 1.027603 .2214
Std. Error .001949 .001227 .0025036 .0018511 .002012 .0006375 .001928 .0081773
z-values .418 -2.602 -1.847 .484 .595 .214 -.902 125.666
.676 .009 .065 .629 .552 .831 .367 .000
Difference 
in the
Coefficients
-.0004277 -.0069932 -.000273 -.000946 -.000350 -.001298
Random-effects estimator performs better than that o f fixed effects estimator in
terms o f both R2 and F-statistic. A  higher R2 suggests that there is strong evidence that 
the variation in industry groups helped towards a better fit. The fixed effects estimation 
drops the two variables nam el and name2, which mark the type o f the industry group
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in the data. These two variables were dropped because there is no variation in the data 
through time. The F statistic246 is a test that the coefficients on the regressors are all 
jointly zero. The model is significant for both the firms in the BSE Sensex and in the 
sample. The goodness o f fit R2 is higher for BSE Sensex companies than for the 
sample LCCs. The t-test suggests that for BSE Sensex companies’ coefficients i.e. 
inside shareholding, bad news, extent o f  new coverage are significant. For the sample 
LCCs coefficients o f variables like inside shareholding, good and bad news, extent o f
news coverage and financial institutions were significant.
Table 7.8: Summary o f  the relationship between dividend payouts and other re gressors.
Variables Hypotheses BSE Sensex companies Low capitalised 
firms in the sample
Growth in earnings -ve -ve +ve
Inside shareholding +ve -ve +ve
Further capital needs +ve -ve +ve
Financial Institutions -ve and +ve -ve -ve
Information variable 
Good News
+ve +ve -ve
Bad News -ve -ve -ve
Extent o f news +ve +ve +ve
Given the difference in the structure o f the BSE Sensex companies and LCCs, it 
is not surprising that the relationship between regressors and the dependent variable is 
opposite. If  the growth in earnings has a negative relationship unlike as suggested in the 
hypotheses, this would mean that the dividend payments are increasing (the proportion 
o f dividends in the earnings is low247 but it keeps a steady growth). In the BSE Sensex 
companies, inside shareholders do not accumulate the earnings for their personal benefit 
the relationship between inside shareholding and dividend payouts is negative. For these 
companies further capital needs may not be related to the dividend payments, when 
required they float either public issues or rights issues.248 The role o f FIs is negative for 
BSE companies because their position is the FI's portfolio is high and accordingly
246 See Appendix -7.1 for the F-statistics.
247 See Chapter-5, Table 5.1.
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agency costs o f debt will be higher and as a result dividend payout w ill be lower. But in 
the case o f the low capitalised firms, their position is low in the FI's249 portfolio and as a 
result agency costs o f debt will be lower and firms are at their discretion to pay 
dividends. Bad news about a firm and the extent o f the news coverage affects all the 
firms in the same manner. But good news affects negatively dividend payouts in the low 
capitalised firms because the dividend payment behaviour is erratic250 and that is why 
good news cannot provide well enough signal o f dividend payout.
As mentioned earlier, if  the model is correctly specified and if  Vj is uncorrelated 
with Xu, then the subset o f coefficients that are estimated by both the fixed-effects 
estimator and the random effects model should not statistically differ. The hypothesis 
that the coefficients are the same cannot be rejected in both the cases o f BSE Sensex 
firms and LCCs in the sample. The test251 did not list nam el and name2, because it 
compares only those coefficients estimated by both techniques. The difference in the 
coefficients between the fixed and random effects model are systematic. This suggests 
that both the individual firm specific and the time specific error terms are related to the 
regressors, which the fixed effects model controls. Given that the Hausman test
248 Flotation costs may not deter these companies from issuing new public issues.
249 In most firms FIs have nominee directors on the board o f the company, in addition to professional 
directors including technical directors and industrialists. And in most cases their work is restricted to 
personal visits to the company and project appraisals. The board o f directors meets once in three 
months. In certain companies there are more than one nominee director from the FIs as members o f  the 
board. Having nominee director from the FIs did not always help in getting additional loans from the 
FI. In situations where the firms are making losses for a continuous period o f  time FIs play a greater 
role as the members o f the board o f  directors and contribute in the decision making process. So, FIs 
provide ex ante monitoring on the basis o f  the firm’s position in their overall portfolio. And the ex post 
monitoring depends on the firm’s performance in time 1 and accordingly firms are monitored in time 2, 
irrespective o f  the firm’s position in the overall portfolio o f  the FI (Information gathered from the 
questionnaire survey o f  managers).
250 Non-payment o f  dividends is justified by the managers o f these firms on the ground that the earnings 
are retained for future investments. They see no adverse impact o f this as they believe that outside 
shareholders realise the intrinsic value o f the firm who have a long- term investment plan with a 
particular firm. Uncertain dividend payouts suggests that managers show no inhibition towards cutting 
dividends drastically although it could affect their share prices in the market (Information gathered from 
the interview-based survey o f  the managers).
251 See Appendix -7 .1  for the test statistics o f  Hausman Test.
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statistic is low suggesting that the coefficients are same, it can be safely concluded that 
the present model with its variables is not misspecified.
Table 7.9: Summary o f  the relationship between dividend payouts with other regressors in the Heavy 
industry group. ________________________ ________________________ ________________________
Variables Hypotheses BSE Sensex companies Sample LCCs
Growth in earnings -ve -ve +ve
Inside shareholding +ve dropped +ve
Further capital needs +ve -ve +ve
Financial Institutions -ve and +ve -ve -ve
Information variable 
Good News
-l-ve +ve -ve
Bad News -ve +ve -ve
Extent o f  news +ve -ve +ve
The R2 is higher in the case o f fixed effects estimation. The dropped variable
suggests that the market value o f inside shareholding did not change considerably 
between 1991-99. The relationship between regressors and the dependent variable here 
is similar to the overall sample set.
Table 7.10: Summary o f the relationship between dividend payouts with other regressors in the Light 
industry group._________ ________________________ ________________________ _____________________
Variables Hypotheses BSE Sensex companies Low capitalised 
films in the sample
Growth in earnings -ve -ve +ve
Inside shareholding +ve -ve -ve
Further capital needs +ve -ve +ve
Financial Institutions -ve and +ve -ve -ve
Information variable 
Good News
+ve -ve -l-ve
Bad News -ve -ve +ve
Extent o f  news +ve +ve -ve
The R2 is higher in the case o f random effects estimation. The relationship
between the regressors and the dependent variable is similar to the overall sample set.
Table 7.11: Summary o f  the relationship between Dividend Payouts with other regressors in the Other 
Industry Group.________ ________________________ ________________________ __________
Variables Hypotheses BSE Sensex companies Low capitalised 
firms in the sample
Growth in earnings -ve -ve +ve
Inside shareholding +ve +ve -ve
Further capital needs +ve -l-ve +ve
Financial Institutions -ve and +ve -ve -ve
Information variable 
Good News
+ve -l-ve +ve
Bad News -ve +ve -ve
Extent o f news +ve -ve +ve
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The R2 is higher in the case o f fixed effects estimation. The relationship between 
the regressors and the dependent variable is also similar to the overall sample set.
For dividend payments to be effective monitoring mechanisms they have to be 
paid before any new rights issue is announced. To check for this, regressions were run 
with variables RD and DR, XRD and XDR denote the extent o f  RD and DR respectively 
i.e. the number o f times. The results are as follows:
Table 7.12: Results o f  regression with variables RD and DR.
BSE Sensex Companies
Fixed Effects Estimation R2 =  .2030
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t- Value
RD -.001864 .0027038 -.689 .492
XRD .0002943 .0020694 .142 .887
Random Effects Estimation R2 = .2153
Variable Coefficient Std. En'or z- value
RD -.0023875 .0027978 -.853 .393
XRD .0005846 .0021434 .273 .785
Hausman Test Chi = 0
Variable Difference Prob. > Chi =  1.00
RD .0005236
XRD -.002903
Fixed Effects Estimation R2 = .2024
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value
DR .0012282 .0017653 .696 .488
XDR .0002813 .000351 .801 .425
Random Effects Estimation R2 = .2014
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value
DR .0012205 .0018143 .663 .507
XDR .0000201 .0003558 .056 .955
Hausman Test Chi = 0
Variable Difference Prob. > Chi =  1.00
DR 7.78e-06
XDR .0002612
Sample Companies
Fixed Effects Estimation R2 =  .4720
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value
RD -.023596 .1036318 -.228 .826
Random Effects Estimation R2 = .1129
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value
RD .0248793 .0762246 .326 .744
Hausman Test chi = 3.72
Variable Difference prob> chi = .8118
RD -.0484753
The above table suggests that for BSE Sensex companies the announcement o f 
rights issue followed by dividends has a negative relationship, rights issue cannot be
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taken as an indication for dividend payments. But this relationship is not significant. 
Although the relationship between DR and dividend payments is positive, the 
relationship is not significant. In the case o f LCCs in the sample, the relationship 
between dividend payments and RD is both negative and positive (the relationship is 
significant in both the cases) when estimated by Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
Estimation respectively. Nothing can be deduced conclusively because both tests 
provide significantly different results.
Correlations may not always imply causation. The Granger (1969) approach to 
the question o f whether x causes y is to see how much o f the current value o f  y can be 
explained by past values o f y and then to see whether adding lagged values o f x can 
improve the explanation, y is said to Granger-caused by x if  the coefficients on the 
lagged x's are statistically significant. Since the data here was in the panel data form, to 
run the Granger test, the data was pooled in a time series format. It was done by 
averaging the data o f one year o f all the firms in a particular category i.e. 'H', 'O', or 'L\ 
Granger test led to spurious results i.e., simultaneous tests on y and x led to the 
conclusion both were Granger caused because coefficients on both lagged x and y were 
statistically significant respectively. The inconclusive results could be due to the method 
o f pooling the data in to time series.
7.7 CONCLUSION:
From this econometric analysis the direction o f the movement o f the variables 
can be established, which confirm to the central hypothesis o f the thesis. And the 
results are significant. Fitness o f good is moderately high. The comparative analysis 
also helped to confirm that the model is robust. The opposite relationship between the 
regressors and the dependent variable in both the samples, corroborate this. The 
inclusion o f 'forecasted growth o f earnings' could have improved the results further.
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For this data for some more years is required. Hausman test suggests that the model is 
parameterised well.
But results obtained for the rights issue and its indicativeness o f dividend 
payments are not conclusive. Given that the sample size was small, compared to the 
number o f LCCs firms listed on the BSE, the results although significant cannot be 
generalised to all LCCs.
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1. BSE SENSEX Companies 
(26 vars, 266 obs)
Appendix - 7.1 
Section-1
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) = .0073067
sd(e_id_t) = .0052853
sd (e__id_t+u_id) = .009017 9
corr(u id, Xb) = -0.2575
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall 
F ( 7, 187)
Prob > F
224
30
7.46667
= 0
= 0
= 0
= 0
2016 
0503 
0955 
6. 75 
0000
dividend [ Coef. Std. Err. t P> j 11 95% conf.Interval
insh I .0007864 .0032139 0.245 0. 807 -.0055537 .0071266
patgr j-.0018701 .0004438 -4.214 0.000 -.0027457 -.0009946
f is [-.0062869 .002902 -2.166 0.032 -.0120118 -.000562
nl | .0006929 .0009054 0.765 0.445 -.0010933 . 0024791
n2 I -.0000564 .0009479 -0.060 0. 953 -.0019263 .0018134
xn i .0001044 .0002669 0.391 0.696 -.000422 .0006309
rl |-.0015714 .0008888 -1.768 0.079 -.0033248 .0001821
namel 
name 2 
cons
| (dropped) 
| (dropped) 
| 1.033031 .0045975 224.695 0.000 1.023961 1.0421
id F (29,187) = 8.334 0.000 30 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u_id)
sd(e_id_t)
sd(e id t + u id)
.006137 
= .0052853
= .0080992
Number of obs = 224
n = 30
T-bar - 7.37273
corr(u id, X)
m m  
0.6406
5%
0.6683
theta -
median
0.7087
0 (assumed)
95%
0.7087
max 
0.7087
R-sq within = 0.1985
between = 0.3594
overall = 0.2830
chi2( 9) = 59.27
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
dividend 1 Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| 95% Conf, Interval
insh I-.0008246 .0012604 -0.654 0.513 -.0032948 .0016457
patgr I -.0019067 .0004384 -4.349 0 . 000 -.002766 -.0010474
f is I-.0039439 .0012475 -3.161 0.002 -.006389 -.0014987
nl ! .0006084 .0008934 0. 681 0.496 -.0011425 .0023594
n2 I-.0000518 .0009342 -0.055 0. 956 - . 0018828 . 0017792
xn 1 .0001586 .0002589 0. 613 0. 540 -.0003488 . 000666
rl I-.0015445 .0008653 -1.785 0.074 -.0032405 . 0001515
namel I .0101331 .0030457 3.327 0.001 .0041637 . 0161025
name 2 I .0055483 .0028433 1. 951 0.051 -.0000245 .0111211
cons | 1.023259 .0040521 252.527 0.000 1.015317 1.031201
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Hausman specification test
dividend | 
 + .
insh | 
patgr | 
f is | 
nl | 
n2 | 
xn | 
rl |
  Coefficients ----
Fixed Random
Effects Effects Difference
.0007864 
.0018701 
.0062869 
.0006929 
.0000564 
0001044 
.0015714
-.0008246 
-.0019067 
-.0039439 
.0006084 
-.0000518 
. 0001586 
-.0015445
.001611 
.0000366 
-.002343 
.0000845 
-4 . 64e-06 
-.0000541 
-.0000269
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
ch i2( 7) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1)] (b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
3.43
Prob>chi2 = 0.8427
2. Other Industry group in BSE SENSEX Companies 
(2 6 vars, 7 7 obs)
sd(u_id) 
s d (e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u_id) 
corr(u id, Xb)
0075591 
0 0 20 10 1  
0078218 
-0.9055
Fixed-effects (within) regression
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall 
F( 7, 48)
Prob > F
64
9
7 . 1 1 1 1 1  
0.5769 
0.0215 
0.0904 
9.35 
0 . 0 0 0 0
dividend 1 Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 95% Conf Interval
insh | .003371 .0013306 2 . 534 0.015 .0006957 . 0060463
patgr I-.0013146 .0006551 -2.007 0.050 -.0026318 2 . 68e-06
f is I-.0065959 .0011567 -5.702 0. 000 -.0089217 -.0042701
nl I .0001757 .0007337 0.239 0.812 -.0012995 . 0016509
n2 I .000579 .0007107 0. 815 0.419 -.00085 . 0020079
xn 1-.0001538 .0002298 -0.670 0. 506 -.0006158 . 0003081
rl | .000011 .0006457 0.017 0. 986 -.0012872 .0013093
cons I 1.024313 .0022961 446.105 0.000 1.019696 1.028929
id 1 F (8,48) = 13.465 0.000 (9 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression 
sd(u_id) - 0
sd(e_id_t) = .0020101
sd(e_id_t + u__id) = .0020101
corr(u id, X) = 0  (assumed)
min 5% median 95% max
0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 0
Number of obs = 64
n = 9
T-bar = 6.94853 
R-sq within = 0.2395
between = 0.117 6
overall = 0.2023
chi2 ( 7)
Prob > chi2 =
14 .20 
0.0477
dividend I Coef. Std. Err. z P>! z| [95% Conf Interval
insh | .0005001 .0005388 0. 928 0.353 -.0005559 . 0015561
patgr I-.0021762 .001054 -2.065 0. 039 -.0042419 -.0001105
f is I-.0011507 .000513 -2.243 0.025 -.002156 -.0001453
nl I -.0000925 .0011703 -0.079 0. 937 -.0023863 .0022013
n2 | .0011473 .0011593 0. 990 0.322 -.0011249 .0034195
xn I .000152 .0003221 0. 472 0. 637 -.0004793 .0007833
rl I .0004791 .0009455 0. 507 0. 612 -.0013741 .0023322
cons I 1.011154 .0020977 482.030 0.000 1.007042 1.015265
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
I
dividend I
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
insh | .003371 .0005001 .002871
patgr | -.0013146 -.0021762 .0008617
f is | -.0065959 -.0011507 -.0054452
nl | .0001757 -.0000925 .0002682
n2 I .000579 .0011473 -.0005683
xn | -.0001538 .000152 -.0003058
rl | .000011 . 0004791 -.0004681
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2 ( 7) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1) ] (b-B) , S = (S_fe - S__re)
5. 57
Prob>chi2 = 0,5909
3. Light Industry Group in BSE SENSEX Companies 
(26 vars, 80 obs)
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) = .0072136
sd(e_id_t) = .0051053
sd(e_id_t + u_id) = .0088375
corr(u id, Xb) = 0.0089
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall 
F ( 6, 54)
69
9
7.66667 
0.2056 
0.1401 
0.1674 
2.33
Prob > F = 0.0451
dividend I Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 95% Conf interval
insh I-.0058278 .003307 -1.762 0. 084 -.0124579 . 0008023
patgr I-.0011363 .0005535 -2.053 0 . 045 -.0022461 -.0000265
f is I (dropped)
nl 1 .0002036 .0015718 0.130 0. 897 -.0029476 . 0033548
n2 I-.0029581 .0016813 -1.759 0. 084 -.0063289 . 0004128
xn | .0005073 .0003741 1.356 0. 181 -.0002427 .0012573
rl I-.0009119 .0015554 -0.586 0.560 -.0040302 .0022065
cons 11.030999 .0061398 167.919 0. 000 1.01869 1.043309
id 1 F (8,54) 10 979 0 000 (9
categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u_id) 
sd(e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u__id) 
corr(u id, X)
0.5315 0.5315
= .0036386
= .0051053
= .0062693
= 0 (assumed)
-- theta - 
median 
0.5556
95( max
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall
chi2(7)
69
9
7.63636 
0.1941 
0.3719 
0.2922
17 . 67
0.5556 0.5556 rob > chi2 = 0.0136
/idend 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z | 95% Conf. Interval
insh I-.0024491 .0030959 -0.791 0.429 -.008517 .0036188
patgr I-.001129 .0006088 -1.855 0. 064 -.0023222 .0000641
f is I-.0047271 .003553 -1.330 0.183 -.0116909 .0022367
nl I-.0002071 .0017056 -0.121 0. 903 -.0035499 .0031358
n2 I-.0035937 .0018171 -1.978 0.048 -.007155 -.0000323
xn I .0005259 .000412 1.276 0.202 -.0002816 .0013334
rl I-.0023295 .0016547 -1.408 0.159 -.0055727 .0009137
cons I 1.03978 .0080369 129.376 0.000 1.024028 1.055532
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
dividend
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects
insh
patgr
nl
n2
xn
rl
Test; Ho:
-.0058278 
-.0011363 
.0002036 
-.0029581 
.0005073 
-.0009119
- . 0.024491 
-.001129 
-.0002071 
-.0035937 
.0005259 
-.0023295
Difference
-.0033787 
-7.24e-06 
.0004107 
.0006356 
-.0000186 
.0014176
difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2( 6) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1)] (b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
8.45
Prob>chi2 = 0.2070
4. Heavy Industry group in BSE SENSEX Companies 
(26 vars, 109 obs)
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) = .0085681
sd(e_id_t) = .0065669
sd(e_id_t + u_id) = .0107952
corr (u id, Xb) == -0.6620
Number of obs = 91
n = 12
T-bar = 7.58333
R-sq within = 0.2701
between = 0.0014
overall = 0.0310
F( 6, 73) = 4.50
Prob > F = 0.0006
dividend 1 Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 95% Conf. Interval
insh I(dropped)
patgr I-.0027659 .0011572 -2.390 0.019 -.0050722 -.0004595
f is I -.0116174 .0037162 -3.126 0 . 003 -.0190238 -.0042111
nl | .0006224 .0017436 0.357 0 . 722 -.0028525 .0040973
n2 I .000251 .0019281 0.130 0.897 -.0035917 .0040937
xn I-.0002141 .0006394 -0.335 0.739 -.0014884 .0010602
rl I -.0030375 .0019289 -1.575 0 .120 -.0068818 . 0008068
cons I 1.053456 . 0122557 85.957 0 . 000 1.02903 1.077881
id 1 F <11,73) - 5.945 0.000 (12 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u_id) 
s d (e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u_id) 
corr(u id, X)
m m  
0.4588
5%
0.4588
= .0041657
= .0065669
= .0077767
= 0 (assumed)
—  theta - 
median 
0.5132
95%
0.5132
max 
0.5132
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall
chi2( 7)
91
12
7.52239 
0.2214 
0.0032 
0.0867
16.94
Prob > chi2 = 0.0178
idend 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z | 95% Conf. Interval
insh I .0008142 .0019494 0.418 0. 67 6 -.0030065 .0046349
patgr !-.0031936 .0012275 -2.602 0.009 -.0055994 -.0007878
f is |-.0046242 .0025036 -1.847 0.065 -.0095313 .0002828
nl I .0008954 .0018511 0. 484 0. 62 9 -.0027328 . 0045235
n2 I .0011971 .0020122 0.595 0 . 552 -.0027467 .0051408
xn I .0001364 .0006375 0.214 0. 831 -.001113 .0013858
rl I-.0017389 .0019284 -0.902 0. 367 -.0055186 .0020408
cons |1.027603 .0081773 125.666 0. 000 1.011575 1.04363
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
1
dividend |
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
patgr | -.0027659 -.0031936 .0004277
f is I -.0116174 -.0046242 -.0069932
nl | .0006224 .0008954 -.000273
n2 I .000251 .0011971 -.000946
xn | -.0002141 .0001364 -.0003505
rl I -.0030375 -.0017389 -.0012986
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
ch i 2 ( 6) 
Prob>chi2
= (b-B) *[SA (-1)](b-B), S = (S fe 
= 1082.40
0.0000
5. Sample LCCs 
(18 vars, 208 obs)
Fixed-effects (within) regression
sd(u_id) 
sd(e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u_id) 
corr(u id, Xb)
. 4718377 
.741759 
. 8791116 
0.0856
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall 
F ( 7, 167)
Prob > F = 0
208
34
6.11765 
0.1411 
0.1476 
0.1482 
3. 92 
0006
dividend | Coef. 
 +-------
Std. Err. P> 111 95% Conf. Interval
insh .1157031 .3475205 0. 333 0.740 -.5703966 .8018028
patgr .0494889 .0107172 4 . 618 0. 000 . 0283302 .0706475
f is -5 .101681 7.083855 -0.720 0. 472 -19.08713 8.883768
nl - .034643 .2014095 -0.172 0.864 -.4322799 .362994
n2 - .0699589 .1753129 -0.399 0. 690 -.4160741 . 2761562
xn .0263914 .0568762 0. 464 0. 643 -.0858976 .1386804
rl .1785598 .128951 1.385 0.168 -.0760244 . 4331441
namel (dropped)
name 2 (dropped)
cons 4 .174967 7.03357 0.594 0. 554 -9.711206 18.06114
id F (33,167) = 1 681 0. 018 (34 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression 
sd(u_id) 
sd(e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u_id) 
corr(u id, X)
= .3345141
.741759 
- .8136991
= 0 (assumed)
5%
—  theta 
median 95%
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall
chi2( 9)
208
34
5.18362 
0.1396 
0.2476 
0.1787
37.41
0.1569 0.1569 0. 3289 0 4056 0.4056 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
dividend | Coef. Std . E rr. z P> 1 z| 95% Conf. Interval
insh I .1731286 .2151695 0 . 805 0. 421 -.2485959 .594853
patgr I .0506186 . 0101627 4 . 981 0.000 . 0307 .0705372
f is I-2.85927 6.591608 -0.434 0. 664 15.77858 10.06004
nl | -.0351853 .1860379 -0.189 0.850 -.3998129 .3294423
n2 I -.0797293 .1626795 -0.490 0 . 624 -.3985753 .2391166
xn I .0114559 .0546611 0 . 210 0. 834 - .0956778 . 1185897
rl I .1802839 .1225901 1. 471 0 .141 -.0599882 .420556
namel I .0856867 .2008266 0. 427 0 . 670 -.3079261 . 4792995
name2 I -.2640339 .1996005 -1.323 0.186 -.6552436 . 1271758
cons [ 1.948696 6.574718 0.296 0.767 -10.93751 14 . 83491
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Hausman specification test
dividend
  Coefficients ----
Fixed Random
Effects Effects Difference
insh 
patgr 
f is 
nl 
n2 
xn 
rl
1157031
0494889
101681
034643
0699589
0263914
1785598
.1731286 
.0506186 
-2.85927 
“ .0351853 
-.0797293 
.0114559 
.1802839
-.0574254 
-.0011297 
-2.242411 
.0005423 
.0097704 
.0149355 
-.001724
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
c hi 2( 7) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1)] (b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
4.34
Prob>chi2 = 0.7396
6. Other Industry group in the Sample: 
(18 vars, 53 obs)
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) 
sd(e_id_t) 
sd(e_id_t + u__id) 
corr(u id, Xb)
= .3482378
= .7532603
= .8298619
0.0053
Number of obs = 53
n = 10
T-bar = 5.3
R-sq within = 0.1870
between = 0.0863
overall = 0.1784
F ( 7, 36) = 1.18
Prob > F = 0.3368
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 95% Conf . Interval
insh | .6167767 .8489889 0.726 0. 472 -1.105052 2.338606
patgr [ .0317195 .0260187 1.219 0.231 -.0210488 .0844878
fis i-270.0248 283.0749 -0.954 0.346 -844.1274 304.0778
nl | .3395433 .503831 0. 674 0.505 -.6822733 1.36136
n2 | -.644659 .3992509 -1.615 0. 115 -1. 454377 .1650595
xn | .0334012 .0910131 0. 367 0.716 -.1511819 .2179843
rl | .151624 .2467065 0. 615 0.543 -.34872 .6519681
cons | 268.6781 283.0016 0. 949 0 . 349 -305.2757 842.6319
id | F (9,36) = 0. 882 0 . 550 (10 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u id) = 0 Number of obs = 53
sd(e_id_t) = .7532603 n = 10
sd(e id t + u id) = .7532603 T-bar = 4.43896
corr(u id, X) = 0  (assumed) R- sq within = 0.1541
between = 0.4599
overall = 0.2441
----------------------  theta -----------
min 5% median 95% max chi2( 7) 14.53
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0424
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. z P> | z 1 95% Conf. Interval
insh | -.2360139 .6112084 -0.386 0. 699 -1.43396 .9619325
patgr | .0538042 .0224907 2.392 0. 017 .0097233 .0978851
fis 1-370.4608 257.803 -1.437 0.151 -875.7455 134.8238
nl | .254466 .3614991 0 . 704 0. 481 -.4540593 .9629913
n2 | -.6170476 .3216553 -1.918 0. 055 -1.247481 .0133852
xn | .0466475 .0825412 0.565 0.572 -.1151302 .2084252
rl | .0466931 .2236417 0.209 0. 835 -.3916367 . 4850228
cons | 370.1538 257.658 1. 437 0.151 -134.8466 875.1543
249
Hausman specification test
dividend
  Coefficients ----
Fixed Random
Effects Effects Difference
insh
patgr
fis
nl
n2
xn
rl
.6167767 
.0317195 
-270.0248
.3395433 
-.644659 
.0334012 
.151624
-.2360139 
.0538042 
-370.4608 
.254466 
-.6170476 
.0466475 
.0466931
.8527907 
-.0220847 
100.4361 
.0850773 
-.0276113 
-.0132464 
.104931
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2 ( 7) = ( b - B )  ’ [ S A ( - 1 ) ]  ( b - B ) ,  s = (S_fe - S_re)
5. 97
Prob>chi2 0.5427
7. Light Industry Group in the Sample: 
(18 vars, 73 obs)
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) = .3254332
sd(e_id_t) = .5651985
sd(e_id_t + u_id) = .6521934
corr(u id, Xb) = -0.0765
Number of obs = 73
n = 11
T-bar = 6.63 636 
R-sq within = 0.2632
between = 0.0419
overall = 0.2124
F ( 7, 55) - 2.81
Prob > F = 0.0143
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. t P> 11 95% Conf. Interval
insh 1-1.214204 .7899959 -1.537 0. 130 -2.797391 .3689831
patgr | .0328785 .0221093 1.487 0.143 -.0114296 .0771865
fis 110.17959 33.57596 0.303 0.763 -57.10813 77.46731
nl I .2555758 .252344 1.013 0 . 316 -.2501328 .7612845
n2 I .8169529 .2644822 3. 089 0 . 003 .2869188 1.346987
xn I -.2526515 .1062363 -2.378 0.021 -.4655538 -.0397493
rl | .0878132 .1939012 0. 453 0. 652 -.3007735 .4763999
cons 1-9.413458 33.51674 -0.281 0.780 -76.5825 57.75558
id I F (10,55) = 1.2 67 0 272 (11 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u_id) = 0
sd(e_id_t) = .5651985
sd(e_id_t + u_id) = .5651985
corr(u id, X) = 0  (assumed)
min 5%
0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 0
-- theta - 
median 
0 . 0 0 0 0
95%
0 . 0 0 0 0
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall
chi2(7) =
73
11
6.21246 
0.2124 
0.7047 
0.3235
31. 08max
0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
dividend ICoef. Std. Err. z P> z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
insh | -.5365194 .4765948 -1.126 0.260 -1.470628 .3975893
patgr I .0553747 .0209075 2 . 649 0.008 .0143968 . 0963526
fis ]-32.33844 28.52404 -1.134 0 . 257 -88.24452 23.56765
nl ] .1036163 .2462529 0.421 0. 674 -.3790305 . 5862631
n2 I .5336411 .2411629 2 . 213 0. 027 .0609705 1.006312
xn | -.2756131 .0998215 -2.761 0.006 -.4712596 -.0799666
rl I .1669692 .1758168 0. 950 0. 342 -.1776255 . 5115639
cons I 32.39493 28.53988 1.135 0.256 -23.54221 88.33206
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Hausman specification test
dividend
—  Coefficients ----
Fixed Random
Effects Effects Difference
insh 
patgr 
f is 
nl 
n2 
xn 
rl
-1.214204 
.0328785 
10.17959 
.2555758 
.8169529 
-.2526515 
.0878132
-.5365194
.0553747
-32.33844
.1036163
.5336411
-.2756131
.1669692
-.6776846 
-.0224962 
42.51803 
.1519596 
.2833118 
.0229616 
-.079156
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
c h i 2 ( 7) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1)] (b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re)
10.71
Prob>chi2 = 0.1520
8. Heavy Industry group in the Sample:
(within)Fixed-effects 
sd(u_id) 
sd (e__id___t) 
sd(e__id_t + u_id) 
corr(u id, Xb)
regression 
.6302754 
.7900713 
1.010673 
-0.2255
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall
79
13
6.07692 
0.2865 
0.0627 
0.1851
F ( 7, 59) = 3.38
Prob > F = 0.0042
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
--------------+
insh | .513058 .4962788 1. 034 0.305 -.4799936 1.50611
f is |-9.033839 7.896505 -1.144 0.257 -24.83471 6.76703
patgr | .058816 .0141603 4 . 154 0.000 . 0304813 . 0871506
nl | -.499978 .3739409 -1.337 0.186 -1.248232 .2482759
n2 | -.0124302 .2870909 -0.043 0. 966 -.5868977 .5620374
xn | .1086334 .1195691 0. 909 0 .367 -.1306238 . 3478906
rl I .1723965 .2405098 0.717 0. 476 -.3088625 .6536556
cons | 7.475628 7.803139 0. 958 0.342 -8.138417 23.08967
id | F (12,59) = 2.253 0. 020 (13 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u id) = .4034724 Number of obs 79
sd(e id t) = .7900713 n 13
sd(e id t + u id) = .8871317 T-bar = 4.91892
corr(u id, X) = 0 (assumed) R-sq within = 0.2814
between = 0.0860
overall - 0.2049
----------  theta --------
min 5% median 95% max chi2 (7) 25.05
0.1893 0 .1893 0 .3756 0. 4534 0 4534 Prob > chi2 = 0.0007
dividend j Coef. Std. Err. z P>l zi 95% Conf. Interval
insh | .3243138 .2803185 1. 157 0.247 -.2251003 .873728
f is | -5.821824 7.53062 -0.773 0.439 -20.58157 8.93792
patgr | .0576977 .0137224 4 .205 0. 000 .0308023 .084593
nl I -.4941851 .3543849 -1.394 0.163 -1.188767 .2003965
n2 | .0047254 .2784916 0 . 017 0. 986 -.5411081 .5505589
xn | .0972128 .1093923 0.889 0.374 -.1171922 .3116177
rl 1 .2773814 .2347768 1.181 0.237 -.1827727 .7375355
cons | 4.34876 7.519148 0 . 578 0.563 -10.3885 19.08602
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
1
dividend |
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
insh I .513058 .3243138 . 1887441
f is | -9.033839 -5.821824 -3.212015
patgr | .058816 .0576977 .0011183
nl | -.499978 -.4941851 -.0057929
n2 -.0124302 .0047254 -.0171555
xn | .1086334 .0972128 .0114206
rl 1 .1723965 .2773814 -.1049849
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systemat
c hi 2( 7) 
Prob>chi2
= (b-B)'[SA (-1)](b-B), S = ( 
19.90 
0.0058
S re)
252
Section -2
1. BSE Sensex Companies
a. Regression with variable RD
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_namel) = .0027 985
sd(e_namel_t) = .00567 93
sd(e_namel_t + u__namel) = .0063314
corr(u namel, Xb) = 0.1121
Number of obs = 114
n = 2
T-bar = 57
R-sq within = 0.2030
between = 1.0000
overall = 0.2122
F ( 8, 104) = 3.31
Prob > F = 0.0021
dividend I Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf . Interval]
insh | 0005924 . 0007044 0.841 0. 402 -.0008045 .0019894
patgr |- 0018233 .0004353 -4.188 0. 000 -.0026865 -.0009601
fis | - 0021207 .0009457 -2.242 0. 027 -.0039962 -.0002452
nl | 0003388 .0013207 0.257 0.798 -.0022801 .0029578
n2 | - 0003328 .0013457 -0.247 0.805 -.0030015 . 0023358
xn | 0004263 .0003574 1.193 0 . 236 -.0002824 .0011351
rd |- 001864 .0027038 -0.689 0 . 492 -.0072257 . 0034977
xrd | 0002943 .0020694 0.142 0.887 -.0038093 . 0043979
cons j1 01857 .0035059 290.530 0 . 0 0 0 1.011618 1.025523
namel | F(l, 104) = 8. 902 0. 004 (2 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression 
sd(u namel) = Number of obs =
sd{e namel t) = .0056793 n
sd{e namel t  + u namel ) .0056793 T-bar
co rr (u namel, X) = 0 (assumed) R- sq within
between
4- V>i .»>. 4— —.
overall
min
L i l 6  U  a .
5% median 95% max chi2( 8)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0  0 . 0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob > chi2
dividend ICoef. Std.
4-
E r r . z P> |z 1 [95% Conf.
insh I .0006286 .0007304 0. 861 0.389 -.0008029
patgr I -.0018264 . 0004514 -4 . 046 0 . 000 -.0027111
fis I-.0027414 .0009567 -2.866 0 . 004 -.0046164
nl I .0004705 .0013687 0.344 0.731 -.0022121
n2 |-.0005022 .0013942 -0.360 0 .719 -.0032348
xn I .0004178 .0003706 1.127 0. 260 -.0003085
rd I-.0023875 .0027978 -0.853 0.393 -.0078711
xrd I .0005846 .0021434 0.273 0.785 -.0036165
cons I 1.020611 .0035656 286.239 0 . 0 0 0 1.013622
114
2
39.0351 
0 . 2 0 0 1  
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.2153
28 . 81 
0.0003
Interval]
.0020601 
-.0009417 
-.0008663 
.0031531 
.0022304 
.0011442 
.003096 
.0047856 
1. 027599
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
1
dividend
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
insh | .0005924 .0006286 -.0000362
patgr I -.0018233 -.0018264 3.07e-06
fis | -.0021207 -.0027414 .0006207
nl | .0003388 . 0004705 -.0001317
n2 | -.0003328 -.0005022 .0001694
xn I .0004263 .0004178 8.52e-06
rd | -.001864 -.0023875 . 0005236
xrd | .0002943 .0005846 -.0002903
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
ch i2( 8) = (b-B)'[SA (-1)](b-B), S = (S fe - S :
0. 00
Prob>chi2 1.0000
b. R e g r e s s i o n  w ith  variable DR
Fixed-effects (within) regression
sd(u namel) = .0030882 Number of obs =
sd(e namel t) = .0057226 n =
sd(e namel t + u namel) = .0065027 T-bar =
corr(u namel, Xb) 0.0305 R-sq within =
F ( 8
between 
overall 
1 0 1 ) 
Prob > F
111
2
55.5 
0 .2024 
1 . 0 0 0 0  
0.1921 
3.20 
0.0028
dividend I Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
insh I .0008944 .0007198 1.243 0 . 217 -.0005335 .0023222
patgr | -.0017241 .0004433 -3.890 0.000 -.0026034 -.0008448
fis I-.0019922 .0009587 -2.078 0 . 040 -.003894 -.0000904
nl | .0001447 .0013679 0 .106 0 . 916 -.0025688 .0028582
n2 I 0004663 .0013805 -0.338 0.736 -.0032049 .0022722
xn I .0004195 .0003613 1.161 0 .248 -.0002972 .0011361
dr | .0012282 .0017653 0 . 696 0 . 488 -.0022736 . 00473
xdr I .0002813 .000351 0. 801 0.425 -.000415 .0009776
cons I 1.015728 .0038857 261.401 0. 000 1.00802 1. 023436
namel 1 F (1, 101) = 9.978 0 . 002 (2 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u namel) 0 Number of obs 111
sd(e namel t) .0057226 n 2
sd(e namel t + u namel) .0057226 T-bar = 38.7387
corr(u namel, X) 0 (assumed) R-sq within = 0.1940
between = 1 . 0 0 0 0
overall = 0.2014
theta ----
min 5% median 95% max chi2 ( 8) 25.72
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 O.OOOC Prob > chi2 = 0.0012
dividend |Coef. Std. E r r . z P> |z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
insh I .0008813 .0007508 1.174 0. 240 -.0005903 .0023528
patgr I -.0017755 .000462 -3.843 0. 000 -.0026811 -.0008699
fis I -.0026853 .000973 -2.758 0. 006 -.0045933 -.0007773
nl | .0004578 .001423 0.322 0. 748 -.0023313 .0032469
n2 I-.0005909 .001439 -0.411 0. 681 -.0034121 .0022303
xn | .0004239 .0003768 1.125 0. 261 -.0003147 . 0011625
dr I .0012205 .0018413 0.663 0. 507 -.0023884 . 0048294
xdr | .0000201 .0003558 0.056 0. 955 -.0006774 . 0007175
cons I 1.01841 .0039552 257.487 0 .000 1.010658 1. 026162
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
1
dividend |
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
insh | .0008944 .0008813 .0000131
patgr | -.0017241 -.0017755 .0000514
fis | -.0019922 -.0026853 . 0006931
nl | ,0001447 .0004578 - . 0003131
n2 ! -.0004663 -.0005909 . 0001245
xn | .0004195 .0004239 -4 .39e-06
dr | .0012282 .0012205 7.78e-06
xdr ! .0002813 .0000201 .0002612
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
c hi 2( 8) = (b-B) ' [SA (~1)] (b-B), S = (S fe - S re)
37
23
1.6087 
0.4720 
0.0005 
0.0107 
0.89 
0 . 5569
Prob>chi2 =
0 . 0 0
1 . 0 0 0 0
2. Sample LCCs
a. Regression with Variable RD
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
sd(u_id) = .3465291
s d (e_id_t) = .141793
sd(e_id_t + u_id) = .3744165
corr(u id, Xb) = -0.2917
Number of obs 
n
T-bar 
R-sq within 
between 
overall 
F( 7, 7)
Prob > F
dividend |Coef. 
 + -----------
Std. Err. P> 111 95% Conf. Interval]
insh i .2264016 .2539821 0.891 0. 402 -.3741707 . 8269739
patgr I .0065384 .0099189 0. 659 0. 531 -.0169161 .0299929
fis 1-1.444955 12.13134 -0.119 0.909- 30.13102 27.24111
nl I .2099988 .131087 1. 602 0.153 -.0999727 .5199703
n2 j .1821182 .1621549 1.123 0 .298 -.2013171 .5655536
xn | .0033561 .0208372 0.161 0.877 -.0459162 .0526283
rd | -.023596 .1036318 -0.228 0.826 -.2686462 .2214543
cons I .601744 11.94956 0.050 0.961- 27.65448 28.85797
id 1 F(22,7) = 5 541 0 013 (23 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression 
sd(u_id) = .3116116
sd(e_id_t) = .141793
sd(e_id_t + u__id) = .3423551
corr(u id, X) = 0  (assumed)
m m  
0.5858
5%
0.5858
-- theta - 
median 
0.5858
Number of obs = 
n =
37
23
T-bar = 1.27189
R-sq within = 
between = 
overall =
95%
0.7459
max
0.7782
chi2( 7) =
Prob > chi2 =
0.3795 
0.0677 
0.1129
6.89 
0.4404
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. Interval]
insh I .0179145 .1375878 0.130 0.896 -.2517525 .2875816
patgr I .0007446 .0088181 0.084 0. 933 -.0165385 .0180277
fis I 6.722001 7.613303 0 . 883 0. 377 -8.199799 21.6438
nl | .2009551 .1167197 1.722 0.085 -.0278114 .4297215
n2 I .1740876 .1186503 1.467 0.142 -.0584627 .406638
xn I .0028908 .0194932 0.148 0.882 -.0353152 .0410969
rd I .0248793 .0762246 0.326 0.744 -.1245181 .1742767
cons I -7.383189 7.560729 -0.977 0.329 -22.20194 7.435567
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Hausman specification test
Coefficients ----
1 Fixed Random
dividend | Effects Effects Difference
insh | . 2264016 .0179145 .2084871
patgr | .0065384 .0007446 .0057938
fis | -1.444955 6.722001 -8.166956
nl | .2099988 .2009551 .0090438
n2 | .1821182 . 1740876 .0080306
xn | .0033561 . 0028908 .0004652
rd I -.023596 .0248793 -.0484753
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
c hi 2( 7) = (b-B) ' [SA (-1)] (b-B) , S = (S_fe - S_re)
3.72
Prob>chi2 0.8118
b. Regr ess ion  w ith  variable DR
Fixed-effects (within) regression
sd(u id) = .3465291 Number of obs = 37
sd(e id t) .141793 n = 23
sd(e id t + u id) = .3744165 T-bar = 1.6087
corr(u id, Xb) -0.2917 R-sq within = 0.4720
between 
overall 
7, 7)
Prob > F
0.0005 
0.0107 
0.89 
0.5569
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
insh | .2264016 .2539821 0.891 0.402 -.3741707 .8269739
patgr | .0065384 .0099189 0 . 659 0. 531 -.0169161 .0299929
fis |-1.444955 12.13134 -0.119 0 . 909 -30.13102 27.24111
nl | .2099988 .131087 1. 602 0.153 -.0999727 .5199703
n2 | .1821182 .1621549 1.123 0 .298 -.2013171 .5655536
xn | .0033561 .0208372 0.161 0 . 877 -.0459162 .0526283
dr | .023596 .1036318 0.228 0.826 -.2214542 .2686462
cons | .578148611.89235 0. 049 0. 963 -27.54279 28.69908
id | F (22,7) = 5.541 0.013 (23 categories)
Random-effects GLS regression
sd(u id) = .3116116 Number of obs 37
sd(e id t) = .141793 n 23
sd(e id t + u id) .3423551 T-bar = 1.27189
corr(u id, X) 0 (assumed) R- sq within = 0.3795
between - 0.0677
overall = 0.1129
----------  theta -----
min 5% median 95% max chi2( 7) 6.89
0.5858 0 .5858 0.5858 0.7459 0.7782 Prob > chi2 = 0.4404
dividend | Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. Interval]
insh | .0179145 .1375878 0.130 0.896 -.2517525 .2875816
patgr | .0007446 .0088181 0.084 0 . 933 -.0165385 . 0180277
fis | 6.722001 7.613303 0.883 0 . 377 -8.199798 21.6438
nl | .2009551 .1167197 1.722 0.085 -.0278114 . 4297215
n2 | .1740876 .1186503 1.4 67 0.142 -.0584627 .406638
xn | .0028908 .0194932 0.148 0 . 882 -.0353152 . 0410969
dr [ -.0248793 .0762246 -0.326 0.744 -.1742767 .1245181
cons [-7.35831 7.540113 -0.976 0.329 -22.13666 7.42004
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Hausman specification test
  Coefficients ----
1
dividend
Fixed
Effects
Random
Effects Difference
insh .2264016 .0179145 .2084871
patgr | .0065384 .0007446 .0057938
fis 1 -1.444955 6.722001 -8.166956
nl | .2099988 .2009551 .0090438
n2 | .1821182 .1740876 .0080306
xn [ .0033561 .0028908 .0004652
dr ( .023596 -.0248793 . 0484753
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systemat
ch i2( 7) 
Prob>chi2
= (b-B) ' [SA (-1) ] (b-B) , S = (, 
3.72 
0.8118
S__re)
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Chapter 8 
Concluding Comments
This thesis proposed to look into the causes o f the low average market 
capitalisation or the existence o f  large number o f LCCs on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange compared to other stock exchanges in the world including emerging as well 
as the developed stock markets.
This phenomenon was analysed by an "entry and exit" model o f firms to the 
“low-cap” category. The entry factors being enhanced by the liberalised legal 
requirements and a decrease in the bureaucratic hurdles. However, this thesis does not 
deal with the causes o f facile entry o f firms on the exchange. At the same time the exit 
factors have been market driven unlike in the past when there were many legal 
restrictions.
The performance o f a firm on the stock exchange was analysed from the point 
o f view its financial policies. Formulating financial policies (real investment decisions 
i.e. taking on all projects with positive net present value and financial restructuring 
decisions like the choice o f debt/equity ratios and dividend decisions, information 
dissemination decisions i.e. that the information it controls flows from its production 
and investment decisions, trade related decisions i.e. trading its equity and debt to 
maximise share price) usually involve taking into account interests o f all the 
stakeholders and here conflicts between different stakeholders come to the fore.
The principal-agent framework helped outline some o f the inherent conflicts in 
the firm structure. Thus the ownership structure o f LCCs was analysed from the point 
o f view o f agency theory. The ownership o f LCCs is biased towards the family
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insiders. In the presence o f different forms o f conflicts policies o f the firm are 
determined, which have an affect on the firm's outstanding equity.
The financial policy on debt brings in conflicts o f interest between the debt 
holders and the shareholders. Whereas the agency costs o f equity brings to the fore, 
the conflicts o f outside shareholders and inside shareholders. There is not yet a 
complete theory or strong empirical evidence showing how agency costs determine an 
optimal debt-equity ratio. In a developing country context o f India, the agency 
conflicts between different claimants took a different form compared to that suggested 
in the traditional agency literature, but it still provided with the broad framework o f 
specific areas o f conflict, which helped deal with the outliers as well. Agency theory 
on its own had its limitations in trying to fully understand the nature o f  financial 
policies o f LCCs in India. In explaining the causes o f the existence o f  large number o f 
LCCs in BSE, this thesis has identified specific features o f a firm ’s policy, which 
reflects risk avoidance on the part o f owner-managers. This could be well applicable to 
other emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets face a financial system which is 
either repressed or is in transition, where internal incentive mechanisms and 
governance systems are weak, external regulatory bodies exist because market 
mechanisms do not deliver.
8.1 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM EACH CHAPTER:
The chapter 1 provided a broad outline o f the research problem and the 
analytical framework o f the thesis along with a description o f the BSE.
The chapter 2 provides an analysis o f the differing nature o f  agency conflicts in 
a developing country compared to that o f a developed country. This chapter presents a 
systematic framework in trying to explain the nature o f financial system and the firm 
structure in a developing country. It describes the characteristics o f specific conflicts
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of interest between different stakeholders o f a firm when formulating its financial 
policies and performance. This chapter concludes that the pecking order amongst the 
stakeholders influences the firm's policies. The dominance o f  a stakeholder and his or 
her bargaining power affects a firm's financial policy and consequently its 
performance on the stock market.
The chapter 3 provides a description o f the financial structure within which the 
Indian firms operate. It broadly outlines the different sources o f finance for Indian 
companies and their ownership pattern. It also provides a framework o f the features o f 
the financial reforms initiated in the early nineties, which have had a considerable 
impact on the financial structure. The previous chapter analysed these stylised facts 
mentioned in this chapter.
The chapter 4 provides with the models o f takeovers and monitoring by FIs. 
Presence o f LCCs does not automatically mean that efficient companies will takeover 
the inefficient companies. This may fail to occur because o f the presence o f 
asymmetric information. In addition to factors mentioned in the literature on the 
determination o f potential targets o f takeover, this chapter also mentions the ability o f 
the raider to restructure the target to suit to its needs. Information asymmetry involved 
in determining the asset redeployability o f the target firm in the combined entity 
restricts an active market for takeovers from occurring. M onitoring o f  a company by 
block debt holders may not depend on the firm level o f debt itself as mentioned in the 
literature, but it depends on the proportion o f this level in the overall debt provided by 
the debt holder. Thus many o f the LCCs may not face any agency costs o f debt. Lack 
o f monitoring by FIs provides the firms opportunities to engage in risky activities, 
which affect the firm performance.
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The Chapter -  5 describes the dividend policy o f LCCs with the help o f 
stylised facts outlined in the third chapter. The dominance o f the inside shareholders is 
evident in their dividend policy, whereby the returns o f the firm are appropriated by 
the inside shareholders for their personal benefit. The high proportion o f retained 
earnings and its low correlation with future earnings proves the presence o f 
accumulation o f free cash flow. Moreover, the monitoring rationale o f dividends is 
very much irrelevant in LCCs. Due to rights issues, much o f the effectiveness o f the 
dividend payments and subsequent floating o f new issues is very weak. M ost o f the 
LCCs announce dividend payments after the announcement o f rights issue, in this case 
dividends are used as a tool to attract funds without the existing shareholders carefully 
studying the performance o f the firm. Rights issues would be an indicator o f 
announcement o f dividend payments. But the econometric results for this proposition 
were weak
The chapter -6 shows the results o f the interviews based survey. The insights 
obtained from this survey point out that debt and equity are used for purposes which 
have not been stressed in the literature. Most managers agreed that outside equity 
could be put to highly risky activities because there is no monitoring from the outside 
shareholders and there is no commitment towards the outside shareholders. Debt was 
used to a limited extent so that it did not bring in any interference o f  the debt holders.
The chapter - 7 carries out an empirical analysis o f the dividend policy with the 
help o f panel data analysis. Although the results o f the econometric tests are 
significant, it cannot be regarded very conclusive given the limited data with which the 
analysis was earned out. This limited data was in part due to many o f the LCCs not 
maintaining a good record o f their accounts and their managers refusing interviews,
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which could also imply that the management did not want to divulge any 
information related to the firm other than which was publicly available.
8.2 CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS:
This thesis in general, concludes that lack o f effective monitoring and the exit 
mechanisms o f the market leads to a large number o f LCCs in the BSE. Lack o f 
effective monitoring manifests itself in the dividend policy o f these firms. The 
function o f monitoring by the dividend policy itself is very weak for LCCs. Lack o f 
effective monitoring from outside shareholders is due to the free rider problem. Debt 
holders determine the extent o f their monitoring on the basis o f the relative position o f 
a firm in their overall portfolio. The importance o f a firm to the block debt holder may 
increase with increase in the firm's market value and accordingly its position in the 
overall portfolio o f the block debt holder. Since LCCs have a very low relative 
position in the portfolio o f  the block debt holder, there is no effective monitoring. The 
market driven exit mechanisms o f takeovers and mergers fail to occur because o f 
asymmetric information problems, this phenomenon is analogous to the market for 
lemons syndrome.
The structure o f the firm in developing country has never been analysed from 
the point o f view o f agency theory. As mentioned earlier nature o f  agency conflicts in 
a developing country are very different from that o f a developed country. Thus thesis 
provides with different definitions o f both agency costs o f debt and equity, which are 
more appropriate with the situation related to debt financing and equity financing in 
India.
Data collected from interviews and the subsequent empirical work done in this 
thesis has never been the focus o f any serious study in India. The data collected is 
scant compared to the proportion o f the low capitalised companies after many attempts
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at collecting more data. This suggests that the rules o f  compulsory disclosure 
and audit have not been very effective. Moreover, there are also concerns regarding 
the audit, whether auditors 'work with' owner-management rather than 'working for' 
the outside shareholder body. As the empirical analysis is based on very few 
companies the results obtained cannot be generalised. Further research would involve 
empirical work with a more extensive database.
8.3 AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
Although agency theory provided a broad framework to analyse the interface 
between capital markets and the firm, it does not encompass certain specific features 
o f the financial system in a developing country and behavioural characteristics o f 
owner-managers o f  FOBs. Agency theory was particularly inadequate to deal with the 
nature o f the dividend policy o f FOBs and in the analysis o f the free cash flow. The 
inadequacy suggests that agency theory does not incorporate contingency-based risk- 
taking attitude o f agents. In the case o f LCCs this contingency-based risk taking by 
owner-managers is in accordance with avoiding risk attached to stochastic future 
corporate returns. It has already been suggested by some organisation theorists that a 
comprehensive view o f managerial risk choices should integrate risk, performance 
attributes o f the choice situation, and internal governance structure. This is easier said 
than done, as this implies heavy information and cost requirements. Further theoretical 
wok in this direction would be to incorporate principles o f portfolio theory into the 
agency framework.
The policy implications, which can be drawn from these hypotheses, are very 
limited. These hypotheses highlight the inadequacy o f the market forces in disciplining 
LCCs. This is the reason why the regulatory body o f the BSE is forced to intervene 
from time to time. But this intervention has not helped in bringing about any change in
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the policies o f the firm. Thus neither the body o f legal duties owed by directors or 
the senior executives nor the government's regulatory regimes has been effective in 
motivating owner-management in the case o f LCCs to maximise outside shareholder 
returns.
Although monitoring by institutional stakeholders fits w ithin a broad tapestry 
o f  devices, which operate to reduce the divergence between the interests o f owner- 
managers and outside shareholders, this has remained inadequate to bring about any 
significant change. This is partially due to the fact that after discontinuation of 
refinance from the state many FI's have had to depend themselves on stock markets for 
additional finance. FIs' performance is based on their monitoring companies who have 
borrowed from them and they have in turn concentrated on few big companies where 
they invest a large proportion o f their capital. The market forces, which serve to align 
the interests o f managers and shareholders i.e. takeovers, product market and market 
for managerial talent, have also been quite ineffective.
SEBI has concentrated on the exit o f LCCs from the exchange i.e. delisting and 
creation o f “Z category” scrips. It needs to equally consider on entry factors. Foremost 
in this line o f thought is to introduce stringent rules o f entry for firms on the BSE. 
These rules need to involve careful scrutiny o f the performance o f  a firm for the past 5 
years before it is allowed to make its IPO. In a situation where intervention by both the 
market forces and the regulatory authority has not helped to achieve the desired 
results, the number o f LCCs may not decline in the short run.
As listed companies on the exchange, activities o f LCCs and their market 
performance can be effectively monitored with the formation o f an index for LCCs. 
Given that the number o f  LCCs is so large in the BSE, they could be segregated on the 
basis o f industry groups. Segregation on the basis o f industry groups can easily detect
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firms which would be outliers to any trend. Simultaneous implementation o f 
disciplinary measures involving entry, monitoring o f the listed firms and exit will be 
more effective than the lackadaisical attempt at delisting companies from the 
exchange.
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